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I. INTRODUCTION
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided twenty-four insurance
related cases between June 2004 and April 2005.' Those cases originated in
1. The Fifth Circuit delivered the following twenty-four insurance related decisions: Ingalls
Shipbuilding v. Federal Insurance Co., 410 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. May 2005); Travlers Indemnity Co. of Illinois
v. Western American Specialized Transportation Services, Inc., 409 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. May 2005); Blakely
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 406 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. Apr. 2005); Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Mid-Continent Insurance Co., 405 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. Mar. 2005); Travelers Casualty &
Surety Co. of America v. Wright Insurance Agency Inc., 404 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. Mar. 2005); Johnson v.
Seacor Marine Corp., 404 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. Mar. 2005); Melder v. Allstate Corp., 404 F.3d 328 (5th Cir.
Mar. 2005); Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 404 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. Mar. 2005);
Monumental Life Insurance Co. v. Hayes-Jenkins, 403 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. Mar. 2005); Lincoln General
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nine federal district courts. Unlike its 2002-2004 rulings, the court of appeals
did not decide any exceptionally novel or complex substantive or procedural
questions. In fact, the Fifth Circuit certified three intricate questions to the
Texas Supreme Court2 rather than engaging in the game of Erie-guessing, a
highly questionable and often unnecessary exercise that this Author criticized
in the 2003-2004 Survey.3
Even more surprising, a substantial number of this year's decisions
concerned first-party claims4 -whether insurers had a duty to defend or
indemnify insureds after third-party victims sued insureds in underlying
lawsuits for a variety of common-law and statutory violations.5 And because
the overwhelming majority of the duty-to-defend and duty-to-indemnify
actions originated in Texas, the Fifth Circuit simply applied Texas's "eight
comers doctrine"6 and decided those familiar controversies efficiently and
intelligibly. But only one case presented an interesting procedural question:
whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)7 prevents
Insurance Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. Feb. 2005); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Disability Services of
the Southwest Inc., 400 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. Feb. 2005); Ridglea Estate Condominium Ass'n v. Lexington
Insurance Co., 398 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. Jan. 2005); Lamar Advertising Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 396
F.3d 654 (5th Ci. Jan. 2005); Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 392 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. Dec. 2004); Royal
Insurance Co. of America v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co., 391 F.3d 639 (5th Cir. Nov. 2004);
Rainwater v. Lamar Life Insurance Co., 391 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. Nov. 2004); Robinson v. Guarantee Trust
Life Insurance Co., 389 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. Oct. 2004); Bott v. J.F. Shea Co., 388 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. Oct.
2004); Hornbuckle v. State Farm Lloyds, 385 F.3d 538 (5th Cir. Sept. 2004); Primrose Operating Co. v.
National American Insurance Co., 382 F.3d 546 (5th Ci. Aug. 2004); Fairfield Insurance Co. v. Stephens
Martin Paving, L.P., 381 F.3d 435 (5th Cir. Aug. 2004); American Home Assurance Co. v. United Space
Alliance, LL.C., 378 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. July 2004); Mayeaux v. Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Co.,
376 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. July 2004); TIG Specialty Insurance Co. v. Pinkmonkey.com Inc., 375 F.3d 365 (5th
Cir. July 2004).
2. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Continent Ins. Co., 405 F.3d 296, 310 (5th Cir. Mar. 2005)
(certifying three intricate contribution and breach-of-covenant-of-good-faith-and-fair-dealing questions
involving primary and excess insurers to the Texas Supreme Court); Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 392 F.3d
802, 811-12 (5th Cir. Dec. 2004) (certifying to the Texas Supreme Court the question: "[Whether an]
ensuing loss provision contained in Section I-Exclusions, part I(f) of the Homeowners Form B (HO-B)
insurance policy as prescribed by the Texas Department of Insurance effective July 8, 1992 (Revised
January 1, 1996) when read in conjunction with the remainder of the policy provide[s] coverage for mold
contamination caused by water damage that is otherwise covered under the policy"); Fairfield Ins. Co. v.
Stephens Martin Paving, L.P., 381 F.3d 435, 437 (5th Cir. Aug. 2004) (certifying a question to the Texas
Supreme Court to determine whether Texas's policy prohibits "a liability insurance provider from
indemnifying an award for punitive damages").
3. See Willy E. Rice, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 2003-2004 Insurance Decisions:
A Survey and An EmpiricalAnalysis, 37 TEx. TECH L. REv. 871, 921, 963, 1029 (2005) and accompanying
notes.
4. See Table A, infra note 689.
5. See discussion infra Part IlI.
6. See infra notes 511-14 and accompanying text.
7. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
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HMO patients from litigating a common-law, mixed-claims action in a
Louisiana court.8
In the majority of first-party lawsuits, litigants asked the Fifth Circuit to
resolve the following substantive questions: (1) whether an insurance
contract's "cost of repair and replacement" provision and Mississippi's law
compel an insurer to compensate insureds for the "diminished value" of their
automobiles;9 (2) whether Mississippi's novation doctrine and other contract
principles permit aggrieved insurance agents to commence breach-of-contract
actions against a reinsurer who assumed a primary insurer's medicare
supplemental contract under an "assumption reinsurance agreement";' l
(3) whether Texas's law and the terms of a mortgage-life insurance contract
require an insurer to compensate a surviving spouse following the death of the
named insured; 1 (4) whether Texas's law requires an insurer to compensate
a company for business-interruption losses after a flood forced the company
to close its stores;' 2 (5) whether Texas's law requires a property insurer to
compensate a condominium association for losses after hail damaged property
owners' roofs; 13 and (6) whether Texas's law requires a homeowners' insurer
to compensate homeowners after flood- and nonflood-related mold
contaminated the homeowners' property. 4
To repeat, the Fifth Circuit's twenty-four opinions covered a narrow
range of procedural and substantive questions. In fact, the Fifth Circuit issued
four extremely short per curiam decisions. 5 And in two other cases, the Fifth
Circuit presented brief analyses and dispositions of statutes-of-limitation and
exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies questions under Louisiana's law.'
6
None of those six truncated analyses are discussed in this Article. In addition,
although the remaining eighteen cases present a diverse body of law and legal
8. See discussion infra Part J.B.
9. See discussion infra Part I.A.
10. See discussion infra Part H.C.
11. See discussion infra Part fl.D.
12. See discussion infra Part I.E.
13. See discussion infra Part I.F.
14. See discussion infra Part I.G.
15. See liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Continent Ins. Co., 405 F.3d 296, 297 (5th Cir. Mar. 2005)
(certifying "unresolved questions to the Supreme Court of Texas"); Rainwater v. Lamar life Ins. Co., 391
F.3d 636, 638 (5th Cir. Nov. 2004) (dismissing an interlocutory appeal and remanding the case "to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion"); Hornbuckle v. State Farm Lloyds, 385
F.3d 538, 544-46 (5th Cir. Sept. 2004) (determining whether the district court abused its discretion by
allowing a fraudulent removal of the diversity action to federal court); Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin
Paving, LP., 381 F.3d 435, 437 (5th Cir. Aug. 2004) (certifying a question to the Texas Supreme Court to
determine whether Texas's policy prohibits "a liability insurance provider from indemnifying an award for
punitive damages").
16. See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Wright Ins. Agency Inc., 404 F.3d 927, 929-30 (5th
Cir. Mar. 2005) (concluding that "'Travelers had one year from that date to file suit. Because the complaint
was not filed until April 2003, the district court properly dismissed Travelers' complaint for being outside
of that statutory window"); Melder v. Allstate Corp., 404 F.3d 328, 332 (5th Cir. Mar. 2005) (finding that
plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies under Louisiana's law).
[Vol. 38:821
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issues, Parts II and ImI of this Article discuss only some of those cases. More
specifically, this Article presents analyses of only the more novel and highly
questionable Fifth Circuit insurance decisions of the 2004-2005 survey period.
Finally, to help the reader to gain a greater understanding of the factors
that influenced the Fifth Circuit's rulings, the Author performed a limited
content analysis of each decision. 7 That methodology allowed the Author to
generate interesting percentages and perform a limited empirical analysis of
the findings.18 Part IV, therefore, presents several tables that illustrate the
types of legal questions, legal theories, plaintiffs, defendants, first- and third-
party victims, and insurance contracts associated with the controversies. That
Part also highlights and compares the dispositions of the cases among and
between the various federal district courts and the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
II. FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND CLAIMS: STATE COMMON-
LAW AND STATUTORY DECISIONS
A. Automobile Insurance: Whether an Automobile Insurance Contract's
"Cost of Repair and Replacement" Provision and Mississippi's Law
Compel an Insurer to Compensate Insureds for the "Diminished Value" of
Their Automobiles
The facts in Blakely v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. '9
are quite sparse and simple. Charles Blakely and other insurance consumers
in Mississippi purchased automobile insurance from State Farm.2" The
insurance contract's coverage provision defined a "loss" as "'each direct and
accidental loss of or damage to: 1. your car; [and] 2. its equipment which is
common to the use of your car as a vehicle. ' ' 2' However, the "Limit of
Liability" clause stated that State Farm's "'liability for loss to property or any
part of it [would be] the lower of: 1. the actual cash value; or 2. the cost of
repair or replacement. "22
Furthermore, the same provision expressly stated in pertinent part that
"cost of repair or replacement" would be based upon one of the following:
"1. the cost of repair or replacement agreed upon by you and [State Farm];
2. a competitive bid approved by [State Farm]; or
3. an estimate written based upon the prevailing competitive price. The
prevailing competitive price means prices charged by a majority of the
17. See discussion infra Parts 11-IMl.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. Blakely v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. Apr. 2005).
20. Id. at 749.
21. Id. (quoting appellant's insurance policy).
22. Id. (quoting appellant's insurance policy).
2006]
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repair market in the area where the car is to be repaired as determined
by a survey made by [State Farm]. If you ask, [State Farm] will identify
some facilities that will perform the repairs at the prevailing
competitive price. [State Farm] will include in the estimate parts
sufficient to restore the vehicle to its pre-loss condition. You agree with
[State Farm] that such parts may include either parts furnished by the
vehicle's manufacturer or parts from other sources including non-
original equipment manufacturers."23
During the policy period, Blakely and similarly situated insured
Mississippians submitted auto claims to State Farm.24 The insureds' respective
cars had been partially damaged in various accidents. Acting in good faith,
State Farm immediately made adjustments, paid for all repairs, and reimbursed
the insureds for their physical losses.26 But the insureds also asked State Farm
to compensate insureds for the alleged "diminished value" of the partially
destroyed vehicles.27 From the insureds' point of view, State Farm had a
contractual obligation to compensate policyholders for the difference between
the fair market value of the vehicles just prior to the accidents and the fair
market value of the vehicles after the repairs.28
State Farm summarily refused to pay for the alleged diminished value of
the repaired vehicles. 29 Therefore, the disgruntled insureds sued State Farm
in a Mississippi state court.3" The insureds' complaint listed several claims
and causes of action: breach of contract, negligence for breaching the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conspiracy, bad faith, and fraud. 3 The
complaint asked for both compensatory and punitive damages.32 Shortly
thereafter, the court removed the case to the District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi, where the district judge granted State Farm's motion
for summary relief.3
3
23. Id. (quoting appellant's insurance policy) (alterations in original).









33. Id. at 750 n.2.
The district court treated the motion to dismiss filed by State Farm as a motion for
summary judgment; we do likewise. See Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 532-533 (5th
Cir.1999) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) ("If, [on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss], matters outside
the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.) (emphasis added)"); Baker v.
Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 197 (5th Cir.1996) ("[W]here a district court grants a motion styled as a
motion to dismiss but bases its ruling on facts developed outside the pleadings, we review the
order as an order granting summary judgment").
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Like Louisiana and Texas, Mississippi has embraced five recognized
doctrines to interpret insurance contracts-the traditional rules of contract
construction and interpretation,34 the doctrine of plain meaning,35 the adhesion
doctrine,36 the doctrine of ambiguity, and the reasonable expectations
doctrine. 38 The Supreme Court of Mississippi has stated consistently that the
doctrine of plain meaning requires courts to construe and enforce insurance
contracts as written if the language in the contract is clear or unambiguous.39
More important, under Mississippi's law, the terms in an insurance contract are
binding and cannot be modified to create an ambiguity where none exists.'
Id. (alterations in original).
34. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Concord Gen. Corp., 95-0809 (La. 1/6/96); 665 So. 2d 1166, 1169
(holding that "[an insurance policy is an agreement between the parties and should be interpreted by using
ordinary contract principles"); Sessoms v. Allstate Ins. Co., 634 So. 2d 516, 519 (Miss. 1993) (embracing
the position that "insurance policies which are clear and unambiguous are to be enforced according to their
terms as written [like all other contracts]"); Balandran v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 972 S.w.2d 738, 741 (Tex.
1998) (reiterating that insurance contracts are subject to the same rules of construction as other contracts).
35. See, e.g., La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 93-0911 (La. 1/8/94); 630 So. 2d
759, 763 (holding that the parties' intent must be "determined in accordance with the general, ordinary, plain
and popular meaning of the words used in the policy"); Blackledge v. Omega Ins. Co., 98-CA-00380-SCT
(9 7); 740 So.2d 295, 298 (Miss.1999) (holding that courts must give terms used in insurance policies their
ordinary and popular definition); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of Tex., 337 S.w.2d 284, 288 (Tex.
1960) (reiterating that courts must give words appearing in insurance contracts their plain meaning when
there is no ambiguity).
36. See, e.g., Duncan v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 99-232 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/3/99); 747 So. 2d 656,
674 (observing that "[iut is well settled that.., insurance policies are generally contracts of adhesion"); J
& W Foods Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 96-CA-00136-SCT ( H 1-10); 723 So. 2d 550, 551-52
(Miss.1998) (concluding that insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and as such ambiguities are to be
construed liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer); Arnold v. Nat'l County Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (concluding without deciding definitively that insurance contracts
are adhesion contracts because they "arise[ ] out of the parties' unequal bargaining power" and they "allow
unscrupulous insurers to take advantage of their insureds' misfortunes" during the bargaining process).
37. See, e.g., Succession of Fannaly v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 2001-1335 (La. 1/15/02); 805 So. 2d
1132, 1138 (repeating that "ambiguous contractual provision is construed against the insurer who furnished
the contract's text and in favor of the insured"); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636 So. 2d 658, 662
(Miss. 1994) (embracing "the general rule that [ambiguous] provisions of an insurance contract are to be
construed strongly against the [insurance company]"); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811
S.w.2d 552, 555 (Tex. 1991) (reaffirming that ambiguous language in an insurance contract must be
construed in favor of the insured).
38. See, e.g., La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 630 So. 2d at 764 (holding that a court should construe an
insurance contract "to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the parties in the light of the customs and usages
of the industry"); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Miss., Inc., 427 So. 2d 139, 141 & n.2 (Miss. 1983)
(adopting the principle that "[tihe objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of
the policy provisions would have negated those expectations"); Kulubis v. Tex. Farm Bureau Underwriters
Ins. Co., 706 S.w.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 1986) ("permit[ting] an innocent victim whose property ha[d] been
destroyed to collect under an insurance [contract] for a loss reasonably expected to be covered"). But see
Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.w.2d 132, 145 n.8 (Tex. 1994) (observing that Texas law does not
recognize the doctrine of reasonable expectation as a basis to disregard unambiguous policy provisions).
39. See Blackledge, 740 So. 2d at 298 (embracing the position that "policy [terms] should be
understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense rather than in a philosophical or scientific sense").
40. See Farmland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scruggs, No. 2003-CA-00874-SCT ('I 10-11); 886 So. 2d 714,
717 (Miss. 2004); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 1999-CA-01685-
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In light of those settled principles, the federal district court decided that
the limit-of-liability provision in State Farm's automobile policy was
unambiguous.4 It provided no coverage for the alleged diminished value of
the insureds' repaired vehicles.42 The disgruntled and unsuccessful consumers
timely appealed to the Fifth Circuit.4 3 After reading the insurance contract, the
court of appeals adopted the federal district court's findings." The Fifth
Circuit observed that the insurance contract clearly defined a "loss," explained
the limit of liability, and explicitly outlined the insurer's obligation for
repairing or replacing insureds' vehicles.45 And of course, the appellate court
ultimately found that the contract did not require State Farm to compensate the
insureds for their cars' diminished values.4
B. Health Insurance Plans: Whether ERISA Preempts Insureds'
Commencing a Mixed-Claims State Court Action Against an HMO Under
Louisiana's Law
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Mayeaux v. Louisiana Health Service and
Indemnity Co.47 continues rather than settles the following question in the Fifth
Circuit: whether ERISA prevents HMO participants from litigating tort-based
and breach-of-contract actions against health insurers, HMOs, and health plan
managers in state courts. To be sure, as discussed below, a recent string of
less-than-stellar decisions from the Supreme Court about the scope of ERISA' s
preemption doctrine-as that doctrine relates to insurers-continues to
contribute to this confusion.
But first, consider the fairly uncomplicated facts in Mayeaux. In 1982,
Cheryl Mayeaux began working for Coleman E. Adler & Sons (Adler).48 At
that time, Adler did not insure its employees under a health plan.49 Still, in
1983, Mayeaux visited Dr. Edward Hyman, complaining about a medical
SCT (1 15); 797 So. 2d 981, 985-86 (Miss. 2001).
41. Blakely v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 F.3d 747, 750 (5th Cir. Apr. 2005).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 751 ("Appellants primarily argue that Mississippi law requires that the term 'cost of repair
or replacement' necessarily includes the concept of diminished value[;] [therefore, the district court
erroneously declared that] ... the terms of the policy excluded diminished value recovery.").
44. Id. at 753 ("Thus, based on our plain reading of the distinct, unambiguous policy language...
that expressly defined the limited alternatives of the 'cost of repair or replacement,' and adhering to the
traditional contract principle .... we conclude this policy did not provide for additional recovery [for the]
diminished value [of insureds'] vehicles.") (citing Royer Homes of Miss., Inc. v. Chandeleur Homes, Inc.,
No. 2001-CA-01574-SCT (1 10); 857 So. 2d 748, 752 (Miss. 2003) (adopting the traditional rule of contract




47. Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. July 2004).




problem." Dr. Hyman discovered that Mayeaux had "a connective tissue
illness ... he call[ed] 'systemic coccal disease' ('SCD')."5' To halt or treat
Mayeaux's condition, Dr. Hyman administered "a so-called 'High Dose
Antibiotic Treatment' ('HDAT' )y52
Ten years after Mayeaux began working for Adler and nine years after
her HDAT began, Adler contacted Louisiana Health Services and Indemnity
Company, doing business as Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Louisiana (BCBS),
and purchased a comprehensive group benefit plan from BCBS on behalf of
Adler's employees (Adler Plan). The reported facts indicate that BCBS
immediately refused to pay for Mayeaux's treatment, concluding that the
Adler Plan excluded or did not cover Dr. Hyman's services. 4 With the
assistance of a medical advisory panel,55 the insurer determined that HDAT
was at best "experimental or investigational.""6
It is important to note that the health insurer's decision "was not based on
any determination regarding the medical appropriateness of Dr. Hyman's
procedures. 57 Because BCBS remained unpersuaded, 8 Cheryl Mayeaux and
Dr. Hyman commenced multiple tort- and contract-based causes of action
against the insurer in a Louisiana state court. 9 BCBS removed the case to the
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, asserting that ERISA






55. Id. at 423 n.1. "BCBS's Physician Advisory Council, a ten-physician board... examined Dr.
Hyman's office notes, the claim form [that he submitted], and his description of the prescribed therapy."
Id. BCBS based its decision to deny coverage on that utilization review, hL
56. Id. at 423.
The Adler Plan expressly exclude[d] benefits for "[s]ervices or supplies which are
Investigational in nature" and define[d] "Investigational" as "the use of any treatment, procedure,
facility, equipment, drug device or supply not accepted, as determined by [BCBS], as standard
medical treatment of the condition being tested, or any such items requiring federal or other
governmental agency approval not granted at the time services were rendered."
Id. (quoting insurance plan) (first and third alterations in original).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 423-24.
In April 1995, Mayeaux asked BCBS to reconsider its coverage decision, but BCBS
refused.... At one point .... counsel for BCBS invited Mayeaux to obtain a second medical
opinion in support of the HDAT therapy. Mayeaux submitted an opinion from Dr. Quentin
Deming that concurred with Dr. Hyman's prescribed treatment, but BCBS continued to deny
coverage.
Id.
59. Id. at 424. The plaintiffs sought breach-of-contract damages that allegedly stemmed from
BCBS's failure to pay for Mayeaux's HDAT, as well as damages for bad faith and fraud. Id. Also, "[tihe
district court allowed the [pilaintiffs to amend their complaint to seek a declaratory judgment of Mayeaux' s
right to receive future benefits under the Adler Plan." Id. And "over BCBS's objection, the district court
permitted the [p]laintiffs to... amend their complaint a second time to add state law causes of action for
unfair trade practices, intentional interference with contract, and defamation." Id.
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
deciding the multiple actions.6° Later, BCBS filed three summary judgment
motions to counter the plaintiffs' state and federal causes of action. 6'
Put simply, ERISA preempts "any and all State laws [if the latter] relate
to any employee benefit plan."'62 Although the term "relate to" is intended to
be broad, "' [p]reemption does not occur... if the state law has only a tenuous,
remote, or peripheral connection with covered plans, as is the case with many
laws of general applicability. '63 Furthermore, if the facts underlying a state-
law claim bear some relationship to an employee benefit plan, courts must
evaluate the nexus between ERISA and state law according to ERISA's
statutory objectives.64 Two relevant statutory objectives include (1) putting in
place uniform national safeguards for the "establishment, operation, and
administration of... [employee benefit] plans," and (2) "establishing standards
of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit
plans. 65
Thus, ERISA preempts a state-law action if a district court can satisfy a
two-prong test: (1) The state-law claim must concern an area of exclusive
federal jurisdiction, such as an employee's right to receive benefits under an
ERISA plan; and (2) The employee's claim must directly affect the
relationships among traditional ERISA entities-the employer, the plan and
its fiduciaries, the participants, and the beneficiaries.66 Applying this standard,
the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana ruled that ERISA
governed Mayeaux's denial-of-benefits claim and that there was no genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether BCBS abused its discretion in denying
coverage.67 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BCBS
and dismissed Mayeaux's state-law actions.6" The plaintiffs timely filed an
appeal.69
Before examining whether the Fifth Circuit reached the correct
conclusion in this case, a brief review of two recent Supreme Court's ERISA
decisions is warranted. But first, consider the following: Under the traditional
fee-for-service model, a patient's physician arguably makes good-faith and
reasonable treatment decisions based exclusively on the physician's medical
judgment about the patient's appropriate medical needs. On the other hand, a
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
63. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645,661 (1995) (quoting District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 n. 1 (1992))
(citation omitted).
64. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)-(b) (2000).
66. See Smith v. Tex. Children's Hosp., 84 F.3d 152, 155(5th Cir. 1996); see also Hubbard v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 42 F.3d 942, 945 (5th Cir. 1995).
67. Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420, 423 (5th Cir. July 2004).
68. Id. at 423-24.
69. Id. at 425.
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health insurer makes eligibility decisions "based on the policy's coverage for
a particular condition or medical procedure."7
However, when an HMO allows a physician to make a benefits decision,
the traditional fee-for-service model changes.7' The altered model allows
some treatment decisions to converge with eligibility decisions.72
Consequently, when the convergence occurs, the physician's decision becomes
a "mixed decision."" Put simply, the HMO decision is mixed because one
cannot easily disentangle the eligibility determination from the physician's
judgments about reasonable medical treatment.74
Under ERISA's § 502(a)(2), 75 an HMO participant may sue a plan
fiduciary for breaching "any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties
imposed upon fiduciaries., 76 But a fiduciary's breach of duties can involve
"mixed" violations-those involving treatment and eligibility decisions.77 In
2000, the Supreme Court decided Pegram v. Herdrich.78 Stated briefly,
"Pegram carved out a narrow class of state law claims from ERISA conflict
preemption. 79 In Pegram, the Supreme Court declared that when an HMO,
acting through its physicians, makes "mixed eligibility and treatment"
decisions, those determinations are not fiduciary acts under § 502(a)(2).80
Therefore, ERISA does not prevent participants from commencing "mixed
eligibility and treatment" actions in state courts.81
Fours years after deciding Pegram, the Supreme Court decided Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila.82 In that case, participants in and beneficiaries under
different employee benefit plans filed separate lawsuits in state court and sued
70. Id. at 430.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 431.
74. Id. at 430.
75. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2000). This section outlines the persons who are empowered to bring
a civil action under the civil enforcement provision, which states in relevant part: "A civil action may be
brought... by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section
1109 of this title." Id.
76. Id. § 1109(a). This section outlines the scope of liability for breaching a fiduciary duty:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be
personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.
Id.
77. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 219 (2004).
78. Pegram v. Hedrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
79. Mayeaux, 376 F.3d at 431.
80. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229-37.
81. Id.
82. Davila, 542 U.S. at 200.
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their respective plan administrators under the Texas Health Care Liability Act
(THCLA) The pertinent section of the THCLA reads:
A health insurance carrier, health maintenance organization, or other
managed care entity for a health care plan has the duty to exercise ordinary
care when making health care treatment decisions and is liable for damages
for harm to an insured or enrollee proximately caused by its failure to
exercise such ordinary care.'
In their state-court complaint, the aggrieved parties alleged that plan
administrators ignored the physicians' recommendations and negligently
refused to pay for the patients' treatments.8 5 The insurers removed the cases
to federal district courts, arguing that ERISA § 502(a) completely preempted
the participants' and beneficiaries' respective causes of action. 6 The
respective district courts agreed and declined to remand the cases to state
court.87 The district courts dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints with prejudice
when they refused to amend their complaints and file "explicit ERISA
claims. 8
Davila complainants appealed the district courts' refusals to remand to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, where the latter court
consolidated the respective cases with others that raised similar issues. 9 After
83. Id. at 200-01; see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-.003 (Vernon 2005).
84. TEx. Cw. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a) (emphasis added).
85. Davila, 542 U.S. at 204. The complaint stated:
Respondent Juan Davila is a participant, and respondent Ruby Calad is a beneficiary, in ERISA-
regulated employee benefit plans. Their respective plan sponsors... entered into agreements
with petitioners, Aetna Health Inc. and CIGNA Healthcare of Texas, Inc., to administer the
plans. Under Davila's plan... Aetna reviews requests for coverage and pays providers, such
as doctors, hospitals, and nursing homes, which perform covered services for members; under
Calad's plan sponsor's agreement, CIGNA is responsible for plan benefits and coverage
decisions. Respondents both suffered injuries allegedly arising from Aetna's and CIGNA's
decisions not to provide coverage for certain treatment and services recommended by
respondents' treating physicians. Davila's treating physician prescribed Vioxx to remedy
Davila's arthritis pain, but Aetna refused to pay for it.
Id. at 204-05.
86. Id. at 205.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2002). The court outlined the
procedural history as follows:
This suit consolidates multiple district court actions and appeals for consideration of common
issues. Ruby Calad, Walter Thorn, Juan Davila, and Gwen Roark sued their respective health
maintenance organizations (HMO's) for negligence under Texas state law: They alleged that
although their doctors recommended treatment, the HMO's negligently refused to cover it. The
HMO's removed to federal court, arguing that because each plaintiff received HMO coverage




examining the causes of action available under ERISA § 502(a), the Fifth
Circuit determined that the complainants' causes could proceed only under two
subsections-§ 502(a)(1)(B) 9 and § 502(a)(2).9 The former allows a
complainant to file a breach-of-contract or a breach-of-promise action against
the insurer for wrongful denial of benefits.92 The latter subsection permits
participants to commence a tort-based action against a plan's fiduciary for
allegedly breaching a fiduciary duty.93
Therefore, in Davila, the Fifth Circuit first analyzed the facts in light of
ERISA's wrongful-denial-of-benefits and fiduciary-duty sections. 94 The court
of appeals found that ERISA's § 502(a)(2) did not control the disposition of
the cases because the complainants' suit did not involve any "mixed eligibility
and treatment decisions." 95 Next, the Fifth Circuit found that the THCLA
actions did not fall within the scope of § 502(a)(1)(B) because the
complainants did not claim that the insurers wrongfully denied benefits. 96 The
court of appeals noted that the complainants asserted tort claims, while ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B) only "creates a cause of action for breach of contract." 7
The Fifth Circuit declared, however, that ERISA did not preempt
litigation of the THCLA action in state court.98 Evidence suggested that the
insurers "controlled, influenced, participated in and made decisions which
affected the quality of the [complainants'] diagnosis, care, and treatment." 99
In addition, evidence supported the assertion that the Davila insurers violated
the duty of ordinary care outlined in the THCLA.1t
90. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (2000). This section outlines the persons who are empowered to
bring a civil action and it reads in relevant part: "A civil action may be brought ... by a participant or
beneficiary... to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." Id.
91. Roark, 307 F.3d at 306-12.
92. Davila, 542 U.S. at 210. The Court stated:
ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B)... is relatively straightforward. If a participant or beneficiary believes
that benefits promised to him under the terms of the plan are not provided, he can bring suit
seeking provision of those benefits. A participant or beneficiary can also bring suit generically
to "enforce his rights" under the plan, or to clarify any of his rights to future benefits.
Id. (emphasis added).
93. Compare Turner v. PV Int'l Corp., 765 S.W.2d 455,461 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied)
("The statute of frauds is not a defense to any action for damages based on fraud or breach of fiduciary duty,
both being tort actions."), with Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gaudet, 192 F.3d 485, 487 (5th Cir. 1999) ("The
FDIC sued the Gaudet defendants on two causes of action-gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.
Both of these theories sound in tort."), and FDIC v. Abraham, 137 F.3d 264, 266-67, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the FDIC's claim against corporate directors for violation of fiduciary duty sounded in tort as
a violation of the duty of care).
94. Davila, 542 U.S. at 206.
95. Roark, 307 F.3d at 307-08.
96. Id. at 308-09.
97. Id. at 309.
98. Id. at 313.
99. Davila, 542 U.S. at 212.
100. Id.
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More important, the Fifth Circuit found that the insurers' duty of ordinary
care under THCLA was "an independent legal duty.'' ° Stated another way,
the duty of ordinary care under the Texas statute arises independently of any
ERISA- or plan-imposed duty. 10 2  Therefore, any civil action to enforce a
statutory duty under the THCLA is beyond the scope of ERISA's civil
enforcement mechanism.'0 3 The Supreme Court in Davila, however, strongly
disagreed.3 4 Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas asserted that
the plans' participants and beneficiaries sued the insurers
only to rectify a wrongful denial of benefits promised under ERISA-regulated
plans, and d[id] not attempt to remedy any violation of a legal duty
independent of ERISA. We hold that [complainants'] state causes of action
fall "within the scope of' ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) and are therefore completely
pre-empted by ERISA and removable to federal district court.'05
Although Davila is replete with dicta about Pegram,36 the Supreme Court
101. Id.
[The participants and beneficiaries] ... contend... that the complained-of actions violate
legal duties that arise independently of ERISA or the terms of the employee benefit plans at issue
in these cases. Both respondents brought suit specifically under the THCLA, alleging that
petitioners "controlled, influenced, participated in and made decisions which affected the quality
of the diagnosis, care, and treatment provided" in a manner that violated "the duty of ordinary
care set forth in §§ 88.001 and 88.002." [The complainants] contend that this duty of ordinary
care is an independent legal duty.




105. Id. at 215.
106. See id. at 218-21.
[Complainants], their amici, and some Courts of Appeals have relied heavily upon Pegram...,
in arguing that ERISA does not pre-empt or completely pre-empt state suits such as
[complainants']. They contend that Pegram makes it clear that causes of action such as
[complainants'] do not "relate to [an] employee benefit plan," ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a), and hence are not pre-empted.
Pegram cannot be read so broadly. In Pegran .... [w]e reasoned that the physician's
"eligibility decision and the treatment decision were inextricably mixed." We concluded that
"Congress did not intend [the defendant HMO] or any other HMO to be treated as a fiduciary
to the extent that it makes mixed eligibility decisions acting through its physicians."
A benefit determination under ERISA, though, is generally a fiduciary act.... Hence, a
benefit determination is part and parcel of the ordinary fiduciary responsibilities connected to
the administration of a plan. The fact that a benefits determination is infused with medical
judgments does not alter this result.
Pegram itself recognized this principle.... Here, however, [the insurers] are neither [the
complainants'] treating physicians nor the employers of [complainants'] treating physicians.
[The insurers'] coverage decisions, then, are pure eligibility decisions, and Pegram is not
implicated. [Therefore, w]e hold that [complainants'] causes of action, brought to remedy only
the denial of benefits under ERISA-regulated benefit plans, fall within the scope of, and are
completely pre-empted by, ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and thus removable to federal district court.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further
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neither cited nor applied Pegram's § 502(a)(2) analysis or holding to resolve
the preemption controversy in Davila.107
In Mayeaux, the court of appeals cited both Pegram and Davila to reach
a very questionable conclusion.10 8 In addition, the Fifth Circuit presented a
less than stellar analysis in Mayeaux. Put simply, the Fifth Circuit focused
exclusively on Pegram's § 502(a)(2) breach-of-fiduciary-duty analysis and on
dicta in Davila, rather than on the Supreme Court's breach-of-contract analysis
in Davila.'°9
In Mayeaux, the Fifth Circuit reported the plaintiffs' claims as follows:
"Mayeaux and Germain contend that the district court erred [by summarily]
dismissing their tort claims for pain and suffering, irreparable connective
tissue damage, depression, loss of consortium, loss of earning capacity, lost
wages, mental anguish, and attorney's fees."" The plaintiffs insisted that the
Supreme Court's ERISA decision in Pegram did not preempt "these state law
tort claims.""' The Fifth Circuit, however, dismissed that crucial observation
and instead agreed with the district court's holding that ERISA preempted the
claims because Davila "expressly rejects any effort to extend Pegram' s mixed-
decision principle to cover traditional indemnity insurers like BCBS."
'' 2
The Mayeaux complainants were correct. The Fifth Circuit completely
avoided any discussion of the poorly analyzed question in Davila: whether
ERISA always preempts participants from commencing entirely independent
tort-based causes of action in state courts-if those actions are completely
divorced from ERISA's breach-of-contract and breach-of-fiduciary-duty
provisions-§ 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(2), respectively." 3
Very likely, the Fifth Circuit as well as the Supreme Court will have to
address this question more carefully and intelligently in the near future. The
reason is not complicated: Under common law, an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is associated with every health-care plan and insurance
contract." 4 And when an insurer breaches an implied covenant of good faith
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (fourth and sixth alterations in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 229 (2000)).
107. Id. at 206 n.1. "In this Court, [the insurers] do not claim or argue that [the participants or
beneficiaries'] causes of action fall under ERISA § 502(a)(2). Because [the insurers] do not argue this point,
and since we can resolve these cases entirely by reference to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), we do not address
ERISA § 502(a)(2)." Id. (emphasis added).
108. See Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420, 430-31 (5th Cir. July 2004).
109. See id. at 430-32.




114. See Union Nat'l Lfe Ins. Co. v. Crosby, No. 2002-IA-01751-SCT (125); 870 So. 2d 1175, 1182
(Miss. 2004) (holding that a breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing arises from the existence of a
contract between parties, but a suit for breaching the covenant sounds either in tort or in contract or both).
See generally Wooten v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 747, 750 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (embracing the view
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and fair dealing, the plaintiff has an election: The grievant may file a cause of
action that sounds either in tort, in contract, or under both theories." 5
Clearly, tort and contract actions are independent from each other. In
fact, complainants in Mayeaux advanced this issue and tried to get the Fifth
Circuit and the federal district court to remand the case to state court.' 16 But,
they were unsuccessful." 7 The Fifth Circuit cavalierly dismissed this concern
without presenting a thoughtful analysis. Instead, the court of appeals simply
concluded that ERISA's § 514 completely preempted complainants
commencing independent tort-based causes in a Louisiana state court."'
C. Health Insurance-Medicare Supplemental Contracts: Whether a
Reinsurer Who Assumed an Insurer's Medicare Supplemental Contracts Is
Liable Under Mississippi's Doctrine of Novation and General Contract
Principles for Allegedly Breaching an "Assumption Reinsurance
Agreement"
On a yearly basis, cases involving conflicts over insurers', reinsurers',
and insurance agents' contractual rights under a Treaty of Reinsurance arise
frequently." 9 In addition, disputes about the scope of third-party beneficiaries'
in Comunale that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exist in insurance contracts, and that
neither party will do anything that will injure the other party's right to receive the benefits of the agreement).
Furthermore, where there is breach, the subsequent action "'sounds both in contract and tort' and "'the
plaintiff will ordinarily have freedom of election between an action of tort and one of contract."' Id.
(quoting Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200, 203 (Cal. 1958)).
115. See Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 870 So.2d at 1182.
116. Mayeaux, 376 F.3d at 424.
In [a] proposed amendment, the Plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Gengelbach (1) breached his duty of
care under Louisiana state law, (2) conspired to retaliate against Dr. Hyman, (3) committed
unethical practices, and (4) intentionally caused Mayeaux injury. The Plaintiffs further alleged
that BCBS (1) was liable for Dr. Gengelbach's actions under the theory of respondeat superior,
(2) breached an implied warranty, and (3) breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing....





The Plaintiffs also appeal the district court's summary judgment dismissal of the Hymans'
state law claims, which were grounded in negligence, unfair trade practices, defamation, and
intentional interference with contracts. We affirm the district court's dismissal of these causes
of action via a grant of summary judgment, however, because these remaining claims are
indisputably preempted by ordinary conflict preemption under § 514 of ERISA.
Id. (emphasis added).
119. See Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 958-59 (5th Cir. 1997).
[F]oreign reinsurers are Underwriters and Underwriting Syndicates at Lloyd's of London, and
foreign companies subscribing to reinsurance ....
A reinsurance treaty is an ongoing contractual relationship between two insurance
companies in which the primary insurer agrees in advance to cede, and the reinsurer to accept,
specified business that is the subject of the contract. Under a treaty, a reinsurer agrees to
indemnify a primary insurer with respect to a portion of the primary insurer's liability in a
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rights under standardized insurance contracts and similar disagreements about
the extent of those rights under an express novation also occur. 20 But, in
Robinson v. Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Co., one finds litigants asking the
Fifth Circuit to resolve disputes about third-party beneficiaries' contractual
rights under both an "Assumption Reinsurance Agreement" and an alleged
implied novation.' 2 ' For these reasons, the controversy is somewhat unique
and interesting.
The reported facts in Robinson were undisputed. 122 Plaintiffs in the case
were soliciting agents for Commonwealth National Life Insurance Company
(Commonwealth). 23 Commonwealth offered a range of insurance products,
including Medicare supplement policies. 24 Each agent had authority to sell
all categories of products. 25  The agents earned commissions directly when
consumers paid premiums to keep the various contracts active; and, they
earned commissions indirectly when "subagents" sold insurance contracts.
126
However, in early January 1996, Commonwealth entered into an Assumption
Reinsurance Agreement (Reinsurance Agreement) with Guarantee Trust Life
Insurance Company (GTL) 27
In a reinsurance arrangement, an insurance company transfers all or some
of its underwritten risks to another insurance company. 28 The company that
purchases the reinsurance is called the initial insurer, the reinsured, or the
ceding company. 29 The reinsurer, or the reinsuring company, is the company
that acquires the risk.130 The two broad categories of reinsurance contracts are
"indemnity reinsurance" and "assumption reinsurance."' 31 To appreciate the
designated line of business.... [Typically], the reinsurance treaty involve[s] the participation
of many reinsurers, each accepting a percentage of the total liability under a single treaty.
N. River Ins. Co. v. Phila. Reinsurance Corp., 63 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Ace Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re Ins. Antitrust Utig.), 938 F.2d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Reinsurance
is arranged by specialized brokers and underwriters. Much reinsurance is done by syndicates doing business
through Lloyd's of London.").
120. See discussion infra Part HI.
121. Robinson v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 389 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. Oct. 2004).
122. Id. at 477 ("[Commonwealth] appointed [each plaintiff] as a selling agent.., at different times,





127. Id. at 477.
128. Colonial Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 843 F.2d 201, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1988).
129. Id. at 202,
130. See id.
An insurance company may want to reinsure its risks for a number of reasons including the
diversification of its business, the acquisition of another insurance company indirectly through
the acquisition of its business, the avoidance of a concentration of risk in one geographic area
or line of business, and relief from the surplus drain that may occur as a result of the heavy
expenses and the necessity of establishing reserves connected with newly written policies.
Id. at 201 n.2.
131. Id. at 202.
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critical distinction between the two, consider the Fifth Circuit's excellent and
expansive discussion of these contracts:
[Under an assumption reinsurance agreement], the reinsuring company takes
over for the initial insurer and becomes directly liable to the policyholders.
The [agreement relieves the] initial insurer... of all liability, including the
maintenance of the required reserves. The reinsuring company has the duty
of establishing and maintaining the required reserves. In addition, the
reinsuring company is entitled to all premiums paid and must pay all future
claims and expenses with respect to the policies.... [Under] an indemnity
reinsurance contract the initial insurer and the reinsuring company share the
benefits and obligations arising out of the reinsured policy or contract.
Furthermore, the initial insurer will transfer to the reinsuring company all or
part of its liability on the policies being reinsured. The initial insurer
remains directly liable to the policyholders and continues to collect premiums
and to pay claims and expenses. The reinsuring company will then reimburse
the initial insurer for the claims and expenses attributable to the risks it has
reinsured. '32
The Robinson controversy concerns whether the reinsurer breached its
legal duties under an assumption reinsurance contract. 133 To repeat, this
controversy is somewhat uncommon because insurance agents rather than
insureds are the complainants. 34 Agents allege that GTL "assumed all of
Commonwealth's medicare supplement policies in Mississippi and
Commonwealth's obligation to pay continuing commissions on existing
policies to the qualifying selling agents."'' 35  Of course, GTL claimed that it
132. Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, there are two types of indemnity reinsurance contracts:
conventional coinsurance and modified coinsurance. Id.
In conventional and modified coinsurance two exchanges take place: (1) the initial insurer
pays the reinsuring company full consideration for the reserve liability assumed, and (2) the
reinsuring company pays the initial insurer a "ceding commission" or an "initial allowance" for
the business acquired. Insurance companies typically net these transactions, with only the excess
amount changing hands. Thus, the reinsuring company has income equal to the reserve liability
actually assumed even though such liability exceeds the consideration actually received.
Id.
133. Robinson v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 389 F.3d 475, 477 (5th Cir. Oct. 2004).
134. See id.
135. Id.
They [asserted that GTL did not pay] commissions ... after the Reinsurance Agreement in
accordance with their agency contracts with Commonwealth and further that they did not receive
commission increases commensurate with the premium increases on Commonwealth policies
which remained in force.
Plaintiff['s] [agents] also contend[ed] that GTL began increasing premiums on the assumed
Commonwealth policies in order to induce policyholders to replace them and began conspiring
with [anonymous agents who continued] to contact and persuade Commonwealth policyholders
to replace their old Commonwealth policies with new GTL policies. [Furthermore, the
disgruntled agents asserted] that GTL ... artificially deflated GTL premiums to induce the
policyholders to convert to GTL policies while at the same time inflating the premiums on the
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continued to pay commissions to Commonwealth's agents according to
Commonwealth's original compensation schedule. '36 But the agents disagreed
and filed lawsuits in a Mississippi state court, citing multiple statutory, tort-
and contract-based actions and claims.'
GTL removed the ten state court cases to the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of Mississippi." 8 The district court consolidated the
cases for trial.' 39 Later, GTL petitioned the court for summary relief."4 After
examining the relevant section of the Reinsurance Agreement, the district court
granted GTL's motion for summary judgment."' The district court found that
the Reinsurance Agreement was not a new contract, and it did not outline the
mutual intent and contractual obligations among all parties.'42 Stated slightly
differently, "the Reinsurance Agreement [was not] a novation of the original
agency contracts between [the agents] and Commonwealth.' 43 After the
district court denied the motion for reconsideration, the agents appealed the
adverse summary judgment to the Fifth Circuit.'"
The central question before the Fifth Circuit was whether the Reinsurance
Agreement created a novation of the agency contracts between Commonwealth
and its agents, creating a new agency relationship between GTL and the
agents. '45 To address this question, the court of appeals reviewed Mississippi's
law of contracts, which recognizes both express and implied novations.'16 An
express novation immediately discharges an existing contractual obligation
Commonwealth policies ....
Id. at 478-79.
136. Id. at 477.
137. Id.
[The agents filed] a multi-count complaint asserting at least eighteen causes of action including
entitlement to an accounting, torts arising out of contract, breach of contract, wilful breach of
contract, breach of covenants of good faith and fair dealing, slander of business and commercial
disparagement, conversion or civil theft, tortuous or fraudulent conspiracy, common law fraud,
fraud of concealment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, twisting, tortuous interference
with contractual relations, tortuous interference with prospective business advantage,
misappropriation of trade secrets, violation of Mississippi's consumer protection laws/unfair and





141. Id. at 478 (finding no evidence that "GTL was obligated to pay plaintiffs [sic] commissions on
inactive or replaced Commonwealth policies or on replacement policies or ... that GTL was contractually
restricted from offering replacement coverage to its insureds").
142. Id. at 479 ("The court ruled that there was no genuine issue of material fact on the question of
whether all three of the parties agreed that GTL would replace Commonwealth [under any] agency
agreements entered into between Commonwealth and plaintiff['s] [agents].").
143. Id. (holding that there was no novation as a matter of law).
144. Id. at 477.
145. Id. at 479.
146. Id. at 480 (stressing that under Mississippi's law, "all of the requirements of a contract must be
present for a novation to be effective").
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and creates a new one by imposing an obligation on a new obligor who was
not previously obligated.'47 Alternatively, Mississippi courts may find an
implied novation where "facts and circumstances demonstrate that all parties
intended to substitute one party for another."' 48 In fact, before a Mississippi
court can find an express or an implied novation, the moving party must
present substantial evidence. 49 This evidence must prove that all parties
accept and have a mutual understanding of their contractual responsibilities
under the new agreement.
50
After reviewing the Reinsurance Agreement and all probative evidence,
the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision to award GTL
summary relief. 5 ' There was no evidence of an express novation because the
agents failed to prove that (1) they "were ...parties to the Reinsurance
Agreement between Commonwealth and GTL," (2) GTL assumed the agency
contracts between Commonwealth and its agents, and (3) GTL expressly
agreed to be bound by those agency contracts.' 52 Also, like the district court,
the Fifth Circuit found no evidence to support the existence of an implied
novation. '5 3
147. See Miss. Motor Fin., Inc. v. Enis, 181 So. 2d 903, 904 (Miss. 1966).
148. Id. at 905; First Am. Nat'lBankoflukav. Alcorn, Inc., 361 So. 2d 481, 487-88 (Miss. 1978)
(declaring that an implied novation requires a factual determination of "substantial proof that the creditor
impliedly accepted the new debtor in the place of the old and it must not appear that the creditor intended
to hold both the new and old debtor for the obligation"); see also RFSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRAcrS
§§ 423-30 (1979) (proposing that a novation substitutes a new party and discharges one of the original
parties to a contract by agreement of all three parties).
149. See Geisenberger v. John Hancock Distribs., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1045, 1052 (S.D. Miss. 1991)
(concluding that under Mississippi's law, an individual "seeking relief for breach of a written contract must
prove the existence of the contract and [a] right to relief").
150. See Ainsworth v. Lee, 67 So. 2d 905, 907 (Miss. 1953) (noting that a novation "'is generally
defined as a mutual agreement among all parties concerned for the discharge of a valid existing obligation
by the substitution of a new valid obligation' (quoting 39 AM. JUR. Novation § 2 (1942))).
151. Robinson, 389 F.3d at 483.
152. Id. at 480.
There is no language in the Reinsurance Agreement nor evidence [to] ... support a finding that
GTL assumed the agency contracts... or agreed to be bound by the terms [of those contracts]
.... Indeed, as GTL points out, [the agents] did not even produce the [agency] contract between
themselves and Commonwealth that was allegedly assumed by GTL by way of novation.
Id.
153. Id. at 480-81.
The district court, by granting summary judgment, found no genuine issue of material fact [to
support] a conclusion that a novation had occurred and, thus, impliedly found no genuine factual
dispute surrounding the issue of an implied novation. Our review of the record supports this
conclusion .... Additionally, [the agents] do not present much of an argument for an implied
novation .... [I]t was incumbent upon [the agents] to produce substantial evidence from which
the district court could make a determination that an implied novation had occurred. [The
agents] produced absolutely no evidence that by executing the Reinsurance Agreement with
Commonwealth, GTL intended [an agency between GTL and the agents]. In fact, the evidence
is to the contrary.... We conclude that the district court correctly found that no novation had
occurred, either implied or express.
INSURANCE DECISIONS
Unlike the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi, however, the Fifth Circuit refused to decide this controversy using
only the theory of novation.'54 And the reason is not complicated. After
carefully reviewing the Reinsurance Agreement, the court of appeals found
that "GTL clearly promised to pay... the appropriate agents' ... commissions"
after GTL assumed control over Commonwealth's outstanding Medicare
supplemental insurance policies.'55 The district court, however, intentionally
ignored or carelessly failed to appreciate the significance of this finding. 56
Therefore, after the district court failed to find an express or an implied
novation-a separate contractual obligation-between GTL and the agents, the
lower court simply concluded that the agents did not have anything else "to
complain about." 157  But the Fifth Circuit declared that the district court's
conclusion was reversible error because the court failed to address two
interrelated questions before awarding GTL's motion for summary judgment:
whether the agents were third-party beneficiaries under the Reinsurance
Agreement and, if so, whether GTL breached any third-party obligations." 8
Therefore, concluding that these questions generated additional genuine
issues of material fact, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary
judgment ruling in favor of GTL regarding the novation issue, reversed the
summary judgment ruling in favor of GTL regarding the third-party-
beneficiary issue, and remanded the case for further proceedings.'59
154. See id. at 481.
155. Id. at 482. "The only reference in the contract [about the agents was GTL's agreeing] to be
responsible for paying the commissions due under Commonwealth policies." Id. at 480.
156. See id. at 482.
[The agents cited] testimony that creat[ed] a factual dispute [over] whether GTL was properly
calculating commissions due under the policies [under which the agents] were entitled to receive
commissions.... GTL suggests that it is undisputed that it has properly paid all commissions
... under the Commonwealth policies. That is a conclusory statement which is hotly contested.
The court found simply that GTL had paid commissions on the Commonwealth policies and
continued to do so. The trial court did not address that this was a hotly disputed issue [which
created] genuine issues of material fact.
Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (The testimony of various credible agents established "that GTL was improperly calculating
[the agents'] commissions and was not paying [the commissions] in accordance with GTL's agreement with
Commonwealth. This factual dispute goes to the heart of the issue as to whether there was a breach of the
third party obligations of GTL undertaken in the Reinsurance Agreement.").
159. Id. at 482-83 ("Since [the agents] are entitled to go forward with their third party beneficiary
claims under the Reinsurance Agreement, the derivative claims such as breach of contract, fraud, negligence,
and perhaps others... survive summary judgment.").
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D. Mortgage Life Insurance: Whether Texas's Law and the Terms of a
Mortgage-Life Insurance Contract Require an Insurer to Compensate a
Surviving Spouse Following the Death of the Named-Insured Spouse
The legal conflicts and questions appearing in Monumental Life
Insurance Co. v. Hayes-Jenkins"6 are not new. More important, the remedies
reported in the decision are not novel. Yet, cases like Monumental arguably
continue to generate unnecessary litigation and interest. Nearly a half century
ago, the Texas Supreme Court clearly outlined the scope of an insurance
applicant's contractual rights under a conditional receipt-after an applicant
completes an application for insurance and pays the first premium, but before
the insurer processes the application and delivers the insurance contract to the
applicant. 161
Although the facts in Monumental are fairly extensive, they are clear and
undisputed. 62 In November 2000, Alvin and Sondra Jenkins (the Jenkinses)
purchased a house in Frisco, Texas. 163 To pay for the property, the Jenkinses
secured a mortgage loan from NovaStar Mortgage, a residential mortgage
lender.' 64 At the loan's closing, the Jenkinses consummated several
agreements, including an escrow agreement. 165  The latter agreement
authorized NovaStar to collect $2,808.70 from the Jenkinses each month and
to place those funds in an escrow account.' 66 The escrow agreement also gave
NovaStar the authority to pay-on behalf of the Jenkinses-a variety of
expenses associated with homeownership and the property, including taxes,
assessments, and premiums to purchase flood and fire insurance. 67
Of course, the escrow agreement did not mention "mortgage
insurance.'68 But NovaStar decided to pitch that insurance product to the
Jenkinses.' 69 At all times pertinent to this case, Monumental Life Insurance
Company (MLIC) and NovaStar were parties to a Mortgage Insurance
160. Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Hayes-Jenkins, 403 F.3d 304, 310-21 (5th Cir. Mar. 2005).
161. See S. Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 483 S.W.2d 388, 390-91 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
[The applicant paid] the first month's premium [and] received a numbered receipt.... [O]ur
Supreme Court [has held] that "conditional receipts" such as the one presently before us provide
for temporary life insurance. Under the terms of the "conditional receipt"... the temporary
insurance will become effective on... "[t]he date of the application"... and when the applicant
pays "the first full premium for any policy or rider applied for."
Id. (quoting insurance policy) (citations omitted).







169. ld. at 307-08.
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Agreement (MIA).'70 Under the MIA contract, NovaStar agreed to distribute
MLIC' s brochures and other promotional materials to NovaStar' s borrowers.171
In fact, MLIC could only pitch its brochures and promotional materials to
NovaStar's borrowers with NovaStar's express written consent. 172 In addition,
NovaStar promised to include the cost of the insurance in its borrowers'
monthly invoices and promised to collect the mortgage insurance premiums
directly from its borrowers. 173  In consideration for NovaStar's promises,
MLIC promised to return a percentage of the insurance premiums to
NovaStar.1
74
In January 2001, conforming to the terms and expectations under the
MIA, NovaStar mailed an unsolicited MLIC application for Mortgage Life and
Disability Insurance to the Jenkinses.175 More significant, NovaStar mailed
MLIC's application to the Jenkinses along with an MLIC brochure describing
MLIC's policy and a cover letter that had been written on NovaStar's
letterhead. 176 The cover letter stated that the mortgage life insurance policy
would pay the Jenkinses' entire mortgage balance "'up to $300,000"' if either
spouse died. 77 Additionally, NovaStar's cover letter stated that the Jenkinses
could "examine the policy without cost or obligation" for thirty days,
commencing the day the couple received their certificate of insurance.17 1
Even more significant, MLIC's brochure emphasized that the Jenkinses
did not have to mail a separate insurance-premium check to either MLIC or
NovaStar. 17 9 Instead, the brochure emphasized that the Jenkinses ' "'insurance
premium [would be] conveniently added to [their] monthly mortgage
payments.' '"180 Furthermore, the application stated that the Jenkinses'
NovaStar "'account [would] be credited in full,"' and the mortgage life
170. Id.
171. Id.





177. Id. (quoting the MLIC brochure).
178. Id. NovaStar's cover letter stated in pertinent part:
"This insurance is yours to try risk free. We're confident that you'll agree that [the insurance]
provides essential protection. Examine the Certificate of Insurance for 30 days at no cost or
obligation. If you decide you don't want the coverage, for any reason, just return the Certificate
to Monumental Life Insurance Company and you'll.., owe nothing."
Id. (quoting the MLIC brochure) (alteration in original).
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting the MIJC brochure) (alteration in original). Furthermore, the MLIC brochure
touted the advantages of the thirty-day "risk free" period, stating in bold print:
"Examine at No Risk for 30 Days. When your certificate/policy arrives, look it over. If you
don't agree that this is sensible and affordable mortgage protection, simply return it within 30
days of receiving it ... and you won't ... owe a cent. No questions asked. In the meantime,
you'll... be fully covered while you make your decision."
Id. (quoting the MLIC brochure) (first omission in original).
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insurance contract would fully cover the Jenkinses "during the thirty-day
period while they examined the policy.''.
After reading the brochures and other materials, the Jenkinses promptly
filled out the application. 182 Relying on MLIC's promise that "no check would
be required and that their premiums would be added to and included in their
monthly invoices," the Jenkinses mailed the application to MLIC. 8 3 The
mortgage insurer received it on January 17, 2001.'8' Of course, when the
Jenkinses mailed the application, they neglected to enclose a check for the first
insurance premium and failed to include the first premium when they
submitted their monthly mortgage payments to NovaStar.
185
On March 14, 2001, MLIC mailed a letter to the Jenkinses informing
them that the insurer had approved their application and that their "'Certificate
of Mortgage Life Insurance should arrive shortly."",186 But the notice of
approval arrived "after NovaStar had mailed [the] March 10th invoice to the
Jenkinses and before [the Jenkinses] mailed their March 25th payment.., to
NovaStar."'' 87 More relevant, the notice of approval did not mention "the first-
premium requirement," and MLIC did not inform NovaStar that MLIC had
approved the Jenkinses' application for mortgage life insurance.
88
On April 4, 2001, Alvin died unexpectedly. 89 And on April 5, 2001,
Sondra received MLIC's insurance policy in the mail." The mortgage-life-
insurance contract clearly stated that "the insurance was effective April 1,
2001, three days prior to Alvin's death."'' But the insurance contract also
stated unambiguously that MLIC would provide coverage only if the Jenkinses
had submitted an application and paid the first premium. 2
"[E]ight days after the policy's effective date, four days after the MLIC
policy was mailed to Sondra, and five days after Alvin's death," MLIC
informed NovaStar that the Jenkinses' application had been approved. 9 3 In
May 2001, Sondra timely filed a claim with MLIC for death benefits. 94 MLIC
immediately denied the claim, asserting that Alvin was not insured under an
MLIC insurance contract when he died.' 95 More specifically, the insurer
181. Id. (quoting the MLIC brochure).
182. Id. at 309.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. "As they had done each month since taking out their loan, the Jenkinses mailed their check
[to NovaStar] ... in the standard invoiced amount of $2,808.70." Id.









195. Id. at 310.
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insisted that it had no contractual duty to pay any proceeds because the
Jenkinses did not pay the first premium before the effective date of the policy
or before Alvin's death.196
Anticipating Sondra's filing a lawsuit and following a fairly customary
practice, MLIC filed a declaratory-judgment action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.' 97 The insurer asked the
district court to declare that the mortgage life insurance contract did not cover
the Jenkinses when Alvin died and that MLIC had no duty to compensate
Sondra. 98 Sondra responded by filing a lawsuit against MLIC, raising several
causes of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) negligence, (3) negligent
misrepresentation, and (4) statutory breach of Texas's Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (DTPA).99 Shortly thereafter, MLIC filed a motion for summary
judgment.200 The district court granted the motion, holding that Sondra had no
contractual right to receive any death benefits. 20' Sondra timely filed a notice
of appeal.2°e
There were two questions before the Fifth Circuit: (1) whether MLIC
waived its right under the insurance policy to demand the first premium as a
condition precedent to coverage, and (2) whether MLIC's words and
conduct 20 3 estopped the insurer from asserting lack of a binding contract as an
affirmative defense.2 °4 On appeal, MLIC argued that the Jenkinses' failure to
pay the first premium before the effective date of the policy or before Alvin's
death conclusively established the absence of a binding contract. 25 Therefore,
absent a valid agreement, a breach of contract was a legal impossibility.2"
196. Id. "MLIC pointed out that the application contained a statement (in fine print in the paragraph
immediately above the applicant's signature line) that specified: '[N]o insurance is in effect unless the
application is approved by the Insurance Company, and the first premium is paid."' Id. (quoting the MLIC
application) (alteration in original).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, §§ 4(10)(ii), (16)(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004), repealed by Act of
Apr. 1, 2003,78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1274, § 26(a)(1), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 3000,4138 (allowing complainants
to commence a private right of action and secure remedies under Texas's Deceptive Trade Practices Act).
200. Monumental, 403 F.3d at 310.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 308-09. To reiterate, the cover letter, brochure, application, and letter of approval
contained certain representations (words) upon which the Jenkinses relied. Id. In addition, the insurer
delivered an insurance contract to the Jenkinses and gave the applicants thirty days to examine the policy.
Id. at 309. This latter conduct also generated reliance. See id.
204. ld.at310.
205. Id.
206. Cf. Hutson v. Wenatchee Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 588 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
"Since plaintiff does not claim that an insurance contract actually was formed, the instructions spelling out
the statutory requirements are much more likely to cause the jury to conclude that plaintiff's theory presents
a legal impossibility." Id.
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To resolve this conflict, the Fifth Circuit carefully researched Texas's
principals of waiver and equitable estoppel. 7 First, under Texas's law,
"waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or
intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming that right., 208 In addition, a
party who raises a waiver defense must show that the opposing party
(1) possessed "an existing right, benefit, or advantage," (2) had actual or
constructive knowledge of the right, and (3) actually intended to relinquish the
right.2 °9
On the other hand, an aggrieved party who invokes the doctrine of
equitable estoppel must prove several different elements.21° Specifically, the
aggrieved party must establish that an opposing party (1) misrepresented or
concealed material facts, (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of those
facts, (3) intended for the aggrieved party to act on those material facts, and
(4) knew the aggrieved party had no way to secure actual knowledge of the
material facts.21' In addition, the aggrieved party must establish that he or she
detrimentally relied on the misrepresented or concealed material facts.21 2
Applying the doctrine of waiver, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit concluded:
[Examining the gravamen of Sondra's waiver argument, it becomes apparent]
that MLIC might.., have waived its right to insist on prepayment of the first
premium as a condition precedent to coverage .... MLIC might have done
so when it unconditionally approved the Jenkinses' application on March 14,
2001 .... prior to receiving the Jenkinses' first premium payment directly,
and in the full knowledge that-under its arrangement with NovaStar-the
Jenkinses could not possibly have [received an invoice from] NovaStar...
until sometime after [the mortgage lender learned that MLIC had approved
the Jenkinses' application].2"3
207. Monumental, 403 F.3d at 310-11.
208. See First Interstate Bank of Ariz., N.A. v. Interfund Corp., 924 F.2d 588, 595 (5th Cir. 1991)
(citing Edwin M. Jones Oil Co. v. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co., 794 S.w.2d 442, 447 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1990, writ denied)).
209. See First Interstate, 924 F.2d at 595 (citing Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. Heritage Cablevision of
Dallas, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 273, 280 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ)).
210. See Robinson v. Robinson, 961 S.W.2d 292, 301 (Tex. App.-Houston [st Dist.] 1997, no
writ).
211. Id.
212. See Braugh v. Phillips, 557 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.)
(observing that equitable estoppel involves determining whether a defendant's conduct causes a plaintiff
to materially alter plaintiff's position after plaintiff relied on defendant's conduct).
213. Monumental, 403 F.3d at 314-15.
Simply put, because MLIC chose to adopt notification procedures that would not permit the
Jenkinses (or anyone similarly situated) to comply with the policy's requirement that the first
premium be paid prior to the date selected by MLIC as the effective date of coverage, MLIC
might well be held to have waived the right to assert that commencement of coverage was barred
by the Jenlinses' failure to pay the first premium before (1) the effective date (which was not
communicated to them until April 5, 2001) or (2) Alvin's death (on April 4, 2001).
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The Fifth Circuit also found prima facie evidence to support the view that
the Jenkinses "might have relied-reasonably and to their detriment--on
MLIC's earlier representations in the brochure, the application, and the
approval letter, [as well as on] NovaStar's representations in the cover
letter. '214 The court of appeals observed,
MLIC's March 14, 2001 letter, which formally notified the Jenkinses that
their application had been approved, is devoid of any admonition that
coverage is conditioned on their prior payment of the first premium. Like the
application itself, this notice's terse congratulatory statement, which informed
the Jenkinses that their Certificate of Insurance/Policy would "arrive shortly,"
could have implied to the Jenkinses that, by completing and mailing their
application to MLIC months earlier, they had successfully completed all acts
required on their part to bring coverage into effect.2"5
But, MLIC argued and correctly observed that Texas's law precludes
using the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel to create or extend
insurance coverage.216 Like many common-law jurisdictions, Texas embraces
the view that waiver and estoppel (1) cannot enlarge the risks insured against
or coverage under an existing insurance contract and (2) cannot create a new
or different insurance contract, comprising different risks insured against.217
However, the Fifth Circuit stated that MLIC mischaracterized Sondra' s waiver
and equitable estoppel arguments.21 8
As the court of appeals correctly noted, Texas's law is fairly clear: An
insured may establish that an insurer has a duty to pay proceeds under a new,
putative insurance contract, provided the insured proves that the insurer
waived or forfeited its right to use a condition precedent as an affirmative
Id. at 315.
214. Id. at 311.
Of particular importance are the representations [about] the 30-day "no risk" examination period.
These representations, contained not only in the cover letter and brochure but also highlighted
in bold print at the top of the application, state affirmatively that the Jenkinses will be "fully
covered" for 30 days while they "look over" their policy yet omit any reference to the fact on
which MLIC now relies--that coverage will become effective only on MUC's receipt of the first
premium payment.
Id.
215. Id. at 312.
216. Id. at 314.
217. See Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Morse, 487 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Tex. 1972) (citing Great Am.
Reserve Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 335 S.W.2d 707, 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, writ ref d)).
Waiver and estoppel may operate to avoid a forfeiture of a policy, but they have consistently
been denied operative force to change, re-write and enlarge the risks covered by a policy. In
other words, waiver and estoppel can not create a new and different contract with respect to risks
covered by the policy.
Mitchell, 335 S.W.2d at 708.
218. Monumental, 403 F.3d at 314.
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defense.21 9 In the present case, the Fifth Circuit found that Sondra employed
neither waiver nor estoppel to enlarge covered risks or to create new ones
under the mortgage insurance contract.220 Instead, the opposite was true; the
debate was over a specific risk that MLIC had already agreed to cover under
the mortgage insurance contact, insuring the life of a mortgagor-insured and
promising to pay an appropriate amount of money to cover a mortgage balance
up to $300,000 upon the death of the mortgagor-insured.22'
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's summary
judgment in favor of MLIC and remanded the case so the trial court could
proceed with a full blown declaratory-judgment trial on the merits.222 But
immediately, the Fifth Circuit realized that deciding in favor of Sondra
presented a slew of troublesome and awkward procedural problems for several
important reasons."' First, during the declaratory-judgment hearing, "Sondra
did not move for summary judgment on the waiver or estoppel issues in the
district court."224 Instead, she filed a countersuit against MLIC alleging an
assortment of tort- and contract-based causes of action.2"
Second, MLIC was "surprised on appeal. '226 The mortgage insurer did
not have "an opportunity-even at the summary judgment stage-to develop
the evidentiary record or to brief [the waiver and estoppel] issues fully. 227
Third, two clearly undisputed facts appeared in the record: (1) MLIC issued
and delivered a mortgage insurance contract to the Jenkinses; and (2) MLIC
only asked the district court for declaratory relief.228 But, to address the
declaratory-judgment issue, the district court only had to (1) read the contract,
(2) employ one of five doctrines of contract interpretation that Texas has
219. Id. at 314 n.18; see also Kennedy v. McMullen, 39 S.W.2d 168, 174 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1931, writ ref'd) (concluding that "conditions precedent may be waived" (quoting 10 TEX. JUR.
Contracts § 270 (1930))); Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Benton, 728 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tex. 1987)
(concluding that "the waiver of a condition precedent may be inferred from a party's conduct" (citing Ames
v. Great S. Bank, 672 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Tex. 1984))).
220. Monumental, 403 F.3d at 314.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 315.
223. See id. at 315 n.21.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 310.
226. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976). "It is the general rule, of course, that a
federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below." Id. The Hormel Court explained
that this is "essential in order that parties may have the opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe
relevant to the issues... [and] in order that litigants may not be surprised on appeal by final decision there
of issues upon which they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence." Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S.
552, 556 (1941); see Coggin v. Longview Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F.3d 459, 470 (5th Cir. 2003) (embracing
the Hormel and Singleton rule that to give litigants the opportunity to offer all relevant evidence and to
eliminate surprises on appeal, federal appellate courts should not consider issues that the parties failed to
raise in the district courts).
227. Monumental, 403 F.3d at 315 n.21.
228. Id. at 304, 307-09.
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embraced,229 and (3) declare that MLIC had no contractual duty to pay
proceeds under the contract.230
Instead, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
engaged in a highly questionable but sanctioned practice that occurs all too
often and unnecessarily in state and federal declaratory-judgment trials. The
court simply granted the insurer's summary-judgment motion, which typically
concerns only questions of fact. However, the lower court should have
conducted a full blown declaratory-judgment proceeding.23' The latter
arguably would have been more appropriate and efficient since it allows a trial
judge to consider questions of fact as well as questions of law.232 Besides, in
its opinion, the Fifth Circuit even recognized and embraced this view:
"Although waiver is ordinarily a question of fact, when the facts and
circumstances are admitted or clearly established, the question becomes one
of law. 233
229. See Balandran v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 972 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. 1998) (reiterating that
insurance contracts are subject to the same traditional rules of construction as other contracts); Nat'i Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. 1991) (reaffirming that ambiguous language
in an insurance contract must be construed in favor of the insured); Arnold v. Nat'l County Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (concluding without deciding definitively that insurance contracts
are adhesion contracts because they arise "out of the parties' unequal bargaining power" and they "allow
unscrupulous insurers to take advantage of their insureds' misfortunes" during the bargaining process);
Kulubis v. Tex. Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 1986) (permitting an
innocent victim, who has an insurance contract that allows for loss reasonably expected, to collect when the
victim's property has been destroyed); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of Tex., 337 S.W.2d 284, 288
(Tex. 1960) (reiterating that courts must give words appearing in insurance contracts their plain meaning
when there is no ambiguity). But see Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 140 n.8 (Tex. 1994)
(observing that Texas law does not recognize the doctrine of reasonable expectation as a basis to disregard
unambiguous policy provisions).
230. See Monumental, 403 F.3d at 315.
231. See Willy E. Rice, Questionable Summary Judgments, Appearances of Judicial Bias, and
Insurance Defense in Texas Declaratory-Judgment Trials: A Proposal and Arguments for Revising Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure 166a(a), 166a(b), and 166a(i), 36 ST. MARY's LJ. 535, 638-39 & nn.487-88
(2005).
Texas's trial judges participate in another unsettling practice. Instead of conducting full-blown
declaratory-judgment trials, trial judges regularly grant or deny summary-judgment motions
without giving intelligible, meticulous, or studious explanations of their rulings. As a
consequence, Texas's appellate courts must spend an enormous amount of time and limited
judicial resources exploring various plausible theories to determine whether an unexplained
summary-judgment ruling was sound or erroneous. Texas's courts of appeals must engage in
such costly, wasteful, and unnecessary conduct whenever a party challenges any unfavorable
summary-judgment ruling because the Texas Supreme Court has been consistently clear
regarding one particular summary-judgment issue: When a trial court does not specify the
ground for a summary judgment, the appealing party may proffer multiple theories to establish
that the judgment was erroneous. In other words, to generate more costs and ensure that
appellate courts consume even more judicial resources, an appellant may present an assortment
of reasons to explain why a summary judgment was unwarranted.
Id. at 638-39.
232. See id. at 607-13 (establishing conclusively that trial courts have the power to decide both
questions of fact and law in declaratory judgment trials).
233. Monumental, 403 F.3d at 313 (quoting Motor Vehicle Bd. of the Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. El
Paso Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass'n, Inc., I S.W.3d 108, 111 (Tex. 1999) (emphasis added)).
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Instead, the Fifth Circuit addressed the bothersome procedural problems
outlined above this way:
We deem it prudent to remand these issues to the district court, which may
require full briefing on the issues or receive additional evidence, if any, into
the record--or both. At such a time, the district court may decide that
(1) summary judgment is proper if there still exists no genuine issue of
material fact, or (2) the case should proceed to a trial on the merits. 34
But, as this Author has argued elsewhere, completely removing summary-
judgment practice from declaratory-judgment trials will eliminate such
pointless and tortuous procedural issues as those appearing in Monumental.235
The evidence is fairly conclusive. Summary-judgment practice in a
declaratory-judgment trial is highly inferior to a full-blown declaratory-
judgment hearing and ruling on the merits.236 In such hearings, the district
judge must decide questions of fact, if there are any, questions of law, and
issue a final judgment, which would be the only reason for an appeal.237 Even
more important, barring litigants from filing summary-judgment motions in
declaratory-judgment proceedings will ensure more efficient and less costly
hearings that arguably would reduce the need for remands.238
E. Property Insurance-Business Interruption: Whether Texas's Law
Requires an Insurer to Compensate an Insured for Lost Profits Where the
Insured Allegedly Experienced Business Interruptions
Perhaps the facts and rulings in Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth
Insurance Co.239 present one of the clearest illustrations to justify eliminating
summary-judgment practice in federal and state declaratory-judgment trials.
Finger Furniture Company owns seven stores in Houston, Texas. 24° Tropical
Storm Allison arrived in the greater Houston metropolitan area in June 2001
and caused heavy rains and severe flooding. 24' As a result, the flooding
prevented Finger's employees from accessing the company's central computer
located in one of Finger' s stores.242 Because Finger could not access its central
computer, the company could not operate any of its Houston stores or make
any sales on Saturday, June 9, 2001 .243 However, Finger opened all of its
234. Id. (emphasis added).
235. See Rice, supra note 231, at 648-55.
236. Id. at 649.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 648-55.
239. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. Mar. 2005).






stores at various hours the next day, Sunday, June 10, 2001 .2' The company
also slashed prices the following weekend, June 16-17, 2001.245 Consequently,
customers purchased furniture at discounted prices and "sales soared."
246
Commonwealth Insurance Company insured Finger under a property-
insurance contract.2 47 More relevant, Finger paid an additional premium to
secure business-interruption coverage.248 Stated briefly, the purpose of the
insurance was "to indemnify the insured" for financial losses or lost profits,
where a "peril insured against" (e.g., terrorism, 249 an explosion, a fire, a storm,
or "business interruption") causes a business to lose money or reduce profits."0
Therefore, after assessing its June 9-10, 2001 losses, the furniture company
filed a loss-of-sales claim, citing the business-interruption endorsement and
seeking indemnification for lost profits.25'
The insurer refused to indemnify and commenced a declaratory-judgment
action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. 2
Like many insurers, Commonwealth filed the equitable action ostensibly for
four specific purposes.253 The insurer wanted the district court (1) to conduct
a full-blown declaratory-judgment trial on the merits, (2) to carefully read the
express, written contract, particularly the business-interruption endorsement,
(3) to interpret disputed words and phrases in the endorsement, and (4) to issue
a formal and final declaration that Commonwealth had no duty to indemnify
Finger. 4 Certainly, these types of reasons explain, in part, Congress's and the





248. See id. at 313-14; see also Bogley v. Middleton Tavern, Inc., 421 A.2d 571, 574 (Md. 1980)
(finding no evidence that "the full business interruption claim... involved a specifically prohibited risk"
and ruling against the insurer because Aetna did not show "that an additional premium would have been
payable because of a greater exposure").
249. See, e.g., N.Y. Career Inst. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 791 N.Y.S.2d 338, 341-44 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005) (describing a court's denial of summary relief to an insured who sued its business-interruption insurer
to recover reimbursements for loss of business income following the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001).
250. See, e.g., Quality Oilfield Prods., Inc. v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 971 S.W.2d 635,638 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). "is type of insurance is called use and occupancy insurance and is
defined as indemnification for any loss sustained by the insured because of his inability to continue to use
the premises or his inability to keep the premises occupied by a tenant." Id. (citing 1 GEORGE J. COUCH,
COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 1: 113 (2d ed. 1984)).
251. Finger, 404 F.3d at 313.
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. See Brief for Appellant at 4-22, Finger (No. 04-20359), available at 2004 WL 352583 I.
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of 1934255 and the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act of 1922,6
respectively.
To make the federal district judge's task easier, Finger and
Commonwealth stipulated that Finger lost $325,402.86 on June 9-10, 200 1.2
The parties used Finger's sales receipts for the same period during the prior
year-June 10-11, 2000-to compute that figure.25' Furthermore, the record
shows conclusively that the insurer and insured raised no question about any
material facts that would justify either party's filing a motion for summary
judgment2 9 Yet, both parties moved for summary relief.2
Once more, the outcome was quite predictable. The district court granted
Finger's motion for summary relief,26' thereby circumventing a full-blown
255. Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court in the United States ... may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration ....
Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be
reviewable as such.
Id.; see also Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord Over Whether Liability Insurers Must
Defend Insureds' Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct: A Historical and Empirical Review of
Federal and State Courts' Declaratory Judgments-] 900-1997, 47 AM. U. L REV. 1131, 1144 & n.66
(1998).
[J]udges must weigh several important factors before granting or denying declaratory relief...
[such as] (1) whether declaratory judgment would settle the controversy, (2) whether declaratory
action would clarify legal relations, (3) whether the use of a declaratory action would increase
friction between federal and state courts, and (4) whether an alternative, more effective legal
remedy exists.
Id. at 1144.
256. UNt. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT §2, 12A U.L.A. 1, 3 (1996) (giving any interested person
the power to ask courts to construe their "rights, status, or other legal relations" arising under a written
instrument); see also Rice, supra note 255, at 1142-43 & nn.56-62.
The purpose of the Act was: (1) to afford state "[c]ourts ... the power to declare rights, status,
and other legal relations"; (2) to harmonize state laws with the laws of the various states
regarding insurers' liability; and (3) to harmonize, as far as possible, "[state laws] with federal
laws and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments." Therefore, the hope was that any
question of construction or validity arising under a contract of any insured could be determined
and the rights, status, or other legal relation of any insured definitively established. At this time,
nearly all states have adopted the Act and two states have enacted substantially equivalent
versions.
Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, the trial judge has complete discretion to
grant or deny declaratory relief under a liability insurance contract. In addition, a state appellate
court may not review a trial judge's declaratory judgment unless evidence establishes that the
lower court abused its discretion.
Id. at 1142-43 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT
§1, 15 U.L.A. 313, 586 (1996).
257. Finger, 404 F.3d at 313.
258. Id. at 313 n.l.
259. See id. at 313.
260. Id.
261. Id.
[A] magistrate judge recommended that the district court enter summary judgment in favor of
Finger for $342,029.32. The district court adopted the magistratejudge's recommendation and
entered judgment in favor of Finger. Finger then asked for attorney's fees. The magistrate judge
[encouraged] the district court [to] grant Finger's request, with some exceptions. The district
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bench trial on the merits--one in which the judge should have done the
following: (1) carefully considered and intelligibly applied at least one of
Texas's doctrines of contract interpretation, (2) thoroughly researched Texas's
business-interruption rules, and (3) thoughtfully applied those common-law
rules to help reach a fair declaratory judgment. Instead, the district court
simply granted summary relief, without providing a full analysis of the legal
question and without providing an intelligible explanation of or justification
for its summary relief.262
Of course, the trial judge's conduct in Finger only mirrors the highly
sanctioned practice of arguably awarding unfair and questionable summary
judgments in federal and state courts. Without doubt, the cavalier manner in
which the district court granted summary relief only contributes to a
widespread and bothersome perception: All too often summary-judgment
practice is highly unwarranted, unfair, unlawful, and dangerous. This view
originated among learned jurists in mid-Eighteenth Century England2 63 and it
court entered an award of $79,201.00 for attorney's fees.
Id. (emphasis added).
262. Id.; see also Rice, supra note 231, at 550-56 & nn.53-74.
Many Texans believe adamantly that the Texas Supreme Court and lower courts are particularly
biased against powerless plaintiffs. In addition, consumers believe Texas's judges systematically
ignore consumers' concerns and deliver biased pro-business decisions. More specifically,
insurance consumers think the Texas Supreme Court's decisions are generally biased in favor
of powerful insurance companies, because insureds are significantly less likely to receive
favorable rulings. Furthermore, a significant number of Texans believe the Texas Supreme
Court and appellate courts generate unduly tortuous and complex analyses to justify arguably
extremely biased, highly questionable, and wildly unwarranted decisions.
Undeniably, these perceptions are exceedingly unsettling and potentially dangerous, for
they could seriously erode the public's confidence in judges and respect for judicial decisions.
•.. Certainly, Texas's courts have awarded summary relief to large classes of plaintiffs. But all
too often judges do not explain their summary rulings or why they blocked trials by jury. Yet
efforts to force courts to state explicitly and intelligibly their reasons for granting or denying
summary relief have been ineffective. Arguably, this omission-more than any other reason-
explains why there is so much anger and frustration among a wide spectrum of Texans and why
so many Texans have negative attitudes toward judges and summary-judgment practice.
Id. at 550-56 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
263. See Rice, supra note 231, at 542-44 & nn.32-36.
In Ex parte Greenhouse, a group of interested persons filed a summary-judgment motion under
the Charities Procedure Act.... The court awarded summary relief.
Sir Romilly supported the lower court's award of summary relief and observed, "[Neither
the court] nor the Master acting as its organ, has any authority to proceed otherwise than as
directed by the act .. " Lord Hart thought differently and asserted: ... "[This is a] dangerous
... innovation in the rules of evidence." Lord Redesdale was even more cynical and emphatic
about the pitfalls of summary-judgment practice. He argued: "[T]his Act ought to be construed
... merely.., for the purpose of saving either time or expense. Unquestionably, [the Charities
Procedure Act is] loosely and incorrectly worded.... It was not intended to alter the law ....
I conceive that the [intent] of this Act... was simply... to substitute a summary proceeding
[for] a more regular proceeding. [Still,] I have an objection, a fixed and rooted objection, to any
rash alterations of established laws, because I am thoroughly persuaded that, generally speaking,
such alterations lead to mischief."
Id. at 542-44 (footnotes omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte Greenhouse, 36 Eng. Rep.
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continues today among similar jurists and commentators in Texas.26
Commonwealth appealed 265 the district court's highly questionable and
adverse summary-judgment ruling to the Fifth Circuit. And the appellate court
correctly recognized that the district court's summary-judgment award in favor
of Finger was suspect and that the lower court did not perform a proper
analysis to determine whether the insurer should have received a declaratory
judgment.266 To correct the district court's deficiencies, the Fifth Circuit
performed an unduly short and less than stellar de novo review of the lower
court's summary-judgment decision.267
The Fifth Circuit stated: "This court reviews the 'legal determinations in
a district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo, applying the
same standards as the district court to determine whether summary judgment
was appropriate. '  Of course, a full-blown and thoughtful declaratory-
judgment analysis would have been more fitting. The reason is not terribly
complicated: The District Court for the Southern District of Texas did not
apply any legal standard to reach its summary-judgment ruling.2 69 In fact, the
federal district court did not explain or even attempt to explain its ruling.27°
Instead, the lower court simply adopted a magistrate's recommendation and
granted Finger's motion for summary relief.27 '
Even more disturbing, the Fifth Circuit-wittingly or unwittingly-
mischaracterized the essence of Commonwealth's legal question.272 To repeat,
the insurer asked the district court to examine the business-interruption
endorsement and determine whether Commonwealth had a contractual duty to
indemnify Finger.273 The court of appeals, however, improperly restyled the
question, stating, "[the first issue on] appeal is how to calculate a loss under
297 (ch. 1818); Corp. Of Ludlow v. Greenhouse, 4 Eng. Rep. 780 (H.L 1827)).
264. See id. at 545 & rn.38-39.
Early on, Texas jurists and commentators voiced similar alarms [like jurists in England]
about the real and potential dangers associated with summary-judgment motions. For example,
three years after the Texas Supreme Court approved summary proceedings, Roy McDonald-the
renowned commentator on Texas Civil Procedure-warned: "[Slummaryjudgment practice is
not without its dangers." To prove his point, he cited trial judges' comments, rulings, and
experiences.
Id. at 545 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Roy W. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 TEx. L. REv. 285, 287
(1952)).
265. See Finger, 404 F.3d at 312.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 314.
268. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Denning, 394 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. Dec. 2004)) (emphasis added).
269. See id. at 312.
270. See id.





the business-interruption provision of [the insurance contract]. Common-
wealth contends the district court should have offset Finger's losses on June
9-10, 2001 with Finger's post-storm profits on June 16-17, 2001.,274
As reported earlier, Commonwealth and Finger stipulated the amount of
the loss. 275  Therefore, a factual dispute about offsetting did not exist.27 6
Again, Commonwealth wanted the district court to declare that
Commonwealth had no duty to indemnify Fingerfor any financial loss under
the terms of the endorsement, which stated in pertinent part:
"[Commonwealth] shall be liable for the ACTUAL LOSS SUSTAINED by
[the] insured resulting directly from such interruption of business, but not
exceeding the reduction in gross earnings less charges and expenses which
do not necessarily continue during the interruption of business.
In determining the amount of gross earnings ...for the purposes of
ascertaining the amount of loss sustained, due consideration shall be given
to the experience of the business before the date of the damage or destruction
and to the probable experience thereafter had no loss occurred.27
Like most states, Texas has adopted five doctrines to interpret language
in insurance contracts as well as parties' rights and obligations under such
agreements.27 Generally, when Texas or other state courts apply the doctrines
of adhesion, ambiguity, or reasonable expectation, insureds are more likely to
prevail in "true" declaratory-judgment hearings.279 Conversely, insurers are
more likely to prevail when courts apply the plain-meaning doctrine and the
"four comers" doctrine-the traditional rules of contract construction and
interpretation.280
In Finger, the Fifth Circuit applied Texas's four comers doctrine,
concluding that "if a policy... can be given only one reasonable construction,
the court must enforce the policy as written., 28' Then the court of appeals
274. Id.
275. See id.
276. See id. If a factual dispute about offsetting actually appeared in the district court, the reported
facts are incomplete, thereby suggesting even further that the analysis in Finger is less than intelligible and
complete. Compare id. ("Commonwealth and Finger stipulated that Finger incurred a gross-earnings loss
of $325,402.86 on June 9-10, 2001."), with id. at 314 ("Commonwealth claims that Finger did not sustain
an actual loss under [the endorsement] because Finger [recouped the sales on June 16-17, 2001] that it did
not make on June 9-10, 2001.").
277. Id. at 314 (quoting business-interruption provision) (emphasis added) (first alteration in
original).
278. See Rice, supra note 231, at 549-55.
279. See generally Rice, supra note 255, at 1162-65 & nn.164-82 (listing the various doctrines and
illustrating how state and federal courts apply them to interpret rights and obligations under insurance
contracts).
280. See id.
281. Finger, 404 F.3d at 314.
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concluded a bit too hastily that "the business-interruption provision has only
• • ,,282
one reasonable interpretation. What was the reasonable conclusion? The
Fifth Circuit stated: "The policy language indicates that a business-
interruption loss [would] be based on historical sales figures....
[Consequently, t]he district court did not err in calculating Finger's loss.,283
Without doubt, the court of appeals failed to focus its attention on the
critical sentence in the endorsement that generated the conflict between
Commonwealth and Finger. That sentence stated: "'[Commonwealth] shall
be liable for the [insured's] ACTUAL LOSS ... resulting directly from [the]
interruption ofbusiness.'",2 Although "Commonwealth and Finger stipulated
that Finger incurred a gross-earnings loss of $325,402.86 on June 9-10, 2001,"
Commonwealth adamantly insisted that "business-interruption" did not
produce the gross loss. 28 5  Or, stated another way, the insurer claimed that
business-interruption-the true peril insured against-was not the efficient
proximate cause of the loSS. 2
86
Therefore, from the very outset, the court of appeals and the district court
should have asked the following: What is the meaning of the term "business
interruption" under Commonwealth's insurance endorsement? And if the
282. Id.
283. Id. at 314-15.
284. Id. at 314 (quoting business-interruption provision) (emphasis added).
285. Id. at 313-14. ("Commonwealth claims that Finger did not sustain an actual loss under this
provision .... ). Furthermore, in Finger, it should be reasonably clear that "business interruption"--rather
than Tropical Storm Allison or the flood-was the "covered peril" or the "peril insured against." See id.
Therefore, the former rather than the latter perils must produce or cause the gross loss. However, under
other property-insurance contracts, insurers promise to indemnify the insured if a different covered peril-a
fire, a flood, or a storm--causes a "necessary interruption of business." See, e.g., Bagelman's Best, Inc. v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. COA03-1413, 2004 WL 2793214, at *2 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2004)
(observing that the insurance contract stated, "We will pay your loss and expense resulting from the
necessary interruption of business caused by an 'accident' to any equipment"); U.S. Airways, Inc. v.
Commonwealth Ins. Co., No. 03-587, 2004 WL 1094684, at *1 n.2 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 14, 2004) (observing
that the insurance contract stated, "Coverage under the policy includes damage to real and personal property
[and] business interruption ... caused by damage to records of accounts receivable"). In Finger, it appears
that the Fifth Circuit viewed business interruption as an effect, a result, or a consequence of a cause
-Tropical Storm Allison or the flooding-rather than determining whether business interruption was the
cause of an effect, namely the cause of the gross loss. From a property insurer's perspective and under law,
the distinction between these two perceptions is significant.
286. See, e.g., Stroburg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 464 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex. 1971).
[W]e have held that "'proximate cause' as applied in insurance cases has essentially the same
meaning as that applied by our own courts in negligence cases, except that in the former the
element of foreseeableness or anticipation of the injury as a probable result of the peril insured
against is not required." By this rule, a remote cause of a cause would not be a proximate cause.
Id. (quoting Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Raley, 109 S.W.2d 972, 974 (Tex. 1937)) (citation omitted).
[fIn cases where the insurance policy does not in express terms so provide .... the insurer [does
not become] liable for a loss unless the loss is proximately caused by the peril insured against
.... Moreover.... the term "proximate cause" as applied in insurance cases has essentially the
same meaning as that applied by our own courts in negligence cases, except that in the former
the element of foreseeableness or anticipation of the injury as a probable result of the peril
insured against is not required.
Raley, 109 S.W.2d at 974 (emphasis added).
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contract did not define that phrase, the Fifth Circuit should have carefully
researched and applied Texas's law. To be sure, the court of appeals did not.
Without citing or discussing a single Texas court decision, the Fifth Circuit
apparently embraced a layperson's definition of the term and simply
concluded, incorrectly, that Finger experienced business interruption on both
days-Saturday and Sunday, June 9th and 10th, respectively.28 7
But Texas's law compels courts to ask the following: Does business
interruption mean a total cessation or shutdown of all business operations? Or,
does it mean a slow down or a reduction in major operations, leaving the
insured with the ability to continue minor business activities? The prevailing
rule in Texas is clear: Before a court forces an insurer to indemnify an insured
for "a loss caused by business interruption, 2 8 probative evidence must
establish that the insured ceased or suspended all business operations.289 In
Texas, as in the majority of jurisdictions, establishing only lost earnings or
profits-without also proving a complete cessation of operations-is
insufficient. 290
In the present case, one fact is incontrovertible: "Finger could not operate
any of its Houston stores on Saturday, June 9, 2001, and no sales were made
on that date. [However,] [a]ll of Finger's stores opened at various times on
Sunday, June 10, 2001. "291 Yet, the company insisted that (1) business
interruptions occurred on both days, and (2) Commonwealth should pay "a
287. See, e.g., Finger, 404 F.3d at 314 (stating that "[tihe strongest and most reliable evidence of
what a business would have done had the catastrophe not occurred is what it had been doing in the period
just before the interruption" (emphasis added)).
288. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murray Guard, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 180, 181 (Ark. 2001) ("St.
Paul asserted that the Wright Law Firm was covered under an 'errors and omissions' policy ... for loss
caused by business interruption."); Cleland Simpson Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, 140 A.2d 41, 42
(Pa. 1958) ("The action is assumpsit on policies of insurance covering the plaintiff against losses caused
by business interruption under circumstances insured against.").
289. See Quality Oilfield Prods., Inc. v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 971 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) ("considering the policy as a whole, [examining] persuasive authority
from other jurisdictions [and concluding] that 'interruption of business' is an unambiguous term meaning
Icessation or suspension of business'); Royal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Mikob Props., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 155, 159
(S.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that under Texas's law, the insurer had no duty to indemnify the insured for loss
of income when the peril insured against a fire caused damage to adjacent buildings because the insured
never suspended operations on the adjacent buildings). But see Lexington Ins. Co. v. Island Recreational
Dev. Corp., 706 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (declaring that the insurer
had a duty to indemnify the insured when a covered peril, a storm, caused business losses, even though the
insured's restaurant remained open for business).
290. See, e.g., Ramada Inn Ramogreen, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 835 F.2d 812, 814(11th
Cir. 1988) (holding that an insured could not recover under the business-interruption clause for decline in
occupancy of a hotel that remained open following a fire in the restaurant); Nat'l Children's Expositions
Corp. v. Anchor Ins. Co., 279 F.2d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 1960) (concluding that the insured could not recover
for partial business-interruption loss because the insured's building was open during the entire period when
an unprecedented snow storm reduced attendance at an exposition); Keetch v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co.,
831 P.2d 784, 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the insured could not recover under business-
interruption insurance contract when volcanic ash caused damage to the insured's motel, thereby reducing
the quality of service to customers, but allowing the insured to continue to operate the motel).
291. Finger, 404 F.3d at 313.
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gross-earnings loss of $325,402.86 [for] June 9-10, 2001.,,292 Clearly, Texas's
law does not require Commonwealth to pay that total amount. But it is equally
clear that the Fifth Circuit's failure to apply Texas's business-interruption rule
caused the court to deliver a poorly reasoned, highly questionable, and,
arguably, unfair ruling.293
F. Property Insurance-Condominiums: Whether a Property Insurer Has
a Contractual Duty to Compensate a Condominium Association Under
Texas's Law After Hail Damaged the Condominium Owners' Property
The general substantive debate in Ridglea Estate Condominium Ass'n v.
Lexington Insurance Co. concerned whether a property insurer had a
contractual duty to indemnify an insured after the insured filed a notice-of-loss
claim and requested a reimbursement for property losses.294 The specific
procedural conflict in Ridglea involved whether the insurer could advance a
breach-of-notice affirmative defense and prevail.295 Unlike its analysis in
Finger, the Fifth Circuit presented a very lucid and coherent analysis in
Ridglea. And the competing explanation for the latter performance is clear:
The court of appeals thoroughly researched and applied Texas's law to reach
a fair conclusion.
Ridglea Estate Condominium Association (Ridglea) operated on behalf
of condominium owners in Fort Worth, Texas.296 In July 2001, a roofing
inspector informed Ridglea that hail had severely damaged the roofs of the
condominiums.297 When the association discovered the damage, Chubb
Custom Insurance (Chubb) insured the property. 298 Therefore, four months
later, in November 2001, Ridglea submitted a claim to Chubb.29 Chubb
inspected the roofs and concluded that a hail storm probably caused the
damage. 3"
There was, however, a slight wrinkle. The only hail storm in greater Fort
Worth had occurred six years earlier on May 5, 1995. °1 Therefore, Chubb
instructed Ridglea to submit a notice-of-loss claim to Lexington Insurance
Company (Lexington), the insurer who insured the property from February
292. Id.
293. Id. at 316 ("Finger is entitled to judgment in the amount of its stipulated loss, and the district
court did not err .... Consequently, the court affirms the district court's judgment").
294. See Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass'n v. Lexington Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. Jan. 2005).
295. Id. at 334.





301. Jennifer Miller, Fort Worth Hailstorm of6 May 1995, Apr. 26, 1996, available at http://www.
ems.psu.edu/- diercks/miller.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
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1995 to February 1996.302 Ridglea immediately submitted a claim to
Lexington.303 Lexington's claims adjuster inspected the damaged roofs. ° 4
Lexington concluded that the financial loss did not exceed Ridglea's
deductible under Lexington's property-insurance contract.3 5 Lexington also
failed to find evidence to prove conclusively that the loss occurred during the
policy period. 3° Consequently, Lexington denied Ridglea's claim on
December 19, 2001-six years, seven months, and fourteen days from the
purported loss on May 5, 1995.307
After a year of intense negotiations and Ridglea's final demand for
$449,198.63 and attorney's fees, Lexington denied the claim again.30 8 Then,
the insurer commenced a declaratory-judgment action in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas.309 Lexington petitioned the
federal district court to declare that Lexington had no contractual duty to
indemnify Ridglea for the hail damage. 3'0 The district court dismissed the
declaratory-judgment suit, realigned the litigants, and made Ridglea the
plaintiff in a direct-action suit against Lexington.31" '
Although the report did not clearly state Ridglea' s cause of action against
Lexington, a fair reading suggests that Ridglea sued Lexington for a breach of
contract. " Both parties filed summary-judgment motions.31 3 The district
court granted Lexington's motion, holding that Ridglea's failure to comply
with the policy's notice requirement barred the direct-action suit.314 The
district court found that Ridglea had a contractual obligation to give "prompt
notice of the loss or damage" before filing the lawsuit.3 5 The lower court also
concluded that Ridglea did not satisfy another condition precedent before
commencing the lawsuit: The aggrieved insured had a duty to contact
Lexington and provide, "'as soon as possible[,] a description of how, when and
where the loss or damage occurred.' ' 3 16
Again, the purported property loss occurred in May 1995, but Ridglea did
not send a notice-of-loss claim to Lexington until November 2001.317
Therefore, from the district court's perspective, the passing of over six years
302. Ridglea, 398 F.3d at 333.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 334.






311. Id. at 333-34.




316. Id. (quoting Ridglea's insurance policy) (alteration in original).
317. Id. at 333.
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prejudiced Lexington, thereby preventing a rational trier of facts to conclude
that Ridglea reported the hail damage and financial loss "within a reasonable
time. ' '3 8 Ridglea appealed the district court's adverse summary-judgment
ruling.319
Before the Fifth Circuit, Ridglea argued that the District Court for the
Northern District of Texas committed reversible error in four instances: (1) by
concluding that Lexington did not waive its right to advance the affirmative
defense--"breach of notice," (2) by failing to conclude that the notice
requirement was void "as a matter of public policy," (3) by failing to find an
ambiguous notice provision that would have allowed the court to construe the
notice clause against Lexington and in favor of Ridglea, and (4) by concluding
that Lexington did not have to show prejudice, thereby allowing the insurer to
proffer breach of notice as an affirmative defense.32
The Fifth Circuit addressed and quickly decided the waiver, public-
policy, and ambiguity issues.321 First, Ridglea cited Farmers Insurance
Exchange v. Nelson322 and argued that under Texas's law, an insurer waives
the notice requirement-before an insured commences a lawsuit-when the
"insurer denies a claim for reasons unrelated to" the insured's notice of loss.
323
According to Ridglea, the insurer violated this rule.324 Lexington cited United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bimco Iron & Metal Co.325 and argued that
the Supreme Court of Texas created an exception to the general rule appearing
in Farmers Insurance Exchange.326
In Bimco, the Texas Supreme Court held that an insurer's total denial of
liability-on any grounds after the insured's deadline for filing a proof of loss
had expired-would not constitute a waiver of the breach-of-notice defense. 7
318. Id. at 334.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 334-37.
322. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Nelson, 479 S.W.2d 717,721-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
323. Ridglea, 398 F.3d at 334.
324. Id. at 334.
[Ridglea maintained that Lexington] waived any defense it might have under the policy's prompt
notice provision because [the insurer] originally denied the claim [solely because] the damage
did not occur during the coverage period.... [But] Ridglea note[d] that Lexington's claims
adjuster originally gave only one reason [for denying Ridglea's claim]-a lack of evidence that
the hail damage occurred during the coverage period .... [Thus, according to Ridglea, as a
result of the insurer's failure to identify breach of notice] as an independent reason for [denying]
the claim, Lexington waived its late notice defense.
Id.
325. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Bimco Iron & Metal Corp., 464 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. 1971).
326. Ridglea, 398 F.3d at 334.
327. Bimco Iron & Metal Corp., 464 S.W.2d at 357; see also Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Modem
Exploration, Inc., 757 S.W.2d 432, 436 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ) (embracing Bimco and holding
that "waiver of [a] notice requirement occurs when the insurer denies liability within the time limited for
giving notice," but also concluding that "a total denial of liability on any grounds after the time limited for
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To reach a proper conclusion, the Fifth Circuit decided to determine whether
Bimco's exception to the waiver rule applied in this case.328 After completing
that analysis, the court of appeals declared that Lexington did not waive the
notice of loss requirement.
329
Second, Ridglea argued, in part, that the notice-of-loss provision was void
and unenforceable as a matter of public policy because the clause violated
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 16.07 1.330 That statute
provides in pertinent part that "a contract stipulation [requiring] a claimant to
give notice of a claim for damages as a condition precedent to the right to sue
on the contract is not valid unless the stipulation is reasonable. A stipulation
that requires notification within less than [ninety] days is void., 33 ' Ridglea
also cited Western Indemnity Co. v. Free and Accepted Masons of Texas for
the proposition that a notice-of-loss provision violates section 16.07 1, because
notification within less than ninety days lends itself to an imprecise
interpretation.332  Lastly, the condominium association argued that because
"prompt is a synonym for immediate," the "prompt notice" requirement in
Lexington's insurance contract was unenforceable under section 16.07 1.
Addressing the insured's argument, the appellate court observed that
section 16.071 "outlawed stipulations requiring notice of claims for damages
within [ninety] days."3 " But the notice-of-loss clause in Ridglea's insurance
contract "requir[ed] notice of an 'event of loss or damage' to insured
property."335 After examining Texas's law,336 the Fifth Circuit declared that
giving notice would not constitute a waiver of the defense of unreasonably late notice").
328. Ridglea, 398 F.3d at 335.
Our task, then, is to determine whether the exception to the waiver rule set forth in Bimco and
Stonewall Insurance applies in the case before us. In order to do so, we must determine whether
Lexington's December 19, 2001 denial of liability was made within the policy's time limit for
giving notice, or after it had expired. Because Lexington's denial of liability was made shortly
after Ridglea's November 2001 notice of damage, the district court's conclusions as to the
timeliness of notice provide a useful benchmark for the waiver inquiry.
Id.
329. Id. at 335-36. "In sum, because Ridglea gave its notice of damage after the period for prompt
notice had expired, Lexington's subsequent general denial of liability likewise came 'after the time limited
for giving notice' and thus did not constitute a waiver of the defense of late notice." Id.
330. Id. at 337.
331. TEx. CIV. PRAc.&REM. CODEANN. § 16.071 (Vernon 2005).
332. Ridglea, 398 F.3d at 339 (citing W. Indem. Co. v. Free & Accepted Masons of Tex., 268 S.W.
728, 728-29 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, holding approved)); see also Round Rock Indep. Sch. Dist. v. First
Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am., 324 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 1963) (holding that provisions calling for immediate
notice are capable of being read as requiring notice in less than ninety days and thus unenforceable).
333. Ridglea, 398 F.3d at 337.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. See, e.g., Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Harper, 129 Tex. 249, 103 S.W.2d 143 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1937, no writ) (reviewing Vernon Civil Statutes article 5546-a nearly identical predecessor
to section 16.071--and concluding that a stipulation requiring notice of an event of loss or damage was
enforceable under article 5546 because a "'[n]otice that an automobile had been stolen"' was not the same
as 'notice of a claim for damages"' (quoting Cooley's Brief on Insurance)); Cmty. Bank & Trust v. Fleck,
20061
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
the distinction between the two notice requirements was significant and
concluded that Ridglea's public-policy argument was unsound.337
Third, citing Texas's doctrine of ambiguity,338 Ridglea argued that the
notice-of-loss provision was ambiguous.339 More specifically, Ridglea claimed
that "prompt" was an ambiguous term; therefore, the prompt notice period
could not have begun to run until Ridglea actually discovered the damaged
roofs, "no matter how objectively unreasonable its failure to discover the
damage may have been."'  But the Fifth Circuit dismissed this argument,
citing a prevailing rule under Texas's common law: When an insurance
contract does not define "prompt," courts must construe the term to mean that
"notice must be given within a reasonable time after [an] occurrence. ' '3 1 And
to repeat, the Fifth Circuit accepted the district court's conclusion that
Ridglea's giving notice to Lexington six-plus years after the hail allegedly
damaged the roof was simply unreasonable. 342
The Fifth Circuit, however, refused to dismiss Ridglea's fourth argument
so quickly. Again, the insured argued that reversible error occurred when the
district court concluded that Lexington had no duty to show prejudice when
Ridglea breached the notice-of-loss provision.343 Below, the district court
embraced Lexington's argument that the prejudice requirement applies only
to disputes involving liability insurance contracts.3" On the other hand,
Ridglea stressed that Texas's law requires an insurer to show prejudice
-regardless of the type of policy-if an insurer intends to use breach-of-
notice as an affirmative defense.345
107 S.W.3d 541, 542 (Tex. 2002) (affirming Harper); see also Am. Airlines Employees Fed. Credit Union
v. Martin, 29 S.W.3d 86, 97 (Tex. 2000) (declaring that "section 16.071 ... does not apply here, when the
notice to be given is not notice of a claim for damages, but rather notice of unauthorized transactions. The
purpose of this notice requirement... is to prevent further unauthorized transactions.").
337. Ridglea, 398 F.3d at 336-37.
338. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Tri-State Cattle Feeders, Inc., 628 S.W.2d 844,846 (Tex. App.
-Amarillo 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.) (stating, in dicta, that "[ain ambiguous clause in an insurance policy
[must] be strictly construed in favor of the insured").
339. Ridglea, 398 F.3d at 337.
340. Id.
341. See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Modem Exploration, Inc., 757 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, no writ) (citing Nat'l Sur. Corp. v. Diggs, 272 S.W.2d 604, 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
342. Ridglea, 398 F.3d at 337.
343. Id.
344. Id.; see Hanson Prod. Co. v. Am. Ins. Co., 108 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1997).
[T]he Texas Department of Insurance [has] issued orders requiring a mandatory endorsement
in general liability and general automobile [insurance] policies stating that... "unless the
company is prejudiced by the insured's failure to comply with the requirement, any provision
of this policy requiring the insured to give notice of ... occurrence or loss ... shall not bar
liability under this policy."
Hanson Prod. Co., 108 F.3d at 629 (quoting an order issued by the Texas State Board of Insurance).
345. Ridglea, 398 F.3d at 337.
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The Fifth Circuit agreed.3 6 First, the court of appeals reviewed the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds. 347 In
Hernandez, the supreme court held that a violation of a condition precedent in
an insurance contract cannot bar an insured's right to recover insurance
proceeds unless the insurer establishes that the violation materially
prejudiced 348 the insurer's rights under the contract violation."
Therefore, embracing the Texas Supreme Court's reasoning and the
general principle underlying that reasoning, the Fifth Circuit declared that in
Texas, if insurers-all insurers-intend to use an insured's breach of a
condition precedent or notice-of-loss effectively as an affirmative defense,
insurers must prove that the breach materially prejudiced the insurers' rights.350
Applying this principle to the facts in Ridglea, the court of appeals held that
the district court committed reversible error as a matter of law.35' The lower
federal court should have forced Lexington to show that Ridglea materially
prejudiced the insurer's rights when Ridglea breached the prompt-notice
provision. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case and instructed the district court
to determine whether Ridglea raised questions of material fact as to whether
Ridglea's breach of notice materially prejudiced Lexington.352
346. Id.
347. lad at 337-38 (discussing Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1994)).
348. See Jack v. State, 694 S.W.2d 391, 398-99 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(embracing a fundamental principle of contract law that states that when one party to a contract commits
a material breach of that contract, the other party has no contractual obligation to perform) (citing Mead v.
Johnson Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685, 689 (Tex. 1981)).
349. Hernandez, 875 S.W.2d at 693.
Courts [must] consider, among other things, the extent to which the nonbreaching party will
[lose] the benefit that [the party] could have reasonably anticipated from full performance [when
determining the materiality of a breach] .... The less the non-breaching party [loses] the
expected benefit, the less material the breach [and prejudice] .... We conclude, therefore, that
an insurer who is not prejudiced... may not deny coverage ....
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241(a) (1981)); see also Hanson Prod. Co., 108 F.3d
at 630-31 (holding that the Texas Supreme Court's reasoning in Hernandez was straightforward; all
insurance policies are contracts; all contracts require material breach to excuse non-performance; and, for
a breach to be material, it must prejudice the non-breaching party in some way) (citing Hernandez, 875
S.W.2d at 692).
350. Ridglea, 398 F.3d at 338.
351. Id.
Because the district court erred as a matter of law in failing to require a showing of
prejudice, we need not address whether questions of material fact exist with regard to the
prejudicial effect of late notice. Where a trial court grants summary judgment [and] fails to
consider an element of a cause of action or defense, it has erred ... because it has failed to
determine that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the omitted element.
Id. (citing Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 407 (5th Cir. 1983)).
352. Id. at 339.
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G. Property Insurance-Homeowners: Whether Under Texas's Law a
Property Insurer Must Compensate Homeowners for "Covered" and "Non-
Covered" Losses After Mold Contaminated the Homeowners' Property
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
"'mold is everywhere"'353 and it "'has been here forever. ' ' 354 Even a
superficial swipe of one's hand through the air causes one to come into contact
with mold spores.355 In addition, the CDC estimates that about 100,000 mold
species populate the globe and about 1,000 are common to the United States.356
Even more interesting, while most mold species are nontoxic, others are
extremely hazardous and have the potential to contaminate and wreak havoc
in both residential and commercial structures.357 Further, exposure to certain
types of mold can cause severe health problems.358
Therefore, in light of the contamination and severe unwanted
consequences associated with certain mold, one can easily understand why
homeowners try to eradicate such contamination immediately. But the cost of
removing hazardous mold is expensive.359 So, it is equally understandable
why residential owners readily ask their homeowners' insurers to pay for
mold-abatement expenses or for reimbursements after the latter use out-of-
pocket funds to remove the contamination. Consequently, mold-related
insurance claims have soared substantially in recent years.
353. Gregory J. Wilcox, Mold Emerging as Major Issue for Homeowners, Insurance Industry, L.A.
DAILY NEWS, Mar. 17, 2002, at BI (quoting Jerry Carnahan, president of the personal insurance line for
the Farmers Group of Companies); see Center for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov (last
visited Feb. 10, 2006).
354. Wilcox, supra note 353, at B I (quoting Jerry Carnahan, president of the personal insurance line
for the Farmers Group of Companies).
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. See Sylvia Pefia-Alfaro, Comment, The Toxic Mold Terrifying Texas: Mold's Hold on the
Insurance Industry, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 541, 542 & nn.4-5 (2003) (presenting an excellent overview and
discussion of mold, mold contamination, and the legal conflicts between insureds and insurers surrounding
whether the latter have a contractual duty to indemnify).
358. Id. at 542 & nn.7-8.
359. See, e.g., Evan Pondel, Growing Problem-Insurance Companies Smarting Under Rising Mold
Claims; New Policy Requests Rejected, L.A. DAILY NEWS, June 16, 2002, at B 1.
[A]ccording to Brian Sullivan, the editor of Dana Point-based Property Insurance Report[,]...
[t]he problem is not mold per se; it's the threat of mold that has dramatically increased the cost
of repairing water damage .... The cost of ridding a home of mold and the construction that
ensues could run as high as $80,000, depending on how serious the problem is, according to Gil
Caspi, owner of Unique Restoration.
Id.
360. See, e.g., Moldering/Hysteria Should Not Drive Debate on Mold Insurance, Hous. CHRON.,
Sept. 19, 2001, at 38A (reporting that Texas policyholders filed increasing numbers of toxic black-mold
claims within the past eighteen months); Terrence Stutz, Insurer to Stop Selling Policies: State Farm Cites
Mold Losses in Ending New Sales to Homeowners, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 19, 2001, at 31A,
available at 2001 WLNR 10083541 (reporting that 9,000 mold-related claims occurred in the first half of
2001 as compared to only 2,600 claims occurring in the first half of 2000); Terrence Stutz, Rush Put on
Mold Coverage Findings: Insurance Official Orders Quick Homeowner Recommendations-Water
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But all too often, substantial numbers of homeowners discover that mold
and its eradication are not "covered perils" or "perils insured against" under
their property insurance contracts. Consequently, and quite frequently,
property insurers refuse to pay for mold-related losses and mold abatement.36'
In fact, citing an unacceptable rise in mold claims,362 lost profits generally,
363
and "lack luster performance in the financial markets"3" specifically, many
property insurers increased homeowners' premiums3 65  and stopped
underwriting mold coverage altogether.3"
Damages Losses Expected to Soar, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 2001, at 41A, available at 2001
WLNR 10082030 (reporting the steady rise in mold-related claims in Texas); Terrence Stutz, State Mold
Plan Criticized: Consumers, Insurers Say Compromise Does Little to Deal with Problem, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 17, 2001, at 25A, available at 2001 WLNR 10084664 (reporting that insurers' mold-
related claims for the first half of 2001 increased five times as compared to the first half of the prior year);
see also Sandra Fleishman, Home Insurance Rates Up Sharply; Industry Blames Stock Losses, Storm
Damage and Mold Claims, WASH. POST, Jun. 8, 2002, at El ("[In Texas, California, Louisiana and Florida,
the] number of claims from people who say mold is ruining their homes and sickening their families has
increased sharply .... ); Pondel, supra note 359, at BI ("A recent survey by the Insurance Information
Network of California showed that 32 percent of the property insurance claims filed in 2001 involved water
damage, which includes mold. When the survey began in 1997, 24 percent of the claims accounted for
water damage.").
361. See, e.g., Wilcox, supra note 353, at Bl.
In California, and most other states, mold is not covered by a homeowners' policy. "There is
no money in the rates for mold. Mold claims, if you will, are a relatively new phenomenon,"
said Jerry Carnahan, president the personal insurance line for the Farmers Group of Companies
.... [H]omeowners are covered for water damage only if it is sudden and accidental. Mold
resulting from this kind of happenstance would generally be covered. But Carnahan notes that
damage from these kinds of accidents is usually fixed right away. If mold results from
maintenance issues like leaks, flooding, condensation or humidity, the problem is the
homeowner's responsibility.
Id. (emphasis added).
362. See, e.g., Pondel, supra note 359, at B 1 ("[M]old has caused far more damage to the insurance
industry of late. As costs associated with claims continue to rise, insurance companies are having difficulty
absorbing the onslaught of expenses.").
363. See, e.g., Fleishman, supra note 360, at El ("Insurance firms ... say they lose money on
homeowners' policies.... [According to Donald L. Griffin of the National Association of Independent
Insurers, 2001] 'was the first year that the whole industry lost money.., about $ 7.9 billion, and it was the
first time our net worth fell below $ 300 billion since 1996[.]').
364. See, e.g., Pondel, supra note 359, at B1.
365. See, e.g., Fleishman, supra note 360, at El.
Homeowners insurance premiums are up as much as 25 percent in some parts of the country this
year and could double in some states, including Texas and California, because of... sharply
rising claims for mold damage. In Maryland and Virginia, there already have been double-digit
percentage increases.... Homeowners insurance rates in Maryland were up about 12.6 percent
in the first five months of the year, compared with 8.3 percent in 2001, said Maryland Insurance
Commissioner Steven B. Larsen. In Virginia, five of the top 10 insurers have been granted rate
increases ranging from 10.7 percent to 25 percent.
Id.
366. See, e.g., Pondel, supra note 359, at B1.
"Right now, there's a very tough market in California," said Lisa Wannamaker, a spokeswoman
for. . . Allstate Corp. "For this reason ... we decided not to write any more homeowners
insurance for anyone with prior losses in the last three years."... Among the largest insurers
in California, State Farm has stopped writing any new homeowner policies, at least temporarily.
Again, the company said the rising costs associated with claims, especially those involving water
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In recent years, highly disgruntled owners of residential property in
Texas367 and elsewhere have filed increasing numbers of toxic-mold lawsuits
against their insurers,36 given the latter's propensity to deny mold claims. To
be sure, the plaintiffs in Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds369 are members of that
group.37° Tropical Storm Allison "ravaged the Texas coastline in the summer
of 2001 . 37' Richard and Stephanie Fiess lived in Harris County in Allison's
path.372 Like the insured in Finger, the Fiesses' property flooded during the
storm.
3 73
Approximately one week after the storm, the Fiesses began removing
damaged sheetrock and discovered that an extensive amount of "black mold"
had contaminated their house.374 The mold grew "in the walls adjoining the
dining room, kitchen, bedrooms, and hall bath. 375 To get a precise description
of the mold, the Fiesses contacted NOVA Labs in Conroe, Texas.376 One of
NOVA's experts, Dr. Paul Pearce, inspected the house, took samples, and
damage, have stifled State Farm financially.
Id.
Rate increases are not the only aggressive steps that insurers are taking, according to consumer
activists. They are also tightening underwriting rules to weed out riskier customers or to limit
coverage of those who have filed more than two claims in three years.... State Farm, Allstate
and some other insurance companies have stopped writing new policies in Texas, California and
Louisiana in large part because of a large number of water-damage claims and because of the
costly mold cases. Florida may be the next state to lose insurers because of mold.
Fleishman, supra note 360, at El.
367. See, e.g., R.A. Dyer, Limited Relief Favored for Excessive Premiums, FORT WoRTH STAR-
TELuGRAM, May 27, 2005, at B6 (reporting that the Texas Legislature enacted legislation "in the wake of
an insurance crisis marked by multimillion-dollar lawsuits, toxic-mold claims, gubernatorial politics and
dramatic grassroots lobbying"); Purva Patel, Bay City, Texas Resident's Fight Against State Farm Has No
End in Sight, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 29, 2004, available at 2004 WL 12381260 (reporting that a "Bay City
resident,. . . a State Farm agent and his wife.., moved out of their mold-infested house and filed a lawsuit
against State Farm to help spur a settlement of his claim. But even that ... could play out for years in
court.").
368. See Fleishman, supra note 360, at El (reporting that 'Texas, California, Louisiana and Florida
[have experienced an escalation in] mold-related claims, lawsuits and awards").
Allstate has ... attached a $5,000 cap to mold claims, a necessary precaution given the costs
associated with repair[.]... And until the water damage and mold claims ebb, families... will
probably pursue litigation to settle their insurance issues. In the past six months, Agoura Hills-
based law firm Chulak & Shiffman has seen 18 plaintiffs involved in mold cases. The goal of
toxic mold lawsuits is to address the costs to fix underlying water problems, said Michael
Chulak. "I haven't been involved in a single case that I haven't settled without suing the
insurance company," Chulak said.
Pondel, supra note 359, at B 1.
369. Feiss v. State Farm Lloyds, 392 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. Dec. 2004).









determined that the hazardous mold was stachybotrys. 3" After a more
extensive inspection, the expert also discovered that "all of the naturally
occurring environmental molds, [plus] altemaria,378  chaetomium, 379
cladosporium, 3  aspergillus 311 [and] penicillium' 382 contaminated the house. 383
As the Fiesses' expert witness, Dr. Pearce was prepared to testify that
non-Allison related mold contaminated seventy percent of the insureds'
house. 38 That contamination originated from "water damage" associated with
"pre-flood roof leaks, plumbing leaks, heating, air conditioning and ventilation
(HVAC) leaks, exterior door leaks, and window leaks., 385 He determined that
Allison-related flooding caused the remaining thirty percent of the
contamination. 38 6 "He conceded, however, that the Allison-related damage had
been extensive, leaving mold [up to three feet] on virtually every wall, stud,
board and baseplate ... of the house. 38 7
When Tropical Storm Allison appeared, State Farm Fire & Casualty
Company insured the Fiesses' house under two insurance contracts-a flood-
insurance policy and a homeowners' contract.388 The Fiesses filed a claim
under the flood insurance policy, and State Farm issued a check for $48,626
so the insureds could repair their home and replace flood-damaged personal
property.389  The Fiesses also filed a mold-contamination claim under their
homeowners' insurance contract.3 ' Communicating its reservation of rights
under the contract, State Farm paid the Fiesses $34,425 for "non-covered mold
remediation" because the insurer's examination suggested that "small pre-
377. Id. "Stachybotrys atra" is "[a] mold that produces toxic compounds (mycotoxins). Prolonged
exposure can be associated with symptoms such as fatigue, hearing loss, and memory loss." J.E. SCHMIDT,
M.D., ArrORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER S-273 (2002).
378. "Altemaria" refers to "a genus of Fungi Imperfecti of the form-class Hyphomycetes, form-
family Dematiaceae; it has dark-colored conidia .... It causes several diseases of plants and is a common
allergen in human bronchial asthma." W.A. NEWMAN DORLAND, DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 54 (30th ed. 1994).
379. "Chaetomium" is "[a] genus of soil fungi. Some species may cause allergy." J.E. SCHMIDT,
M.D., supra note 377, at C-183.
380. "Cladosporium" is "[a] genus of fungi having dematiaceous or dark-colored conidiophores with
oval or round spores, commonly isolated in soil or plant residues." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 358
(27th ed. 1995).
381. "Aspergillus" refers to "[a] genus of fungi (class Ascomycetes) that contains many species, a
number of them with black, brown, or green spores. A few species are pathogenic for humans, avians, and
other animals." STEDMAN's, supra note 380, at 156.
382. "Penicillum" refers to "[a] genus of fungi (class Ascomycetes, order Aspergillales), species of
which yield various antibiotic substances and biologicals." STEDMAN's, supra note 380, at 1340.




387. Id. at 804-05.
388. See id.
389. Id. at 804.
390. Id. at 805.
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flood water leaks" contributed to mold formation.39'
Concluding that State Farm's offer was insufficient to fully cover the cost
of eradicating mold attributable to pre-flood water leaks and to pay for mold-
related damages, the Fiesses sued State Farm in Texas state court, listing a
variety of common-law and statutory causes of action in their complaint.392
Citing a diversity of citizenship, State Farm removed the case to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where the insurer filed
a motion for summary judgment.3 93 After reviewing the homeowners' policy
and Texas's law, the district court granted State Farm's motion."
The Fiesses appealed the adverse ruling, claiming that the federal district
court committed three reversible errors.395 First, the Fiesses argued that water
leaks-associated with faulty plumbing as well as with heating, ventilation,
and air conditioning-were covered perils under the homeowners' policy.39
Therefore, because water leaks were the efficient proximate cause of the mold,
State Farm could not raise the mold-exclusion clause as an affirmative
defense.397
The exclusion clause contained in section 1 of State Farm's homeowners'
contract stated in relevant part:
"f. We [State Farm] do not cover loss caused by:
(1) wear and tear, deterioration or loss caused by any quality in it to
damages or destroy itself.
(2) rust, rot, mold or other fungi.
(3) dampness of atmosphere, extremes of temperature.
(4) contamination.
We do not cover ensuing loss caused by collapse of building or any part
of the building, water damage or breakage of glass which is part of the
building if the loss would otherwise be covered under the policy.
i. We do not cover loss caused by or resultingfromflood, surface water,
waves, tidal water or tidal waves, overflow of streams or other bodies of
water or spay from any of these whether or not driven by wind."'3 9
391. Id.
392. Id. The insureds filed the action in the "27thJudicial District Court of Harris County, asserting
claims for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), breach of contract, and fraud and
intentional misrepresentation." Id. After removal to federal court, the "Fiesses then filed an amended





397. Id. at 806.
398. Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, No. Civ. A. H-02-1912, 2003 WL 21659408, at *6 (S.D. Tex. June
4, 2003) (quoting insurance policy) (emphasis added).
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The Fifth Circuit, however, refused to consider the purported HVAC and
plumbing-leaks exceptions under the exclusion clause, concluding that it did
not have jurisdiction.3" Put simply, the court of appeals found that the Fiesses
(1) did not intend to incorporate the district court's order-regarding the
exceptions-into their appeal since they filed their appeal before the lower
court issued its order, and (2) failed to file a new or amended notice of appeal
incorporating the order after the court issued the order.'
The insureds also argued that reversible error occurred when the district
court (1) rejected their expert witness's testimony, and (2) refused to address
their mold claims under the doctrine of concurrent causation."' The district
judge concluded, "Because the Fiesses are unable to meet their burden of
segregating the amount of damage caused solely by the purportedly covered
peril from that caused by excluded perils, their mold loss claim must fail under
the doctrine of concurrent causation."' 2 To evaluate the merits of this finding,
the Fifth Circuit reviewed the facts and Texas's law.403
At the outset, it is worth noting that courts must consider and apply
corollary rules when determining whether to give a litigant relief under the
"doctrine of concurrent causes. '" 4 4 An insured bears the initial burden of
proving that a liability insurance contract covers a loss, or that a peril insured
against under a property insurance contract caused a loss.' 5 If the insured
satisfies the initial burden, the burden shifts to the insurer, who must establish
that language in the exclusion clause prevents the insured from recovering
damages under the contract.' 6 If the insurance company satisfies its burden,
the burden shifts again to the insured.' °7 At that point, the policyholder must
prove that an exception exists, which precludes or negates the insurer's using
language in the exclusion clause as an affirmative defense."0
399. Fiess, 392 F.3d at 806; see also Warfield v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 904 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir.
1990) ("Where the appellant notices the appeal of a specified judgment only or a part thereof... this court
has no jurisdiction to review other judgments or issues which are not expressly referred to and which are
not impliedly intended for appeal.").
400. Fiess, 392 F.3d at 806-07; see also Warfield, 904 F.2d at 326 (stressing that if a litigant files
a notice of appeal before a court issues an order, the litigant clearly did not intend to incorporate the order).
401. Fiess, 392 F.3d at 807-08.
402. State Farm Lloyds, 2003 WL 21659408, at *10.
403. Fiess, 392 F.3d at 807-08.
404. See Wallis v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 2 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999,
pet. denied) (reaffirming that "Texas recognizes the doctrine of concurrent causes").
405. See Venture Encoding Serv., Inc. v. Ad. Mut. Ins. Co., 107 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2003, pet. denied); see also Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Vic Mfg. Co., 143 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1998)
(applying Texas's law).
406. Venture Encoding Serv., Inc., 107 S.W.3d at 733.
407. Id.
408. See Vic Mfg. Co., 143 F.3d at 193; Employers Cas. Co. v. Block, 744 S.W.2d 940, 945 (Tex.
1988), overruled by State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1996); Love of God
Holiness Temple Church v. Union Standard Ins. Co., 860 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993,
no writ).
2006] 869
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
Now, the "doctrine of concurrent causation is not an affirmative defense
or an avoidance issue; rather, it is a rule embodying the basic principle that
insureds are not entitled to recover under their insurance policies unless they
prove that [the policy covers] their damage."' 9 Put simply, it states the
following: When covered and noncovered perils concurrently create a loss, the
insured may receive damages only for the loss emanating from the covered
peril.4 ° Furthermore, since an insured may recover only for covered losses,
the insured carries the additional burden of segregating covered damages from
noncovered damages.a '
Therefore, the insured must "present some evidence upon which the jury
can allocate the damages attributable to the covered peril.'" 2 Although an
insured does not have "to establish the amount of his damages with
mathematical precision, there must be some reasonable basis upon which the
jury's finding [can rest]., '4 3 But the district court concluded that the Fiesses
could not prevail under the doctrine of concurrent causation.4 4 The lower
court ruled that the Fiesses produced "no evidence that would provide a
reasonable basis for distinguishing mold caused by the flood from mold caused
by non-flood events. 415
The Fifth Circuit, however, was not persuaded. Again, the Fiesses
produced expert testimony from Dr. Pearce establishing that nonflood related
water events produced seventy percent of the mold, and Allison-related
flooding caused the remaining thirty percent.41 6 Given that testimony, the
court of appeals concluded the Fiesses "successfully raised a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the amount of mold in their home not attributable to
Allison-induced flood waters. 4 7 Because Texas's courts only require insureds
to use a "reasonable basis" rather than "mathematical precision" to prove the
amount of "covered damages, 418 the court of appeals concluded that a jury
409. Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227,258 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.) (citing Wallis,
2 S.W.3d at 302-03).
410. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex. 1971); Paulson v. Fire Ins.
Exch., 393 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1965); Warrilow v. Norrell, 791 S.W.2d 515, 527 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1989, writ denied); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Rodriguez, 88 S.W.3d 313, 320-21 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (citing Wallis, 2 S.W.3d at 302).
411. See Rodriguez, 88 S.W.3d at 321 (quoting Wallis, 2 S.W.3d at 303).
412. Allison, 98 S.W.3d at 258-59 (citing Wallis, 2 S.W.3d at 303); see Rodriguez, 88 S.W.3d at 321.
413. Allison, 98 S.W.3d at 258-59 (citing Wallis, 2 S.W.3d at 303); see Rodriguez, 88 S.W.3d at 321.
414. Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, No. Civ. A. H-02-1912, 2003 WL 21659408, at *10 (S.D. Tex. June
4, 2003).
415. Id.
Damage to the residence caused by floodwaters is expressly excluded by the Policy. Although
the Fiesses' expert, Dr. Pearce, belatedly attributed 70% of the mold damage to water events
other than the flood... Dr. Pearce conceded at deposition that there was mold on every wall,
stud, baseboard, and base plate throughout the residence caused by the flood.
Id.
416. Feiss v. State Farm Lloyds, 392 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. Dec. 2004).
417. Id.
418. Id. at 808 n.24; Lyons v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co. of Tex., 866 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Tex. 1993)
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could determine whether a covered peril caused the extensive mold
contamination in the walls, and whether a covered peril caused the mold
contamination above the maximum point where the Allison-related flooding
occurred.419
Finally, the Fiesses argued that the "ensuing loss" language in the
exclusion clause covered their mold claims.42 ° Once more, the pertinent part
of the exclusion clause reads as follows: "'We [State Farm] do not cover loss
caused by: .. . mold or other fungi .... [But we] do cover ensuing loss
caused by... water damage. . . if the loss would otherwise be covered under
this policy.' 42 ' The Fifth Circuit, however, could not find any Texas Supreme
Court case that addressed the question of whether the "ensuing loss" language
covers mold-related contamination that stems from otherwise covered "water
damage.' '422
Certainly, Texas's lower courts have addressed the issue; but a major
conflict exists among those decisions. Some courts have forced insurers to
compensate insureds for mold contamination that results or ensues from a
covered water damage.423 Others have not.424 Rather than engaging in the
("When covered and excluded perils combine to cause an injury, the insured must present some evidence
affording the jury a reasonable basis on which to allocate the damage.") (citing Paulson v. Fire Ins. Exch.,
393 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1965); see, e.g., Wallis, 2 S.W.3d at 304 ("[T]here must be some reasonable
basis upon which the jury's finding rests."); see also Rodriguez, 88 S.W.3d at 321-22.
419. Fiess, 392 F.3d at 808.
420. Id. at 809.
421. Id. at 809 n.25 (quoting exclusion clause) (emphasis added).
422. Id. at 809.
423. See Home Ins. Co. v. McClain, No. 05-97-01479-CV, 2000 WL 144115, at *4 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding that mold contamination resulting or ensuing
from otherwise covered water damage is not excluded from coverage by virtue of the ensuing loss
provision); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 450 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, no writ) (construing
the ensuing loss provision as providing coverage for wood rot, an excluded loss, that was caused by
otherwise covered water damage); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Yates, 344 F.2d 939, 941 (5th Cir.
1965) ("A likely case for application of the [ensuing loss] clause would be if water... coming from a burst
pipe flooded the house and in turn caused rust or rot; loss from rust or rot so caused would be a loss ensuing
on water damage."); Flores v. Allstate Tex. Lloyd's Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 810, 814 n.3 (S.D. Tex. 2003)
("[T]his Court construes the mold exclusion as precluding coverage for mold occurring naturally or resulting
from a non-covered event, but not for mold 'ensuing' from a covered water damage event."); Salinas v.
Allstate Tex. Lloyd's Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 820, 824 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (finding that the HO-B policy covers
"mold claims to the extent that the claimed mold damage ensues from an otherwise covered water damage
event").
424. See, e.g., Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, No. Civ. A. H-02-1912, 2003 WL 21659408, at *7 (S.D.
Tex. June 4, 2003) ("For coverage to be restored via the ensuing loss clause, an otherwise covered loss must
result or ensue from the excluded loss."); Harrison v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co., No. 03-00-00362-CV, 2001 WL
391539, at *2 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) ("To qualify for the
exception [under the ensuing loss clause], ensuing water damage must follow from one of the types of
damage enumerated in exclusion (f). In other words, the ensuing loss provision covers water damage that
results from, rather than causes, rotting."); Zeidan v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 960 S.W.2d 663,666 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1997, no writ) (interpreting an ensuing loss provision in conformity with Lambros); Daniell
v. Fire Ins. Exch., No. 04-94-00824-CV, 1995 WL 612405, at *2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ)
("[W]hile an ensuing loss provision will cover water damage caused by an excluded event, it will not cover
the excluded event even if it is caused by water damage."); Lambros v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 530 S.W.2d
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controversial game of "Erie guessing, 4 25 the Fifth Circuit certified the ensuing
loss question to the Supreme Court of Texas. 426 Finally, the court of appeals
reversed the district court's summary judgment in part.427 The Fifth Circuit
found that the Fiesses provided sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact
regarding the degree to which nonflood related water damage caused the mold
contamination and their financial loss.
428
II[. THIRD-PARTY INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND CLAIMS: STATE COMMON-
LAW DECISIONS
A. Third-Party Liability Claims: Injury to Persons
1. Whether Under Louisiana's Law a Liability Insurer Has a Duty to
Defend and Indemnify Its Insured After Third-Party Victims Sued the
Insured for Injuries Originating on the Insured's Vessel
If a single contract and a single dispute were the focus of attention in
Johnson v. Seacor Marine Corp.,429 the case would be an ideal teaching tool
to use in a first-year contracts course. Seacor discusses or provides a fairly
extensive overview of several principles of contracts-sufficient versus
insufficient consideration, a promise for a promise, performance of a duty, a
pre-existing duty, exclusions, misrepresentations, waiver of legal rights,
equitable estoppel, subrogation of rights, and the rights of third-party
beneficiaries. 430 But, the central conflict in Seacor involves or implicates six
complicated, express-written contracts. 43' Additionally, fairly complicated
principles of admiralty law as well as the law of marine and liability insurance
appear in the decision.432 Therefore, attempting to understand the Fifth
Circuit's analysis would be an extremely taxing enterprise for novices.
138, 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd) (holding that "an ensuing loss caused by water
damage is a loss caused by water damage where the water damage itself is the result of a preceding cause"
that is excluded from coverage under the policy).
425. Compare Fiess, 392 F.3d at 811 ("We could make an Erie-guess [about] ... how the Texas
Supreme Court would resolve this conflict. We think the better approach, given the significance of the issue,
is to certify the question to the only court that can settle this uncertainty with finality."), with Transcon. Gas
Pipe Line Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 89 (1938) ("[Ilt is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can, what the highest court
of the state would decide.")). See generally Rice, supra note 3, at 921, 963, 1029 (criticizing unwarranted
Erie guessing and challenging the court to stop muddling settled Texas's law).
426. Fiess, 392 F.3d at 811.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Johnson v. Seacor Marine Corp., 404 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. Mar. 2005).
430. See id.
431. See id. at 873.
432. See id. at 871.
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However, the court's discussion in Seacor is somewhat challenging even
for arguably seasoned jurists. The reason is not terribly difficult: The Fifth
Circuit overlooked or disregarded some settled principles of contract law to
reach at least two questionable legal conclusions. Furthermore, the court of
appeals delivered questionable rulings because the tribunal apparently did not
clearly appreciate the relevant distinctions between marine-insurance contracts
and other agreements-liability-insurance, maritime, and ordinary contracts.
To be sure, if the court would have carefully examined the similarities and
differences between, for example, maritime and comprehensive general
liability (CGL) contracts, the analysis would have been more succinct,
convincing, and intelligible.
A careful review of the intricate facts and numerous contractual
agreements in Seacor should help illustrate the less-than-obvious problems
with the Fifth Circuit's decision in that case. First, several important parties
appear in the reported facts. Production Management Industries (PMI) is a
labor contractor.433 PMI provides labor and other support services for the oil
and gas industry in the Gulf of Mexico off the Louisiana coast.4' Gray
Insurance Company (Gray) is PMI's CGL insurer.435 Among other contractual
obligations, Gray agreed to defend PMI from third-party lawsuits and to
indemnify PMI under appropriate circumstances.436
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Chevron)437 and Matrix Oil and Gas Co. (Matrix) 438
are oil and gas companies. Among other operations, Chevron and Matrix
explore for and distribute oil and gas worldwide.4 39 More relevant, both
Chevron and Matrix also provide transportation services for other offshore oil-
and-gas companies and individuals working on various oil rigs."' SEACOR
Marine, Inc. (SEACOR) "operates one of the world's largest fleets of
433. Id. at 873.
434. Id.; see also Contract Operations, http://www.pmi.net/contoper.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
Whether it's in the open waters of the Gulf of Mexico or on a remote land location on the
Gulf Coast, PMI knows what it takes to optimize the complex task of efficiently and safely
operating oil and gas producing properties.... Headquartered in New Iberia, Louisiana ....
PMI can also assist with your helicopter and marine transportation needs.
Id.
435. Seacor, 404 F.3d at 874.
436. Id.
437. See Chevron Worldwide Operations, http://www.chevron.com/operations/ (last visited Feb. 17,
2006).
Chevron spans the globe [and is one] of the world's largest integrated energy companies ....
Chevron is an international leader in finding, producing, and marketing oil and gas, as well as
other energy products. Active in approximately 180 countries, the company's Caltex, Texaco
and Chevron-branded products hold top-tier rankings worldwide.
Id.
438. See Matrix Oil HL, Operations & Projects, http://www.matrixoil.com.au/operations.cfm (last
visited Feb 17, 2006) ("The Company's objective is to procure development oil and gas assets in known
hydrocarbon producing area's [sic] of Indonesia.").
439. See supra notes 437-38.
440. Seacor, 404 F.3d at 873.
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diversified marine support vessels," which SEACOR uses "to [support]
offshore oil and gas exploration and development.""' Among other places
around the globe, SEACOR uses its vessels to deliver equipment, supplies, and
personnel to rigs in the Gulf of Mexico and along the outer-continental shelf
near Louisiana.42
During the late 1990s, PMI entered into separate contracts with Chevron
and Matrix-PMI/Chevron Agreement and PMI/Matrix Agreement,
respectively." 3 Under each agreement, Chevron and Matrix agreed to
transport PMI workers from the shore of Louisiana to offshore rigs.'" The oil
companies formed additional contracts with SEACOR." 5 Under the
SEACOR/Chevron and SEACOR/Matrix "blanket time-charter" agreements,
Chevron and Matrix agreed to purchase and SEACOR agreed to provide
chartering services. 46 Chevron and Matrix contacted SEACOR and asked the
chartering company to transport PMI' s workers from Louisiana's shore to the
offshore oil rigs." 7
A careful reading of the reported facts leaves very little doubt about the
legal relationships involved: Under the tripartite arrangement, the legal
relationships were clear. Chevron and Matrix were PMI's contractors; and,
SEACOR was PMI's subcontractor." In fact, "knowing that its obligations
under the charter agreements with [Chevron and Matrix] would probably
involve transporting [PMI's] employees, [SEACOR] contacted PMI directly
and insisted that [SEACOR] would not transport any PMI employees until
PMI signed a 'Vessel Boarding and Utilization Agreement Hold Harmless'
(VBA)."' 49
PMI and SEACOR signed the VBA on July 17, 1999.450 Under that
agreement, SEACOR agreed to transport PMI's employees on SEACOR
vessels. 451' As consideration, PMI agreed to name SEACOR as an additional
insured under PMI's CGL insurance policy.452 PMI also agreed to accept a
subrogation-rights waiver and to delete the watercraft-exclusion clause from
441. See SEACOR Marine, Profile, http://www.seacormarine.com/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2006)
(follow "Company Profile" hyperlink).




446. Id. ("On December 20, 1990, Chevron and SEACOR signed a 'blanket time-charter agreement.'
This agreement, subject to unilateral cancellation by either party, set the general terms that would apply to
future vessel charters.... [However,] unlike Chevron, Matrix never directly contracted with SEACOR.").
447. Id.
448. See id.
449. Id. ("[The terms under the VBA]form contract [applied] when a SEACOR vessel [transported]
contractors' employees.") (emphasis added).





the CGL policy that PMI purchased from Gray.453 The pertinent part of the
latter clause excluded the following:
"g. 'Bodily injury'... arising out of the... use or entrustment to others of
any... watercraft owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any insured.
Use includes operation and 'loading and unloading.'
This exclusion does not apply to:
(1) A watercraft while ashore on premises you own or rent;
(2) A watercraft you do not own that is:
(a) Less than 26 feet long; and
(b) Not being used to carry persons or property for a charge;
(4) Liability assumed under any 'insured contract' for the
ownership, maintenance or use of aircraft or watercraft ....
It is important to note that for all relevant time periods, Gray routinely
furnished insurance certificates to PMI's contractors.455 Those notices outlined
the nature and extent of PMI's coverage under the CGL policy.4 56 At PMI's
request, Gray sent a certificate to SEACOR.457 When Gray delivered the
insurance certificate, however, Gray did not know that PMI and SEACOR had
entered into a formal agreement and did not know the content of the VBA.458
Between late December 2000 and early February 2001, three of PMI's
employees received injuries while SEACOR transported them to Matrix- and
Chevron-operated platforms in the Gulf.459 The employees sued SEACOR in
three separate suits assigned to three different district judges.' In each of
those underlying lawsuits, SEACOR filed a third-party declaratory-judgment
action-against both PMI and Gray-in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana.46' Citing the VBA and the CGL policy,
SEACOR asserted that Gray had a contractual duty to provide a legal defense
and to indemnify.42
453. Id.
454. Id. at 874 n. 1 (emphasis added) (quoting the CGL Watercraft Exclusion of the Gray Insurance
Co. commercial liability policy coverage form).




459. Id. ("On December 15, 2000, Plaintiffs Johnson and Hoffpauir were injured while transferring
between Matrix operated platforms and the Shirley G. Plaintiff Fleming was injured while transferring from
a Chevron platform to the Sylvia F on February 1, 2001.").
460. Id.
461. Id. at 871, 874.
462. Id. at 874 ("[In the underlying lawsuit,] the three [injured workers] settled [their claims] against
[PMI and SEACOR] and trials went forward on SEACOR's third-party claims against PMI and Gray.").
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Gray filed a summary-judgment motion in each of the three underlying
suits. 463 Put simply, the insurer maintained that sufficient consideration did not
support the VBA; therefore, the "hold-harmless" agreement was
unenforceable. 464 The district court judges reached conflicting conclusions
about whether sufficient consideration supported the VBA./' 5 To resolve the
conflict, the litigants appealed their respective adverse rulings to the Fifth
Circuit, where the court consolidated the cases.46
On appeal, Gray presented a stellar argument in light of the facts and
fairly settled contract principles. According to the insurer, the blanket charter
agreements between PMI and the oil companies imposed a duty on SEACOR
to transport PMI's employees to Matrix's and Chevron's platforms. 7
Consequently, as PMI's alleged subcontractor, SEACOR had a preexisting
duty to transport PMI' s employees to the oil platforms when the vessel owner
consummated the VBA with PMI. 68 And because there was a preexisting
duty, SEACOR did not pay any new or additional consideration for PMI's
promises under the VBA. 469
Under the preexisting-duty rule, one's promise to do what one is already
legally obligated to do is unenforceable.47 Every first-year law student-who
has read Stilk v. Myrick,47' the renowned English case about seamen who
refused to work on the high seas unless they received additional pay-knows
this general contract principle. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has embraced this
principle.472 However, in SEA COR, the court of appeals decided to ignore the
general principle and apply a questionable minority rule.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. ("In Johnson v. SEACOR, Judge Haik found [that consideration supported] the agreement
in Hoffpauir v. SEACOR, Judge Doherty ruled that the VBA [could not be enforced, given the] lack
of [sufficient] consideration. In Fleming v. Grand Isle Shipyard, the third case, Judge Lemelle did not reach
the issue.").
466. Id. at 871, 874.
467. Id. at 875.
468. See id.
469. Id.
470. See 2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN H. BENDER, CoRBIN ON CoNTRAcrs § 7.1 (rev. ed. 1995);
3 RiCHARD A. LORD, WMtLSTON ON CONTRACTS § 7.36 (4th ed. 1992).
As a general principle, when a party does simply what he has already obligated himself to do
under a contract, he cannot demand any additional compensation or benefit, and, it is clear that
if he takes advantage of the situation and obtains a promise for more, the law in general regards
it as not binding as lacking consideration.
LORD, supra, § 7.36.
471. Stilk v. Myrick, (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1168, 1169 (holding that a promise to pay seamen extra
money for what they were obligated to do under a pre-existing contract 'ship's articles' was void for lack
of consideration).
472. See, e.g., Gen. Intermodal Logistics Corp. v. Mainstream Shipyards & Supply, Inc., 748 F.2d
1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1984).
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Surprisingly, citing so-called "influential treatises" -rather than settled
principles of contract law in Louisiana-the Fifth Circuit concluded that
SEACOR's and PMI's mutual promises were sufficient new consideration to
enforce the VBA, notwithstanding SEACOR's preexisting contractual duty.474
To justify that conclusion, the Fifth Circuit again cited treatises and concluded:
"A court should no longer accept [the preexisting-duty] rule [outright]. [A
court] should never use it as the major premise of a decision, at least without
giving careful thought to the circumstances of the particular case, to the moral
desserts of the parties, and to the social feelings and interests that are
involved." It is well accepted that the mere exchange of promises is
ordinarily sufficient to satisfy the requirement of consideration .... "[A]s
long as the contracting parties gain some legally enforceable right as a result
of the contract which they previously did not have, consideration is
present." '475
However, a careful reading of the SEA COR opinion strongly suggests that
Gray raised another argument before the Fifth Circuit. Given the court of
appeals's strong response, it appears that the insurer argued the following:
SEACOR became PMI's subcontractor when SEACOR formed the
transportation agreements with Matrix and Chevron. Therefore, the vessel
owner had a contractual duty to protect PMI-the third-party beneficiary-as
well as PMI's interests, its employees.
But the Fifth Circuit did not embrace that apparent argument. Instead, the
court of appeals concluded, "[E]ven if SEACOR owed a duty to Chevron and
Matrix to transport PMI employees under SEACOR's agreements with those
oil companies, SEA COR owed no legally enforceable duty to PMI.... [O]nly
the oil companies had a remedy against SEACOR. '4 76 Without doubt, this is
a remarkable conclusion, for it ignores settled law in Louisiana.
473. Seacor, 404 F.3d at 875 (citing PERILLO & BENDER, supra note 470, § 7.1) ("All of the most
influential treatises urge courts to avoid using the preexisting duty rule if even minimal consideration
supports the contract. Indeed, Corbin strongly cautions courts against relying on this rule in formulating
their decisions.").
474. Id. at 876.
475. Id. at 875 (quoting PERILLO&BENDER, supra note 470, § 7.1; CLAUDED. RoHWER &ANTHONY
M. SKROCKI, CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL § 2.24 (5th ed. 2000)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)
(arguing that if the promisee incurs any legal detriment that amounts to a bargained for exchange for the
promisor's promise, sufficient consideration is present). "'In addressing the existence or non-existence of
consideration, courts have not concerned themselves with the adequacy of fairness of the consideration but
only with finding the presence of some legal detriment incurred as part of a bargain."' Id. (quoting RoHwER
& SKRocKI, supra, § 2.24); see also Morrison Flying Serv. v. Deming Nat'l Bank, 404 F.2d 856, 861 (10th
Cir. 1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73(d) (1981) ("But the tendency of the law has been
simply to hold that the performance of contractual duty can be consideration if the duty is not owed to the
promisor.").
476. Seacor, 404 F.3d at 877 (emphasis added).
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True, a presumption always exists against a benefit in favor of a third
party when two persons form a valid, enforceable contract. Both Louisiana
477
and Texas478 follow this rule. But the law is equally clear regarding another
matter: The absence of privity to a contract does not necessarily prevent a
third party from commencing a cause of action against the parties that formed
the contract.479 More important, where parties intended to create a contractual
relation for the benefit of another, the third-party beneficiary has a contractual
right to secure common-law or equitable remedies under that contract.480
Therefore, in light of these latter principles of contract, it is difficult to
understand the Fifth Circuit's rationale for inserting such highly questionable
dicta in the decision regarding the rights of third-party beneficiaries in
477. See Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Howard Weil Fin. Corp., 93-1568 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/27/94); 631 So.
2d 1308, 1310 (concluding that in Louisiana, a contract for a third party's benefit is a stipulation pour autrui,
and that the contract "gives the third party beneficiary the right to demand performance from the promisor")
(citing LA. CONST. art. 1981); see also Smith v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2003-1580 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/3/04);
869 So. 2d 909, 912-13 (stressing that "a contract for the benefit of a third-party [or] a stipulation pour
autrui... is never presumed. Rather, the intent of the contracting parties to stipulate a benefit in favor of
a third-party must be made manifestly clear." (citing Homer Nat'l Bank v. Tri-Dist. Dev. Corp., 534 So. 2d
154, 156 (La. Ct. App. 1988))).
478. See Corpus Christi Bank & Trust v. Smith, 525 S.W.2d 501, 503-04 (Tex. 1975) ("[W]e must
begin with the presumption that parties contract for themselves, and a contract will not be construed as
having been made for the benefit of third parties unless it clearly appears that such was the intention of the
contracting parties."); see also Econ. Forms Corp. v. Williams Bros. Constr. Co., 754 S.W.2d 451,455 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (explaining that, in deriving intent from a contract, a court
presumes "that parties contract for themselves and will not construe a contract as having been made for the
benefit of third parties unless it clearly appears that this was the intention of the parties to the contract");
Knight Constr. Co. v. Barnett Mortgage Trust, 572 S.W.2d 381, 382-83 (Tex. Civ. App.- Houston [14th
Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (adopting the proposition that a third party's right "to enforce [a] contract...
'should not rest on implication,' but should be clearly apparent, and any doubt should be resolved against
such intent" (citation omitted)).
479. See Lumber Prods., Inc. v. Hiriart, 255 So. 2d 783, 789-90 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
The traditional notion that lack of privity to a contract eliminates any actionable interest in one
not privy might (in the absence of other law) prevent one's recovery of damages for breach of
contract against his contractor's subcontractor. But this is not the only law here pertinent. [By
statute, the third-party beneficiary has a right to sue and] non-privity has been eliminated as a
defense to the subcontractor's claim against the owner by the building contract law in cases
[under statute].... Thus non-privity is not necessarily determinative ....
Id.
480. See Concept Design, Inc. v. J.J. Krebs & Sons, Inc., 96-1295 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/19/97); 692 So.
2d 1203, 1205-06 (concluding that "'to establish a stipulation pour autrui... [t]he third-party relationship
must form the consideration for a condition of the contract[, and] the benefit may not be merely incidental
to the contract' (quoting In re Adoption of S.R.P., 555 So. 2d 612, 618 (La. Ct. App. 1989))); see also
Econ. Forms Corp., 754 S.W.2d at 456 ("A third party [may] recover upon a contract made between other
parties only if the parties intended to secure some benefit to that third party, and only if the contract was
entered into directly and primarily for the third party's benefit.") (second emphasis added); Dorsett Bros.
Concrete Supply, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 880 S.W.2d 417,421 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993,
writ denied) (citing Econ. Forms Corp., 754 S.W.2d at 456); Thomson v. Espey Huston & Assocs., Inc., 899
S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ) (adopting the rule in Economy Forms and concluding
that "[a] third party may recover on a contract made between other parties only if the parties intended to
secure some benefit to that third party .... [A]ny doubt must be resolved against finding.., a third-party
beneficiary").
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Louisiana. Without doubt, the dicta only cloud the law, and it was not




To repeat, ignoring Gray's argument, the court of appeals declared that
the VBA was valid and PMI had an obligation to cover SEACOR under PMI's
CGL policy.482 However, citing the watercraft exclusion in the liability-
insurance contract, 83 the Fifth Circuit declared that the watercraft exclusion
plainly excluded SEACOR's request for a legal defense and the company's
request for indemnification. 4" Stated differently, Gray had no contractual duty
to defend SEACOR in the underlying lawsuits or to indemnify SEACOR for
expenditures associated with settling the underlying lawsuits.4"'
2. Whether Under Texas's Law a Liability Insurer Has a Duty to Defend
and Indemnify Its Insured: A Provider of Disability Home-Care Services
After a Third-Party Complainant Sued the Insured for Negligence
Arguably, one of the Fifth Circuit's more poorly researched, highly
strained, and unfair decisions appears in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Disability
Services of the Southwest Inc.486 Texas implemented a voucher program that
provides transitional living assistance for persons with disabilities.487 Among
other state agencies, the Texas Department of Human Services (TDHS)
administers the housing program for the disabled.48 Disability Services of the
481. Seacor, 404 F.3d at 878.
482. Id. at 877.
483. See Acadia Ins. Co. v. McNeil, 711 A.2d 873, 875 (N.H. 1998) (observing that liability and
traditional marine insurance differ). The latter is "an indemnity policy, which requires an insurer to
reimburse the insured only for payments actually made." Id. Under a liability policy, "the insurer [is]
,responsible for any liability incurred by the insured while the policy was effective."' Id. (quoting Miller
v. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot., 509 F. Supp. 1047, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)); see also Backhus v. Transit Cas. Co.,
549 So. 2d 283, 288, 291 (La. 1989) (recognizing that the "statutory definition of marine insurance
[includes] both property insurance and liability insurance" and recognizing other dimensions of marine
insurance, which include "insurance against loss or damage to property and marine protection and indemnity
insurance").
484. Seacor, 404 F.3d at 877.
485. Id. at 878.
486. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Disability Servs. of the Sw. Inc., 400 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. Feb. 2005).
487. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 531.059(b) (Vernon 2005).
Subject to the availability of funds, the commission shall coordinate with the Texas Department
of Human Services, the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, and the Texas
Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation to develop a housing assistance program
to assist persons with disabilities in moving from institutional housing to integrated housing.
In developing the program, the agencies shall address:
1) eligibility requirements for assistance;
2) the period during which a person with a disability may receive assistance;
3) the types of housing expenses to be covered under the program; and
4) the locations at which the program will be operated.
Id.
488. Id.
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Southwest Incorporated (DSSW) provides personal care as well as home- and
community-based services for the disabled at eight locations in Texas.489
DSSW has one location in Houston, Texas, where the company operates a "24-
Hour Shared Attendant Program (Program) at the Airport Landing
Apartments." 90
TDHS awarded a contract to DSSW, under which the company agreed to
provide daily living assistance for disabled residents living in the
apartments. 49' Kenneth Ray Lofton (KRL) was quadriplegic and was "unable
to use his legs or arms, [although he] was able to speak without difficulty and
use a mouth stick to perform certain tasks. KRL needed assistance, however,
for all of his daily living activities. 492 In November 2000, he entered DSSW's
Program and secured an apartment at the Airport Landing Apartments.493
Again, under the terms of the contract, "DSSW was obligated to provide
assistance for KRL's daily living. 494
Less than five days after arriving at the apartments, KRL developed a
severe urinary-tract infection.49 He could not report his condition to DSSW
because they had not installed necessary communication devices in KRL's
bedroom.496 Although a telephone was located outside his bedroom, KRL
could not reach or use it because he was quadriplegic.497 Consequently, KRL
died four days after arriving at the apartments.498 Shortly thereafter, KRL's
family and estate filed a mixed-claims lawsuit against DSSW.499 They alleged
the following: (1) DSSW negligently failed to arrest the urinary-tract infection
that contributed to KRL's death, and (2) DSSW negligently failed to install
communication devices in KRL's apartment so KRL could easily report his
needs directly to DSSW or to intermediaries and his family.5"
During all relevant periods, Allstate Insurance Company insured DSSW
under a commercial general-liability policy.5"' After learning about the
underlying third-party lawsuit, Allstate filed a declaratory-judgment action in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.5°2 The
insurer asked the district court to declare that Allstate had no duty to defend
DSSW against KRL's estate and family's mixed-claims lawsuit. 50 3 Again,
489. Disability Services of the Southwest, http://www.dsswtx.org (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).










500. Id. at 261.
501. Id. at 262.




following an all too common, inefficient, and arguably unwarranted practice
in state and federal declaratory-judgment trials, Allstate filed a motion for
summary judgment5'O The district court granted the motion,'°5 and DSSW
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.'
6
In the district court, Allstate argued that DSSW's alleged failure to
provide communication devices for KRL was inseparable from the estate and
family's claim that DSSW also failed to provide adequate medical care for the
deceased quadriplegic.5 7 Therefore, citing an exception in the so-called
"medical services exclusion clause," Allstate asserted that it had no contractual
duty to defend DSSW. 508 To determine whether the district court's summary
judgment was proper and whether Allstate had a duty to defend DSSW in the
underlying lawsuit, the Fifth Circuit first examined the exclusion clause in the
insurance contract.509 That provision states the following:
"[T]his insurance does not apply to 'bodily injury', 'property damage' or
'personal and advertising injury' arising out of:
1. The rendering or failure to render: a. Medical, surgical, dental,
x-ray or nursing service, treatment advice or instruction, or the
related furnishing of food or beverages; b. Any health or
therapeutic service, treatment, advice or instruction; or c. Any
services, treatment, advice or instruction for the purpose of
appearance or skin enhancement, hair removal or replacement of
personal grooming.
2. The furnishing or dispensing of drugs or medical, dental or
surgical supplies or appliances; or
3. The handling or treatment of dead bodies, including autopsies,
organ donation or other procedures. 510
However, after examining the exclusion clause, the Fifth Circuit
essentially accepted Allstate's argument without carefully and intelligently




507. Id. at 263.
508. Id. at 262.
509. Id. at 262-63.
510. Id. at 262 n. I (quoting the insurance contract).
511. See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 1998); King v. Dallas Fire Ins.
Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2002) (reaffirming that under the "eight comers' rule, the "four comers"
of the factual allegations in the underlying complaint and the "four comers" of the insurance policy solely
determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend, and the pleadings must allege facts within the scope of
coverage for a duty to defend the insured to exist); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Merch.
Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. 1997) (emphasizing that under the "eight comers" rule,
the pleadings and allegations are liberally interpreted and their truth is presumed); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 249 F.3d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that an insurer must defend
the entire underlying lawsuit if a court finds that the insurance contract covers any part of the lawsuit).
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exceptionally clear: Courts must compare the allegations in a third-party
complaint to the coverage provision in a liability policy to determine whether
an insurer has a duty to defend. 12 If the coverage clause covers or potentially
covers the allegation in the complaint, the insurer must defend the insured
against the underlying lawsuit. 1
3
More important, Texas's law is clear regarding another issue: If there is
doubt about whether the allegations against the insured state a covered cause
of action under a liability policy and require the insurer to defend the action,
courts must resolve such doubt in favor of the insured. 51 4 Yet, in light of these
settled principles and the Texas Supreme Court's decisions, the Fifth Circuit
summarily discarded them. Instead, the appellate court ruled as follows:
"[T]he claim that KRL's death was caused by the failure to provide
communication devices is inseparable from the Lofton family's claim that
DSSW failed to provide adequate medical care, and the medical services
exclusion applies. Accordingly, Allstate has no duty to defend DSSW."51"
To reach that conclusion, the court of appeals adopted and applied a very
narrow and highly inapplicable holding found in Duncanville Diagnostic
Center, Inc. v. Atlantic Lloyds Insurance Co. of Texas.51 6 In that case, the
Eleventh Court of Appeals in Eastland held that an insurer has no duty to
defend an insured in an underlying lawsuit (1) if the insured negligently
performed professional medical services, and (2) the ensuing covered and
excluded third-party injuries and causes were related or interdependent.57 But
again, Duncanville is inapplicable; for Allstate did not establish, and the trial
court did not find, that DSSW failed to provide medical care or professional
medical services. 1 '
In fact, Allstate failed to prove, and the Fifth Circuit did not determine,
whether DSSW was a health-care provider.1 9 Once more, under the exclusion
clause, Allstate had no duty to defend only if its insured health care providers
512. See supra note 511.
513. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 939 S.W.2d at 142 (holding that an insurer has a
duty to defend if the claims in an underlying, fairly and reasonably construed petition state a cause of action
that the insurance contract potentially covers).
514. See id. (citing Heyden Newport Chem. Corp. v. S. Gen. Ins. Co., 387 S.W.2d 22, 26 (Tex.
1965)).
515. Disability Servs. of the Sw. Inc., 400 F.3d at 265.
516. Duncanville Diagnostic Ctr., Inc. v. Ad. Lloyds Ins. Co. of Tex., 875 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. App.-
Eastland 1994, writ denied).
517. Id. at 791-92.
The negligent acts and omissions were not independent and mutually exclusive; rather, they were
related and interdependent. Therefore, the professional services exclusion operated to exclude
coverage not only for the claims of negligence in rendering the professional services but also for
the related allegations of negligent hiring, training, and supervision and negligent failure to
establish adequate policies and procedures.
Id.




engaged in certain proscribed acts. 2 Yet, a careful reading of the reported
facts52' and Texas's cases522 reveal that TDHS contractors are not health care
providers simply because they provide home care and daily living services.523
And one needs only to examine the definition of "health care provider,"5 24
"health care,"552 "medical care, 526 and "professional services" '527 under Texas's
520. See id.
521. See id. at 262-65.
Under the terms of the contract between the Texas Department of Human Services and DSSW,
DSSW was obligated to provide assistance for KRL's daily living.... If KRL had not been a
quadriplegic, he would not have required communication devices that could be operated by a
mouth stick. Providing this service to KRL is typical, if not integral, to the provision of a 24-
Hour Shared Attendant Program for someone in KRL's condition, as evidenced in the contract
between DSSW and TDHS .... The contract between DSSW and TDHS makes clear the
purpose of the communication devices: it required DSSW to "[a]rrange for each household to
have a telephone or an emergency response device for requesting assistance in emergency
situations andfor requesting assistance with activities for daily living." Even DSSW understood
the emergency nature of the communication devices.
Id. (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting the insurance contract).
522. See, e.g., Farm & Home Say. Ass'n v. Magnolia Ret. Servs. & Consulting Co., No. 01-89-
01187-CV, 1990 WL 39464, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (not designated for
publication) (observing that "Pine Place converted [its] property into a personal care home where
approximately 105 residents are cared for under a contract with the Texas Department of Human Services"
and noting that "commercial kitchen equipment, dining room equipment, an emergency response system,
and a fire alarm system were.. . [equipment for] the apartment complex and not... additional equipment
for the health care facility"); Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Trinity Coal., Inc., 759 S.W.2d 762,763 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1988, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (reporting that "Trinity had provided home day care services in
the El Paso area under contracts with Texas Department of Human Services since 1975" (emphasis added)).
523. See supra notes 521-22.
524. See TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.03(3) (Vernon Supp. 1993). Section 1.03(3)
defined "health care provider" as follows:
[Any person, partnership, professional association, corporation, facility, or institution duly
licensed or chartered by the State of Texas to provide health care as a registered nurse, hospital,
dentist, podiatrist, pharmacist, or nursing home or an officer, employee, or agent thereof acting
in the course and scope of his employment.
Id.; see also TEX. Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.001(a)(12)(A) (repealing TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4590i, § 1.03(3)). Section 74.001(a)(12)(A) defines "health care provider" as follows:
[A]ny person, partnership, professional association, corporation, facility, or institution duly
licensed, certified, registered, or chartered by the State of Texas to provide health care,
including: a registered nurse, a dentist, a podiatrist, a pharmacist, a chiropractor, an optometrist
or a health care institution.
§ 74.001(a)(12)(A); see also Townsend v. Catalina Ambulance Co., 857 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1993, no writ) (observing that section 1.03(3) of the Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act specifically defines "entities that are health care providers, including hospitals and nursing
homes" and concluding that an "ambulance company is not one of those specifically listed").
525. See TEx. CIrv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.001(a)(10) (defining "health care" as "any act or
treatment performed or furnished, or that should have been performed or furnished, by any health care
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement"
(emphasis added)).
526. See id. § 74.001(a)(19) (defining "medical care" as "any act... under Section 151.002 [of the]
Occupations Code [that was] performed or furnished, or [that] should have been performed ... by one
licensed to practice medicine in [Texas] for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's care, treatment,
or confinement" (emphasis added)).
527. See id. § 74.001(a)(24) (defining "professional or administrative services" as "those duties or
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statutes to establish that DSSW was not a health care provider.
But there is more. Even if DSSW were a bona fide health care provider,
the exclusion clause should not have released Allstate from its contractual duty
to provide a legal defense. Texas's law is exceedingly strict about an insurer's
responsibility when third parties file mixed-claims5 28 lawsuits against insureds:
If an insurer has a duty to defend any portion of a third-party lawsuit, the
insurer must defend the entire suit.5 29 Therefore, whether DSSW's alleged
failure to provide medical services was inseparable from the company's
alleged failure to provide communications devices was not the relevant
question. The two allegations of negligence were distinct or mixed.
Moreover, given Allstate's failure to prove that DSSW was a health care
provider, the Fifth Circuit's ruling in favor of the insurer was arguably unfair
and a major flaw in the decision.
3. Whether a Liability Insurer Has a Duty to Defend Its Insured Under
Texas's Law After Third-Party Parents Sued the Insured for Allegedly
Causing the Death of the Third Parties' Children in Mexico
Lincoln General Insurance Co. v. Reyna53° presents another remarkable
illustration of the Fifth Circuit's failure to apply Texas's mixed-claims rules
to help resolve duty-to-defend conflicts between an insurer and its insured. To
be sure, insurance-defense and personal-injury attorneys have the primary duty
to cite relevant state-law rules and statutes in their complaints, answers,
motions, and briefs. Stated another way, insureds' and insurers' counsels must
clearly outline and educate judges about various theories of recovery and
affirmative defenses. On the other hand, courts must thoroughly research state
laws and apply those laws intelligibly and fairly. Put simply, the Fifth Circuit
performed the latter tasks poorly in Reyna.
services that a physician or health care provider is required to provide as a condition of maintaining the
physician's or health care provider's license, accreditation status, or certification to participate in state or
federal health care programs" (emphasis added)).
528. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 231, at 535, 619-20 & nn.388-92 (discussing Texas's declaratory-
judgment trials, Texas's duty-to-defend doctrine, and the law of mixed claims, mixed allegations, or mixed
complaints); Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Decisions Over Whether Insurers Must
Defend Insureds That Violate Constitutional and Civil Rights: An Historical and Empirical Review of
Federal and State Court Declaratory Judgments 1900-2000, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 995, 1068-69 & n.393
(2000) (discussing declaratory judgment, the duty-to-defend doctrine, and the law of mixed claims, mixed
allegations, or mixed complaints).
529. See Harken Exploration Co. v. Sphere Drake Ins. P.L.C., 261 F.3d 466, 474 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding that an insurer "must defend [the insured] against the entire suit including causes of action that
would not alone trigger the duty to defend, regardless whether the complaint is pled in the alternative or not
because the [underlying plaintiffs'] factual allegations of negligence are sufficient to trigger the duty to
defend"); Investors Ins. Co. of Am. v. Breck Operating Corp., No. Civ. A. 1:02-CV-122-C, 2003 WL
21056849, at *7 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (concluding that the policy's exclusion of coverage for the "reckless,
wilful, wanton, or knowing actions [did] not preclude the policy's potential coverage of the claimed property
damage").
530. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 355 (5th Cir. Feb. 2005).
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To help prove the point, consider the extremely sparse, yet undisputed
facts in the case. Cesar Reyna is a resident of Texas, and he does business as
Reyna Travel Tours Company.53' While in Mexico, Reyna's bus collided with
another vehicle.532 Reyna's employee-Joel Lozano-was driving the bus
when the incident occurred.533 Two people in the other vehicle died after the
head-on collision.5 4 In May 2002, the estate and relatives of the deceased,
third-party victims, sued Reyna and Lozano in a Texas court.535
During all relevant periods, Lincoln General Insurance Company insured
Reyna Travel Tours Company under a business-automobile insurance
contract.536 After learning about the third-party lawsuit, Lincoln informed
Reyna that it would deny coverage and would not provide a legal defense in
the underlying state-court action.537 As a consequence, "Reyna never filed an
answer, and on September 11, 2002, the [third-party] plaintiffs obtained a
default judgment against Reyna and Lozano.' '53 In November 2002, the Texas
court entered a final judgment against Reyna and Lozano for approximately
$13 million.539 Reyna was liable for ninety percent of the damages.54°
To determine whether it indeed had a contractual duty to defend Reyna
in the underlying action, Lincoln filed a declaratory-judgment action in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.MI The district
court allowed the third-party plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit (Intervenors)
to intervene in the declaratory-judgment action.5 42 Lincoln and the Intervenors
filed cross-motions for summary judgment.5 43 Ultimately, the federal district
court awarded Lincoln's motion for summary relief and denied the
Intervenors' motion.5" The Intervenors appealed to the Fifth Circuit.45
The court of appeals examined the record, reviewed the undisputed facts,
applied Texas's eight corners doctrine, and declared that the district court's
summary-judgment award-in favor of Lincoln-was legally sound.54 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that Lincoln had no duty to defend Reyna in the
531. Id. at 349.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id. ("Jorge Cantu and Manuel Oyervidez .... both in the other vehicle, were killed.").
535. Id. ("Mayra Lizeth Arellano Medina, Jose Rodrigo Garza Ramos, Maria Del Socorro Cantu







542. Id. Among other reasons, the federal district court allowed the third-party plaintiffs to intervene





546. See id. at 350 & nn.8-15. For a discussion of the eight comers doctrine, see supra notes 511-14.
2006]
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
underlying lawsuit. 547 As a consequence, the Intervenors-as judgment
creditors-had no contractual right to secure damages from Lincoln.548
To reach that decidedly questionable conclusion, the Fifth Circuit first
reviewed the Intervenors' allegations in the underlying, state-court
complaint. 49 Multiple mixed claims could have formed the foundation for
several independent causes of action against Reyna and Lozano collectively.
The Intervenors alleged that: (1) Lozano negligently operated the bus in
Mexico, thereby causing the head-on collision and damages; (2) Reyna
negligently entrusted the bus to Lozano; (3) Reyna negligently failed to
implement safety policies; (4) Reyna failed to enforce the company's safety
policies; and (5) Reyna negligently hired, trained, supervised, and retained
Lozano.55°
After examining the Intervenors' underlying complaint, the Fifth Circuit
reviewed the coverage clause in the business-automobile insurance contract.
55
'
That provision stated in relevant part that Lincoln would satisfy a claim "when
'bodily injury or property damage' results from an 'accident' and 'from the
ownership, maintenance or use of a covered auto. "552 The policy defined an
"'accident' as [the] 'continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions
resulting in bodily injury or property damage.', 5 3 Furthermore, the contract
outlined another condition precedent before Lincoln would pay proceeds:
"[An] accident or loss must occur within (1) the policy period and (2) the
coverage territory,"'55 which included "the United States, territories and
possessions of the United States, Puerto Rico, and Canada."555
To justify its decision to affirm the district court's ruling, the Fifth Circuit
focused on a single argument appearing in the Intervenors' appellate brief.
The Intervenors asserted that Lincoln had a duty to defend Reyna because
"Reyna's... negligent[] hiring, training, and supervision [of] Lozano
[comprised] an 'accident' as defined [in the insurance contract]."556 As support
for their argument, the Intervenors cited the Texas Supreme Court's analysis
and holding in King v. Dallas Fire Insurance Co., 557 because the insurance
contracts in King and in Reyna contained "nearly identical" words and phrases
547. Id. at 349.
548. See id.; cf. United States v. Feldman, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1117 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
("California law defines a 'judgment creditor' as [a] person in whose favor a judgment is rendered or, if
there is an assignee of record.... the assignee of record." (alteration in original)).
549. Reyna, 401 F.3d at 351.
550. Id. The Intervenors asserted that Lozano breached "the duty to exercise ordinary care in
operating the bus 'reasonably and prudently."' Id. They also alleged that Reyna was "vicariously liable
.. because of Lozano's negligence." Id.
551. Id.
552. Id. (quoting the insurance policy).




557. King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. 2002).
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in the coverage provisions.558
In King, the Texas Supreme Court declared that the insurer had a duty to
defend because the negligent hiring, training, and supervision claim was an
accident under the liability policy.559 But the Fifth Circuit distinguished King
from Reyna.56 The appellate court concluded that the Texas Supreme Court's
determination-that an accident occurs when an insured negligently hires,
trains, and supervises--only "applies in cases involving intentional conduct
where the court is required to interpret intent and from whose standpoint. 56'
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that "King intended the term
'accident' to always include a claim for negligent hiring, training, and
supervision regardless of the type of employee conduct.,
562
From the court of appeals's perspective, embracing the rule in King-
where complaints in underlying, third-party lawsuits accuse the insureds of
negligent conduct-would always raise a question of intent when, in fact, no
allegation of intent appears in the underlying complaint. 563  Consequently,
King did not apply to the facts in Reyna.564 But it is exceedingly clear that the
Fifth Circuit's analysis and conclusion in Reyna are flaccid. Among other
reasons, the court of appeals, wittingly or unwittingly, overlooked an entire
body of Texas insurance law that instructs courts how to resolve mixed-claims,
duty-to-defend cases.
Again, as outlined above, the third-party intervenors or judgment
creditors in Reyna raised at least five allegations against Reyna and his
employee, Lozano, in the underlying lawsuit.565 Therefore, Texas's mixed-
claims rules require courts-including the Fifth Circuit in diversity cases-to
determine whether a coverage provision in a liability policy covers or
potentially covers any of the allegations. 66 Furthermore, Texas's law is
equally clear about another matter: If tribunals have doubt about whether the
factual allegations in an underlying third-party complaint state a cause of
558. Reyna, 401 F.3d at 351-52.
559. King, 85 S.W.3d at 188-89. In King, an insured company commenced a declaratory-judgment
action against its insurer to determine whether the insurer had a duty to defend under a commercial general
liability policy. Id. at 186. In the underlying suit, the third-party victims alleged that the company's
employee intentionally assaulted the victim and that the injury arose out of the company's allegedly
negligent hiring, training, and supervision of the employee. Id. at 187. The issue before the King court was
whether the employer's allegedly negligent hiring, training, and supervision was an "occurrence" under the
insurance contract when the employee's intentional conduct caused the injury. Id. at 186. The exclusion
clause in the contract excluded insurance proceeds for any intentional or expected injury or damage. Id. at
188. The Texas Supreme Court, however, held that the exclusion clause expressly stated that whether an
occurrence was an accident depends on the insured's standpoint. Id. Consequently, the insurer had a duty
to defend. Id.





565. Id. at 351.
566. See supra notes 528-29 and accompanying text.
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action-within the coverage provision of a liability policy-and require the
insurer to provide a legal defense, courts must resolve such doubts in favor of
the insured. 67 Certainly, in Reyna, the Fifth Circuit did not adhere to these
rules. In fact, the court of appeals deviated from its own settled rules.56 8 And,
as a consequence, the court decided undeniably and incorrectly against the
insured's judgment creditors.
B. Third-Party Liability Claims: Injury to Property and Business Interests
1. Whether Under Texas's Law a Liability Insurer Has a Duty to Defend an
Insured Oil and Gas Company Against Third-Party Landowners' Lawsuits
After the Insured Company Allegedly Polluted the Landowners' Property
The substantive conflict in Primrose Operating Co. v. National American
Insurance Co. also concerns whether an insurer has a duty to defend its insured
against a third-party lawsuit.569 But unlike many of the Fifth Circuit's
decisions, Primrose presents a comprehensive and intelligible analysis of the
facts and legal issues. More important, the decision is based soundly upon a
careful and thoughtful analysis and application of Texas's law. Even more
important, the Fifth Circuit's analysis and conclusions in Primrose are written
lucidly. Even laypersons can readily understand what appears in the decision.
The facts in Primrose are extremely familiar and easy to understand,
especially if one owns land and leases mineral rights in Texas. The Senn
family has a ranch in West Texas."' From 1992 to 1999, Primrose Operating
Company (Primrose) had a lease to drill for oil and gas on the ranch.571 In
1999, CADA Operating, Inc. (CADA) acquired the lease from Primrose and
began drilling on the land.572 In September 1999, the Senns sued Primrose,
CADA, and several other oil companies in a Texas court, alleging that the
companies were liable for polluting the Senns' ranch.573 Among various
causes, the Senns listed negligence, gross negligence, trespass, and nuisance
in their complaint.574
567. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Merchs. Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.w.2d
139, 141 (Tex. 1997).
568. See, e.g., Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Azrock Indus., Inc., 211 F.3d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 2000)
(stressing that the eight corners rule must be applied liberally in favor of the insured, with any doubts
resolved in favor of the insured); Enserch Corp. v. Shand Morahan & Co., 952 F.2d 1485, 1492 (5th Cir.
1992) (emphasizing that an insurer must defend if the insurance contract potentially covers any allegation
in the third-party complaint).
569. Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 552 (5th Cir. Aug. 2004).







After a settlement, the Senns dismissed CADA from the underlying
lawsuit.575 But, after a second trial in the state court, a jury found that
Primrose negligently polluted the Senns' ranch and awarded the Senns
$2,194,000 in damages.576 When the pollution occurred, Primrose was insured
under three comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance contracts. 577 The
Chubb Insurance Group (Chubb) insured Primrose from April 1, 1991 until
April 1, 1997.578 The Mid-Continent Casualty Company (Mid-Continent)
insured Primrose from April 1, 1997 until April 1, 1999.179 Additionally, the
National American Insurance Company (NAICO) covered Primrose from
April 1, 1999 until Primrose transferred the lease to CADA in December
1999.580 Thereafter, from December 1999 until April 1, 2001, only NAICO
insured CADA.5 81
Shortly after the Senns filed their lawsuit, Primrose and CADA reported
the pending third-party action to their respective CGL insurers and requested
a legal defense.5 2 Chubb and Mid-Continent agreed to defend Primrose under
a reservation of rights.583 NAICO, however, refused to defend both Primrose
and CADA.58 In March 2002, the two insured companies sued NAICO in
another Texas court, because both Primrose and CADA were "citizens of
Texas with their principal places of business in Texas. '585 In the insured
companies' complaint, they alleged that NAICO breached a contractual duty
when the insurer refused to defend the companies against the Senns' various
claims and actions.58 6
Of course, NAICO is a foreign insurance corporation, whose principal
place of business is in Oklahoma. 5 7 Therefore, alleging complete diversity,
the liability insurer removed the duty-to-defend case to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas.88 In that court, the litigants
575. Id. at 551 (On the other hand, "[a]t the time the Senn litigation went to trial in October 2001,
a number of the other defendant oil companies... had been dismissed.").
576. Id. ("Primrose has appealed this judgment.").





582. Id. at 551.
583. Id. at 550; see also Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 601 S.W.2d 520,522 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A reservation of rights means that the insured and insurer
agrees-prior to a determination of the insured's liability in an underlying lawsuit--"to suspend the
operation of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. When coverage is in doubt, an insurer defending the
insured under such an agreement, reserves to itself all of its policy defenses in case the insured is
subsequently found liable." Wilkinson, 601 S.W.2d at 522.
584. Primrose, 382 F.3d at 551.
585. Id.
586. Id. In addition, Primrose and CADA alleged that NAICO violated, presumably, article 21.21
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posited their arguments before a jury, and after the close of all evidence, both
the insured companies and NAICO petitioned the district court for a judgment
as a matter of law.589 The district court completely denied Primrose's and
CADA's motions." The lower court, however, partially granted NAICO's
motion. 91 Ultimately, the jury awarded damages for NAICO's breach of
contract, as allowed under article 21.55592 of the Texas Insurance Code.5 93
NAICO timely filed an appeal asserting that the district court erroneously
denied its motion for judgment as a matter of law and refused to alter or amend
the judgment.594 To determine whether NAICO's petition was meritorious, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit performed an eight comers analysis to
assess whether the insurer had a duty to defend Primrose and CADA during
the Senns' trial.595 Again, Texas's eight comers rule is not complicated: A
court must compare the allegations against an insured-those appearing in an
underlying third-party complaint-with the coverage provision in a liability
insurance policy.596 If the insurance policy potentially covers any allegation
outlined in the complaint, the insurer has a duty to defend.597
589. See Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 2004). A motion for
judgment as a matter of law should be granted if "'there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury to find for a party."' Id (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)). "'[I]f reasonable persons could
differ in their interpretations of the evidence, then the motion should be denied."' Id. (quoting Thomas v.
Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 220 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 2000)). "' A post-judgment motion for judgment
as a matter of law should only be granted when the "facts and inferences point so strongly in favor of the
movant that a rational jury could not reach a contrary verdict.' I (quoting Thomas, 220 F.3d at 392
(quoting Waymire v. Harris County, Tex., 86 F.3d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1996))).
590. Primrose, 382 F.3d at 551.
591. Id. The district court concluded that Primrose and CADA failed "to offer any evidence to
support their DTPA claims" and that CADA failed "to present sufficient evidence supporting its claims
under the Texas Insurance Code." id.
592. The prior statute was Texas Insurance Code, article 21.55, section 6. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art
21.55, repealed by Act of Apr. 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1274, § 26(a)(1), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 3000,
4138. The present statute is Texas Insurance Code, section 542.060, which states:
a) If an insurer that is liable for a claim under an insurance policy is not in compliance with this
subchapter, the insurer is liable to pay the holder of the policy or the beneficiary making the
claim under the policy, in addition to the amount of the claim, interest on the amount of the
claim at the rate of 18 percent a year as damages, together with reasonable attorney's fees.
b) If a suit is filed, the attorney's fees shall be taxed as part of the costs in the case.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.060 (Vernon 2005).
593. Primrose, 382 F.3d at 551.
NAICO filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law and an alternative motion for a new trial,
both of which were denied by the district court. After the district court entered judgment for
[Primrose and CADA], NAICO filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the
district court miscalculated prejudgment interest and the statutory penalty under Article 21.55
[of the Texas Insurance Code]. NAICO also renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law
and for a new trial. The district court also denied these motions.
Id.
594. Id.
595. Id. at 552.
596. See Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Jayhawk Med. Acceptance Corp., 198 F.3d 548, 551 (5th Cir.
2000).
597. Enserch Corp. v. Shand Morahan & Co., 952 F.2d 1485, 1492 (5th Cir. 1992).
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The Fifth Circuit carefully sifted through the facts, discovering the
following relevant bits of information. First, Primrose and CADA argued, and
NAICO conceded, that the respective CGL policies covered the Senns'
allegations." 8 Put simply, the Senns claimed that the two licensees and others
severely polluted the groundwater on the ranch as well as the surface and
subsurface of the land.59 Second, NAICO stressed that the identical pollution-
exclusion clauses in the CGL policies excluded the Senns' allegations.'
To determine whether facts supported the insurer's argument, the Fifth
Circuit examined the pollution-exclusion clause. 60' That provision excluded
coverage for the following:
"f. Pollution
(1) 'Bodily injury' or 'property damage' arising out of the actual,
alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, see page, migration,
release or escape of pollutants:
(a) At or from any premises, site or location which is
or was at any time owned or occupied by, or rented or
loaned to, any insured;
(d) At or from any premises, site or location on which
any insured or any contractors or subcontractors
working directly or indirectly on any insured's behalf
are performing operations:
(2) Any loss, cost or expense arising out of any:
(a) Request, demand or order that any insured or
others test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain,
treat, detoxify or neutralize, or in any way respond to,
or assess the effects of pollutants[.]"' 2
NAICO asserted that section f(1)(a) excluded the underlying claims
because Primrose and CADA "occupied" land where the pollution occurred. 3
Certainly, the insured companies agreed that-without knowing more-the
pollution-exclusion clause barred coverage. But Primrose and CADA stressed
598. Primrose, 382 F.3d at 553.
599. Id. at 552.
[Tihe operative pleading for purposes of our analysis is the Serms' Fourth Amended Original
Petition, in which the Senns alleged that Primrose and CADA, along with several other oil
companies, polluted their ranch through releases of saltwater, oil, and other fluids. Specifically,
the Senns contended that these releases contaminated the surface, subsurface, and groundwater
of their ranch.
Id.
600. Id. at 553 & n.5.
601. Id. at 553.
602. Id. (quoting pollution-exclusion clause) (omissions and alteration in original).
603. Id.
2006]
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:821
the following: (1) They purchased a "pollution endorsement," and (2) under
that endorsement, the insurer agreed to cover pollution-contamination claims
if the insureds satisfied six conditions.' Of course, NAICO argued before the
district court and on appeal that it had no duty to defend because the
companies breached several conditions.' °5
More specifically, one part of a multi-pronged condition required the
pollution to be "sudden and accidental." Another awkwardly stated prong
required the contamination to be "neither expected nor intended by any
insured. 60 7 NAICO maintained that the companies "expected" the types of
pollution and corollary losses appearing in the Senns' complaint. 608
Furthermore, the insurer argued that the pollution was "neither sudden nor
accidental."" To decide whether the insurer's argument was sound, the Fifth
Circuit reviewed Texas's law, which is only marginally clear about the
meaning of these terms.610
In Texas, "accidental" means an unforeseen and unexpected event;611 and
"sudden" means an abrupt or brief event.612 Therefore, the "sudden and
accidental" requirement unambiguously excludes coverage for all "'pollution
604. Id. (According to the companies, "the Pollution Exclusion precludes NAICO's duty to defend,
only if one of... six conditions [was] not met.").
605. Id.




610. See Gulf Metals Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 993 S.W.2d 800, 805 (Tex. App.-Austin
1999, pet. denied). That court stated as follows:
[In] Mustang Tractor[, the Fifth Circuit] applied Texas law in interpreting the pollution-
exclusion clause of a general liability policy almost identical to the clause here. The [Fifth
Circuit], after applying Texas rules of contractual construction, reached an opposite conclusion
to that urged by Gulf Metals when analyzing "sudden" as joined with "accidental" to form the
phrase "sudden and accidental." The court reasoned that the use of both words together reflected
two separate requirements. Because "accidental" describes an unforeseen or unexpected event,
to ascribe the same meaning to "sudden" would render the terms redundant and violate the rule
that each word in a contract be given effect. The court stated that "sudden" therefore must
contain a temporal element meaning abrupt or brief.
Id. (citing Mustang Tractor & Equip. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 76 F.3d 89 (5th Cir. 1996)); see also N.
Ins. Co. v. Aardvark Assocs., Inc., 942 F.2d 189, 192-93 (3d Cir. 1991).
"The very use of the words 'sudden and accidental' ... reveal a clear intent to define the words
differently, stating two separate requirements. Reading 'sudden' in its context, i.e., joined by
the word 'and' to the word 'accident,' the inescapable conclusion is that 'sudden,' even if
including the concept of unexpectedness, also adds [an] additional element because
.unexpectedness' is already expressed by 'accident.' This additional element is the temporal
meaning of sudden, i.e. abruptness or brevity. To define sudden as meaning only unexpected
or unintended, and therefore as a mere restatement of accidental, would render the suddenness
requirement mere surplusage."
Gulf Metals, 993 S.W.2d at 805 (quoting Mustang Tractor, 76 F.3d at 92).
611. Gulf Metals, 993 S.W.2d at 805.
612. See Pioneer Chlor Alkali v. Royal Indem. Co., 879 S.W.2d 920, 937 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1994, no writ).
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that is not released quickly as well as unexpectedly and unintentionally.' 6 13
After carefully examining the underlying complaint, the Fifth Circuit correctly
observed that the Senns did not allege that Primrose and CADA expected the
pollution.614 Instead, the third-party complainants alleged that the companies
were negligent, thereby causing potentially permanent groundwater
contamination and other environmental damage.1 5
Furthermore, from the court of appeals's viewpoint, "[n]ot expecting a
particular incident to occur and an accidental occurrence are completely
consistent with a claim of negligence, 616 thereby allowing the companies to
satisfy the first multi-prong condition.617 And because an unexpected and
accidental pollution incident could have caused at least one of the Senns'
negligence allegations, NACIO had a duty to cover the resulting losses.61 8
Moreover, a "prior incidents" condition in the pollution endorsement
inelegantly stated: A loss could "'not [be] caused or contributed to... by any
pollution incident that commenced prior to the beginning of the policy
period.' '619 In the underlying third-party pleadings, the Senns listed Primrose
and CADA as joint defendants and alleged that the two committed an
assortment of negligent acts.620 But the complaint did not identify the
companies' respective acts. The Senns simply alleged that "'acts of negligence
... produced an indivisible injury to [their] property.' ' 621
In light of an "indivisible injury," NAICO argued that since Primrose and
CADA's respective negligent acts occurred before and after the insurer began
to cover CADA and Primrose, a pollution incident commenced before the
beginning of the respective policy periods.622 Therefore, given those "prior
acts," the insurer insisted that the companies breached a condition, which
extinguished NAICO's duty to defend the insureds in the underlying action.623
613. Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Vic Mfg. Co., 143 F.3d 192, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Mustang
Tractor, 76 F.3d at 93).




618. Id.; see also Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 828 (Tex. 1997) (reaffirming
that "an 'accident' includes the 'negligent acts of the insured causing damage which is undesigned and
unexpected' (quoting Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 416 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Tex.
1967))); Hallman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 114 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003), rev'd on other
grounds, 159 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2005) (embracing the view that "there is an accident when the action is
intentionally taken but is performed negligently and the effect is not what would have been intended or
expected had the deliberate action been performed non-negligently"); Harken Exploration Co. v. Sphere
Drake Ins. P.L.C., 261 F.3d 466, 472 (5th Cir. 2001) (adopting the same principle).
619. Primrose, 382 F.3d at 556 (quoting "condition d" of the pollution-exclusion clause).
620. Id.
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Of course, the Fifth Circuit found that argument unpersuasive.624 The
court of appeals observed that "NAICO fail[ed] to distinguish [clearly] among
the alleged negligent acts, the resulting pollution incidents, and the injury
arising from the pollution incidents., 625 The third-party complaint "state[d]
that... 'acts of negligence ... produced an indivisible injury' [and] not that
... negligent acts or... pollution incidents [were] indivisible. ' 626 Therefore,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that Primrose's and CADA's respective negligent
acts-during the respective policy periods-could have produced a completely
indivisible pollution incident.627
The final pertinent condition in the endorsement stated that a "'failure to
comply with any government statute, rule, regulation, or order"' must not
contribute to or be the cause of a pollution incident.628 In their underlying
complaint, the Senns stated that Texas's laws require companies to clean up
any spills. 629 The complaint also stated that Primrose and CADA failed to
clean up the spills that produced the injuries. 6 0 Therefore, citing the language
in the complaint, NAICO argued that the companies' failure to comply with
Texas law contributed to the alleged pollution.63'
The Fifth Circuit dismissed this latter argument, concluding that it was
meritless.632 The court noted that "the Senns' negligence [claims were]
completely independent of any allegation of statutory or regulatory
noncompliance. ,633 In the end, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling and declared that NAICO had a contractual




626. Id. at 557 (quoting third-party complaint).
627. Id. at 557 & n.9.
For instance, the Senns allege that [Primrose and CADA's] negligence caused groundwater
contamination. As [Primrose and CADA's] have occupied the same land, but at different times,
groundwater damage is likely an indivisible injury[;] it may be difficult to identify what portion
of the injury came from which [company]. Yet, the pollution incidents causing the damage
would be wholly independent of each other.
Id. at 557 n.9.






634. Id. at 566.
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2. Whether Under Louisiana's Law a Commercial General Liability
Insurer Has a Duty to Defend and Indemnify After a Third-Party Business
Sued the Contractor for Allegedly Interfering with the Third Party's
Contractual Relationships with Others
The legal questions in LamarAdvertising Co. v. Continental Casualty Co.
were whether the insurer had a duty to defend as well as a duty to indemnify
its insured, Lamar Advertising Company.6 35 Among other services, Lamar
sells advertising displays to municipalities for the latter's billboards, buses, bus
shelters, and benches throughout the United States.6 36 Between January 1999
and January 2002, Lamar wanted to expand its advertising business; therefore,
the company purchased two companies-Triumph Outdoor Holdings, L.L.C.
(Triumph), and Transit America Las Vegas, L.L.C. (Transit).637
Shortly after Lamar purchased Triumph and Transit, RAL Construction
Company sued Lamar's "predecessors in interest" as well as Lamar in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of California.631 "[T]he
California suit arose as a result of a contract dispute between RAL and
Lamar's predecessors in interest. ' ' 639 Under an agreement entitled the Transit
Shelter Maintenance and Construction Agreement (Agreement), RAL was the
exclusive provider of maintenance and construction services for Triumph and
Transit's bus shelters.64° The duration of the contract was for a period of "no
less than ten years."64
Lamar purchased Triumph and Transit before the Agreement expired, and
shortly thereafter, Lamar breached the Agreement and stopped using RAL's
642services. In addition, Lamar formed new contracts with municipalities and
decided not to purchase RAL's services for those jobs. 643 Claiming a breach
of contract, RAL commenced a lawsuit. 6" The original complaint only sought
breach-of-contract damages.645 RAL did not assert any tort-based actions or
claims.646
635. Lamar Adver. Co. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 396 F.3d 654 (5th Cir. Jan. 2005).
636. See Lamar Advertising Company, http://www.lamaroutdoor.com/main/products (last visited
Feb. 17, 2006).
637. Lamar, 396 F.3d at 657.
638. Id. at 656. The California suit or underlying suit was "a suit styled RAL Construction v. Lamar
Advertising Co. et at." Id. at 657.









TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
However, less than a year after filing the original complaint, RAL filed
a second amended complaint that contained additional claims.M4 More
specifically, along with the breach-of-contract action, RAL's amended
complaint outlined two tort-based causes against Lamar: (1) an action for the
interference with contractual relations, and (2) an action for the negligent
interference with prospective advantage. 6 8 Ultimately, Lamar and RAL settled
the California suit, but Lamar incurred over $1.8 million dollars in defense
costs and settlement payments. 649
In 1999, Lamar purchased a comprehensive general liability (CGL) policy
from Continental Casualty Company.650 The insurance contract commenced
January 1, 1999 and terminated January 1, 2002.61 Two pertinent coverage
provisions appeared in the CGL contract. 652 Under Coverage A, "Continental
agreed 'to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages [because of] property damage."''653 And "[u]nder Coverage B,
"Continental agree[d] 'to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of 'personal injury.' 65 4
During the policy period, Lamar sent two letters and copies of the original
and amended complaints to Continental.655 In one of the letters, Lamar asked
Continental to pay the cost of defending against RAL's lawsuit and to make
reimbursements for the cost of settling the underlying lawsuit.656 The insurer
refused to reimburse Lamar's expenditures for defending itself and for settling
the case.657 To determine whether Continental had a duty to defend as well as
a duty to indemnify, Lamar filed suit against Continental in a Louisiana
court.658 Continental removed the suit to a federal district court in Louisiana,
647. Id. at 657. "RAL filed a first amended complaint, but only named additional defendants; the
substantive assertions merely re-alleged the breach of contract claim." Id.
648. Id.




653. Id. at 657 (quoting general liability policy) (alteration in original). The policy defined "property
damage" in two ways: "(1) 'Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that
property... '; and (2) '[l]oss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured."' ld. at 658 n.3
(quoting general liability policy) (alteration and omission in original).
654. Id. at 658 (quoting general liability policy). The policy defined "personal injury" as follows:
"Personal injury" means injury, other than "bodily injury," arising out of one or more of the
following offenses:
d. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or
disparages a person's or organization's goods, products, or services....
Id. at 658 n.4 (quoting general liability policy) (omissions in original).
655. Id. at 657-58.





claiming diversity of citizenship.659
Lamar and Continental filed motions for summary judgment.' In its
motion, Lamar cited the CGL contract's two coverage provisions and RAL's
property-damage and personal-injury allegations in the second amended
complaint as being sufficient to establish Continental's duty to defend and
indemnify."' Specifically, in the underlying complaint, RAL asserted that
Lamar knew RAL had a "prior contractual relationship with Triumph and
Transit.' '662 Yet, Lamar interfered with that relationship by persuading
Triumph and Transit to terminate their contractual relationship with RAL. 66
RAL also asserted that Lamar negligently caused Triumph and Transit to
terminate their relationship with RAL (1) by inappropriately soliciting and
hiring RAL's employees and (2) by causing RAL's employees to disfavor
employment with RAL.66
After considering both parties' summary judgment motions and
examining Louisiana's law, the federal district judge ruled in favor of
Continental. 665 Lamar appealed its adverse ruling to the Fifth Circuit.'
Like Texas, Louisiana has embraced the eight corners rule to determine
whether an insurer has a duty to defend its insureds against third-party
lawsuits. 6  In Louisiana, an insurer must defend if an unambiguous coverage
provision covers the claims outlined by an underlying third party.668 In light
of this rule, the court of appeals carefully reviewed the underlying facts and
the two coverage clauses. 669 Lamar acknowledged that under Coverage A,
Continental was not liable for consequential economic damages if Lamar could
not establish that RAL's property experienced some physical injury.67 ° But
Lamar insisted that RAL's employees were considered property under the
CGL insurance contract.67' Therefore, Lamar's alleged interference with those
contractual relations was a covered tort under the contract, which required









667. See Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki, 230 So. 2d 253, 259 (La. 1969) (concluding an
"insurer's duty to defend suits brought against its insured is determined by the allegations of the injured
plaintiff's petition, with the insurer being obligated to furnish a defense unless the petition unambiguously
excludes coverage").
668. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Smith, 243 F. Supp. 2d 576, 580 (E.D. La. 2003) (applying Louisiana's
law).
669. Lamar, 396 F.3d at 660-65.
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thoroughly and intelligently considering the case law, flatly rejected Lamar's
assertion that RAL's employees were property.673 The Fifth Circuit dismissed
Lamar's first argument.
674
As stated earlier, RAL also alleged that Lamar negligently interfered with
RAL's prospective advantage.675  Therefore, according to Lamar, that
negligence claim fell squarely under Coverage B-within the scope of the
personal injury clause.676 But curiously and quite surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit
did not address the negligence issue.677 Instead, the court of appeals fashioned
Lamar's argument as follows:
Lamar contends that RAL asserted a claim for disparagement against Lamar
which was covered under Coverage B. Lamar points to RAL's allegation in
the second amended complaint stating that Lamar "wrongfully and
intentionally advised, counseled, persuaded, and otherwise induced [Lamar's
predecessors-in-interest] to terminate... their contractual agreement with
RPAL.
,,678
Then, the appellate court proceeded to discuss-ad nauseam-
Louisiana's defamation, disparagement, and libel laws. 679 Ultimately, the Fifth
673. Id. at 660-63 & n.6 ("Lamar has cited no controlling case authority .... [I]t merely points to
four cases it contends are analogous to the facts pleaded in the second amended complaint. We find three
of these cases inapposite, and the fourth case inapplicable on other grounds."); see Borden, Inc. v. Howard
Trucking Co., 454 So. 2d 1081, 1082-83 (La. 1983) (finding that a compressor was equipment rather than
a person and that the compressor was physically damaged); Nelson v. Want Ads of Shreveport, Inc., No.
31168-CA (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/30/98); 720 So. 2d 1280, 1282-83 (finding that coupons were tangible
property and that the insured had alleged facts sufficient to raise a claim for misappropriation or
conversion-sufficient to trigger coverage under the policy's definition of property); Dietrich v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 551 So. 2d 64, 65-67 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that the right to the benefit was intangible
property, but the employee's actual benefit was tangible property; and remanding the case to the trial court
to determine whether a breach of contract or obligation, or a tort conduct-as defined under the insurance
contract-caused the employee's loss); Williamson v. Historic Hurstville Ass'n, 556 So. 2d 103, 107 & n.2
(La. Ct. App. 1990). In Williamson, the court held that injury to reputation and loss of profitability
constitutes damages to tangible property within the meaning of a homeowner's policy, which "defin[ed]
'property damage' as 'physical injury to or destruction of tangible property including loss of its use."' Id.
The court, however, employed Webster's Dictionary to define tangible rather than using the Louisiana
Supreme Court's or the Louisiana Civil Code's definition to decide whether tangible property is corporeal
property. Id. at 107 n.2.
674. Lamar, 396 F.3d at 663.
675. Id. at 657.
676. Id. at 663.
677. See id. at 663-65.
678. Id. at 663 (emphasis added).
679. See id. at 664. The court stated:
Although Louisiana does not recognize disparagement as an independent tort, other jurisdictions
define disparagement as the "[d]efamation of the quality of goods or services," a standard that
is consistent with the language under Coverage B of Continental's policy. "An action for
defamation in Louisiana requires the plaintiff to plead and prove: (1) defamatory words,
(2) publication, (3) falsity, (4) malice, and (5) resulting injury.". . . Lamar cites no case in
support of the proposition that a disparagement claim may be "gleaned" from the face of a
complaint that contains no specific reference to defamatory words, falsity, malice, or publication
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Circuit found that Lamar's second argument did not "pass muster because the
factual allegations in RAL's second amended complaint [did] not state a cause
of action for disparagement."6 ' Therefore, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
federal district court's rulings were sound6"' and that Continental had no duty
to defend682 and no duty to indemnify.6"3 Clearly, the Fifth Circuit knows the
legal distinction between negligence-based and intentional torts and claims.
Upon careful review, the court's legal analysis in the latter part of Lamar
seriously undermines that prevailing view.
IV. A BRIEF STATISTICAL OVERVIEW: FIFTH CIRCUIT'S 2004-2005
INSURANCE DECISIONS
On other occasions, this Author presented brief statistical overviews and
dispositions of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals's insurance decisions.6"4
Those exercises proved revealing to both jurists and empiricists who sample
judicial decisions and look for trends as well as meaningful relationships
among legal and extralegal variables.685
to a third party. Although Louisiana case law requires a liberal interpretation of RAL's claims,
courts will not read into a complaint an allegation of defamation that has not been made.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
680. Id. at 664. "RAL's complaint made no specific allegation of any disparaging or defamatory oral
or written publication by Lamar." Id. at 663.
681. Id. at 666 ("For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of summary judgment and final
judgment in favor of Continental, dismissing Lamar's complaint, are hereby AFFIRMED.").
682. Id. at 665 ("Accordingly, we find [after plainly reading] the policy's terms, Coverage B's
definition of 'personal injury' does not encompass RAL's claims for breach of contract, tortious interference
with a contract, or wrongful solicitation and hiring of RAL's workforce, even under the most liberal
construction of RAL's pleadings.").
683. Id. at 665-66. The court stated the following:
Lamar also contends that... genuine issues of material fact [exist] concerning Continental's
obligation to indemnify it which preclude the district court's grant of the motion for summary
judgment. In support of this position, Lamar contends that the district court failed to consider
certain excerpts of deposition testimony proffered by Lamar which, according to Lamar, "at a
minimum" create a genuine factual dispute about whether "RAL was actually disparaged, or its
employees were actually raided, ... and whether these actions... caused property damage
and/or personal injury." Continental counters that because an insurer's duty to defend is broader
than its duty to indemnify, the district court's ruling that it owed no duty to defend Lamar is
dispositive of Lamar's indemnification claim.... Even assuming that consideration of extrinsic
evidence to determine coverage liability is proper in the absence of an ambiguity in the policy's
terms, these excerpts do not support Lamar's argument. As Continental correctly points out,
Lamar has not identified the relationships of each deponent to the parties in this litigation.
Moreover, it is impossible to discern whether some of them were RAL employees, Lamar
employees, or unrelated to those companies.... Lamar's contention that there exists a genuine
issue of material fact [regarding whether] Continental [has an] obligation to indemnify it is
therefore without merit. We, accordingly, affirm the district court's grant of the summary
judgment motion in favor of Continental.
Id.
684. See Willy E. Rice, Insurance Decisions-A Survey and An Empirical Analysis, 35 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 947, 1026-34 (2004); see also Rice, supra note 3, at 1017-29.
685. See Rice, supra note 684, at 1026-34; Rice, supra note 3, at 1017-29.
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But, like before, this Part does not present an extensive statistical review
of the Fifth Circuit's 2004-2005 insurance decisions. Put simply, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided only twenty-four cases.686 That small
number of cases does not allow one to conduct a more sophisticated statistical
examination to reveal the causal connection between the insureds' and
insurers' win-loss ratio and various legal and extralegal variables.
But a review of simple descriptive statistics-frequencies and percentages
-often reveals noteworthy or unanticipated patterns or both in judicial
opinions. Therefore, given those potential positive benefits, this Author
performed a content analysis of the twenty-four cases and reported a series of
simple descriptive statistics in three tables.687
First, Table A presents frequencies and percentages for some selected
demographic characteristics of insurers and insureds that petitioned the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals for relief in 2004-2005.688
686. See cases cited supra note I.
687. See Tables A-C, infra notes 689, 698, 715.
688. See Table A, infra note 689.
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TABLE A. SOME SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURANCE
-LAW LITIGANTS WHO PETITIONED THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS FOR REvIEw-2004-20056 9
Demographic Frequencies Percentages
Characteristics (N = 24) (100.0)




Federal Districts Where Cases Originated:
Louisiana-Eastern District 2 8.3
Louisiana-Middle District 2 8.3
Louisiana-Western District 1 4.2
Mississippi- Northern District 1 4.2
Mississippi-Southern District 3 12.5
Texas-Eastern District 1 4.2
Texas-Northern District 5 20.8
Texas-Southern District 8 33.3
Texas-Western District 1 4.2
Types of Plaintiffs:
Insured Individuals 15 62.5
Primary Insurers 2 8.3
Excess Insurers 2 8.3
Insured Corporations 4 16.7
Estate 1 4.2
Types of Insurance Contracts






Officers & Directors 1 4.2
689. Willy E. Rice, TABLE A. SOME SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARAcTERIsTIcs OF INSURANCE-
LAW LITIGANTS WHO PETIIONED THE FIFrH CIRCurr COURT OF APPEALS FOR REvIEw-2004-2005 (2006)
[hereinafter Table A].
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Types of Insurance Complaints:
First-Party Complaints 19 79.2
Third-Party Complaints 5 20.8
Nearly sixty-three percent (62.5%) of the cases originated in Texas, and
the remainder originated in Mississippi and Louisiana-12.5% and 25.0%,
respectively.690 But nearly sixty-seven percent (66.6%) of various actions
began in three federal district courts-the Southern District Court of
Mississippi (12.5%), the Northern District Court of Texas (20.8%), and the
Southern District Court of Texas (33.3%).691
While a variety of persons petitioned the Fifth Circuit for declaratory and
summary relief, the overwhelming majority were insured individuals (62.5%)
and insured corporations (16.7%).692 Furthermore, the overwhelming majority
of petitions involved first-party complaints-79.2%. 693 And while an equal
number of disputes involved automobile, property, and homeowners'
insurance contracts-1 2.5% respectively-disputes involving comprehensive
general liability insurance contracts comprised nearly forty-two percent
(41.7%) of the cases. 694
Table B presents frequencies and percentages for a number of legal
variables. 695 During the 2004-2005 session, class-action suits comprised less
than five percent (4.0%) of the cases.696 Overwhelmingly, the greater majority
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TABLE B. THEORIES OF RECOVERY, REMEDIES, AND THE DISPOSmON OF
INSURANCE-LAW ACTIONS IN FEDERAL DIsTRICT COURTS AND
IN THE FIFrH CIRCUr COURT OF APPEALS-2004-2005 698
Theories of Recovery, Remedies & Frequencies Percentages
Outcomes (N = 24) (100.0)
Types of Actions:
Individual Actions 23 96.0
Class Actions 1 4.0
tPetitioners' Legal Theories (Causes):
Breach of Contract 17 70.8
Declaratory Judgment 13 54.2
Negligence/Bad-Faith 5 20.8
Fraud 3 12.5
Equitable Subrogation 1 4.2
Unfair Business Practices 2 8.3
tRemedies Sought:
Declaratory Relief 13 54.2
Actual Damages 7 29.2
Legal Defense 7 29.2
Indemnification 10 41.6
Grounds for Disposing Cases in Federal
District Courts:
On the Merits 15 62.5
Procedurally 9 37.5
Disposition of Cases in Federal District Courts:
Plaintiffs/Insureds Won 9 37.5
Defendants/Insurers Won 15 62.5
Disposition of Cases in the Fifth Circuit Court:
Plaintiffs/Insureds Won 10 41.7
Defendants/Insurers Won 14 58.3
698. Willy E. Rice, THEORIES OF RECOVERY, REMEDIES, AND THE DISPOSMON OF INSURANCE-LAW
ACTIONS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS AND IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL-2004-2005 (2006)
[hereinafter Table B].
TEXAS TECH L4W REVIEW
Litigants' Success-Failure Rate Before the
Fifth Circuit:
Affirmed for Insurers/Defendants 9 37.5
Affirmed for Insureds/Plaintiffs 3 12.5
Reversed Against Insureds/Plaintiffs 4 16.7
Reversed Against Insurers/Defendants 5 20.8
Affirmed & Reversed in Part 3 12.5
t Multiple causes of action appeared in several cases; therefore, the reported percentages
can exceed one-hundred percent.
Second, the insureds and insurance companies petitioned the Fifth Circuit
and the federal district courts for a variety of remedies under an array of
recovery theories. 699 Plaintiffs-insureds commenced breach-of-contract actions
in nearly seventy-one percent (70.8%) of the cases; and, about forty-two
percent (41.6%) filed tort-based actions-negligence, bad faith, fraud, and
unfair practices-against various insurers." But in fifty-four percent (54.2%)
of the lawsuits, insurance companies and consumers initiated declaratory-
judgment actions, asking the courts for declaratory relief under a variety of
insurance contracts. 0
Litigants petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a variety of remedies. Once
more, in about fifty-four percent (54.2%) of the cases, insureds and insurers
asked the court of appeals for declaratory relief.7°2 In nearly thirty-percent
(29.2%) and forty-two percent (41.6%) of cases, respectively, insureds asked
the Fifth Circuit to declare that insurers had a duty to defend and indemnify
insureds. 70 3 Additionally, in nearly thirty percent (29.2%) of the cases, the
complainants asked the Fifth Circuit to award actual damages.M
What were plaintiffs-insureds' and defendants-insurers' success-failure
ratios in the district courts and in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals? The
reported percentages reveal that the federal courts were substantially more
likely to rule against plaintiffs-insureds.0 5 More specifically, the federal
district courts decided in favor of the defendants-insurers an astounding sixty-
three percent (62.5%) of the time.7°6 But on appeal, that percentage decreased
only slightly. The Fifth Circuit decided in favor of the defendants-insurers












percentages and outcomes are very similar to 2002-2003 and 2003-2004
reported findings.7"8
The last displayed percentages in Table B represent a breakdown of the
litigants' success-failure ratio before the Fifth Circuit.7°9 Those percentages
provide some added information about plaintiffs-insureds' and defendants-
insurers' likelihood of prevailing on appeal. First, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
thirty-eight percent (37.5%) of the federal district courts' decisions in favor of
the insurers and reversed in favor of the insurers seventeen percent (16.7%) of
the district courts' pro-insureds decisions.10 On the other hand, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed just thirteen percent (12.5%) of the district courts' pro-insured
decisions, while reversing twenty-one percent (20.8%) of the district courts'
pro-insurer decisions.71' These findings support what other judicial studies
consistently uncover: On average, federal courts of appeals have a higher
propensity to decide in favor of defendants than in favor of plaintiffs.1 2
Finally, Table C illustrates and compares the dispositions of the insurance
cases among the federal district courts and in the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 713 The reported percentages show the relationships between a few
selected background variables and the litigants' likelihood of success.714
708. See Rice, supra note 684, at 1027 n.793; Rice, supra note 3, at 1022-23.
709. See Table B, supra note 698.
710. Id.
711. Id.
712. See Rice, supra note 684, at 1026 nn.787-89 and accompanying text.
713. See Table C, infra note 715.
714. Id.
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First, the types of insurance complaints affected insureds and insurers'
likelihood of prevailing.7t 6 Among the district court cases, insurers won sixty-
three percent (63.2%) of the time if the underlying lawsuit involved a first-
party claim; insurers won an equally impressive sixty-percent (60.0%) of cases
in the district courts when litigants asked district judges to determine whether
insurers had a duty to settle or defend insureds against third-party claims.7 17
However, after the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district courts' rulings, the
percentages did not change substantially overall. On appeal, insurers still won
sixty percent (60.0%) of the cases if the underlying lawsuit involved a third-
party claim.71 8 But insurers won fifty-eight percent (57.9%) of cases in the
court of appeals if the controversy concerned whether insurers had a duty to
pay or settle a first-party claim in an underlying lawsuit.719
Second, among the actions decided in the federal district courts, insureds
had a slight, an equal, or a greater likelihood of winning only if they
(1) resided in Texas (46.7%), (2) filed their complaints in the Middle District
Court of Louisiana (50.0%), or (3) commenced their action in the Northern
District Court of Texas (80.0%).7" ° However, in all other instances, insurance
companies had the greater likelihood of prevailing in the federal district
courts.721 Insurers definitely experienced this rate of success if their principal
places of business were located in Louisiana or Mississippi; the reported
percentages are 83.3% and 66.7%, respectively.722
Furthermore, an examination of litigants' probability of winning before
the Fifth Circuit did not reveal an overabundance of dramatic reversals. First,
as reported above, insureds that lived in Texas won a modest forty-seven
percent (46.7%) of the cases in the federal district courts.72 3 But before the
Fifth Circuit, insured Texans won an impressive sixty percent (60.0%) of the
cases.724 On the other hand, defendants-insurers still had the greater likelihood
of prevailing before the Fifth Circuit if their principal places of business were
located in Louisiana and in Mississippi; the reported percentages are 83.3%
and 100%, respectively.725
Also, barring one significant instance, the insureds-plaintiffs experienced
considerably less success before the Fifth Circuit--depending on the location
of the district court in which they commenced their lawsuits. In the Southern
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cases.726 However, before the Fifth Circuit, those same litigants prevailed fifty
percent (50.0%) of the time.7 27
But insureds who filed their complaints in the Northern District Court of
Texas won eight percent (80.0%) of the cases in that court; but, before the
Fifth Circuit, they won slightly less--66.0%.
728
The central finding is clear: On average, insurers-defendants had a
significantly larger likelihood of prevailing in the federal district courts as well
as before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. These results materialized
whether insureds filed first- or third-party complaints against the insurers or
whether the federal courts applied Louisiana's, Mississippi's, or Texas's legal
principles.
V. CONCLUSION
The thoroughness, intelligibility, and soundness of the Fifth Circuit's
2004-2005 insurance-law decisions closely mirrored that appellate court's
decisions between late 2002 and early 2004. Stated simply, the quality of the
twenty-four decisions were extremely inconsistent. Without doubt, several
decisions and analyses were stellar. But more often than not, the intelligibility
and richness of the opinions were less than ideal.
Additionally, this Author's prior Fifth Circuit reviews stated the reasons
for the marginal presentations.729 First, like before, far too many legal
questions were not thoroughly researched. Often, the court cited several
irrelevant cases and overlooked many relevant decisions to reach an arguably
strained and less than fair conclusion. Second, as before, the Fifth Circuit
continues to embrace and apply the "law of the panel," which prevents one
panel from overruling another panel's ruling.730 But more problematic, the
Fifth Circuit applies its "law of the circuit" too frequently-when the
application of settled Louisiana's, Mississippi's, and Texas's rules would be
more appropriate. 3
Again, this Author stresses what has been stressed before. Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas have adopted and consistently apply five standard




729. See Rice, supra note 684, at 1035-36; Rice, supra note 3, at 1029-30.
730. See St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1255 (5th Cir. 1998) (reaffirming
doctrine that one panel of the Fifth Circuit cannot overrule another); Broussard v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 665
F.2d 1387, 1389 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (declaring that absent an intervening change in the law, one panel
cannot overturn another panel's ruling).
731. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vest Transp. Co., 666 F.2d 932,948 (5th Cir. 1982)




construction and interpretation,732 (2) the doctrine of plain meaning,733 (3) the
adhesion doctrine, 73 (3) the doctrine of ambiguity,735 and (5) the doctrine of
reasonable expectations.736 However, federal district courts rarely apply these
rules, preferring instead to issue highly questionable summary judgments.
And the Fifth Circuit rarely applies these doctrines consistently to help
decipher the meaning of obtuse words and phrases and to determine insurers'
and insureds' rights and obligations under various insurance contracts.
Without doubt, the time has arrived for each panel within the Fifth Circuit to
study, embrace, and apply the five doctrines outlined above more carefully and
consistently. Very likely, after implementing those changes, the overall clarity,
soundness, and predictability of the Fifth Circuit's insurance-law decisions
will improve substantially.
732. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Concord Gen. Corp., 95-0809 (La. 1/6/96); 665 So. 2d 1166, 1169
(holding that "[a]n insurance policy is an agreement between the parties and should be interpreted by using
ordinary contract principles"); Sessoms v. Allstate Ins. Co., 634 So. 2d 516, 519 (Miss. 1993) (embracing
the position that "insurance policies which are clear and unambiguous are to be enforced according to their
terms as written [like all other contracts]"); Balandran v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 972 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex.
1998) (reiterating that insurance contracts are subject to the same rules of construction as other contracts).
733. See, e.g., La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 93-0911 (La. 1/8/94); 630 So. 2d
759, 763 (holding that the parties' intent must "be determined in accordance with the general, ordinary, plain
and popular meaning of the words used in the policy"); Blackledge v. Omega Ins. Co., 740 So. 2d 295, 298
(Miss. 1999) (holding that courts must give terms used in insurance policies their ordinary and popular
definition); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of Tex., 337 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Tex. 1960) (reiterating that
courts must give words appearing in insurance contracts their plain meaning when there is no ambiguity).
734. See, e.g., Duncan v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 99-232 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/3/99); 747 So. 2d 656,674
(observing that "[i]t is well settled that.., insurance policies are generally contracts of adhesion"); Lewis
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 97-CA-00183-SCT (134) (Miss. 1998); 730 So. 2d 65, 72 (concluding that "[i]nsurance
policies are contracts of adhesion and as such ambiguities are to be construed liberally in favor of the
insured and against the insurer"); Arnold v. Nat'l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex.
1987) (concluding without deciding definitively that insurance contracts are adhesion contracts because they
"arise out of the parties' unequal bargaining power" and they "allow unscrupulous insurers to take advantage
of their insureds' misfortunes" during the bargaining process).
735. See, e.g., Succession of Fannaly v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 2001-1355 (La. 1/15/02); 805 So. 2d
1134,1138 (repeating that an "ambiguous contractual provision is construed against the insurer who
furnished the contract's text and in favor of the insured"); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636 So. 2d
658, 662 (Miss. 1994) (embracing "the general rule that [ambiguous] provisions of an insurance contract are
to be construed strongly against the [insurance company]"); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co.,
811 S.w.2d 552, 555 (Tex. 1991) (reaffirming that ambiguous language in an insurance contract must be
construed in favor of the insured).
736. See, e.g., Leblanc v. Babin, 00-1813 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/24/01); 786 So. 2d 850 (holding that a
court should construe an insurance contract "to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the parties in the light
of the customs and usages of the industry"); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Miss., Inc., 427 So. 2d
139, 141 n.2 (Miss. 1983) (adopting the principle that "[tihe objectively reasonable expectations of
applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations"); Kulubis v. Tex. Farm
Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 1986) (permitting an innocent victim whose
property had been destroyed to collect under an insurance contract for loss "reasonably expected" to be
covered). But see, Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 145 n.8 (Tex. 1994) (observing that
Texas law does not recognize the doctrine of reasonable expectation as a basis to disregard unambiguous
policy provisions).
